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It is all but universally accepted in epistemology that knowledge is factive: S knows 
that p only if p. The purpose of this thesis is to present an argument against the 
factivity of knowledge and in doing so develop a non-factive approach to the 
analysis of knowledge. The argument against factivity presented here rests largely 
on empirical evidence, especially extant research into visuomotor noise, which 
suggests that the beliefs that guide everyday motor action are not strictly true. 
However, as we still want to attribute knowledge on the basis of successful motor 
action, I argue that the best option is to replace factivity with a weaker constraint on 
knowledge, one on which certain false beliefs might still be known. In defence of 
this point, I develop the non-factive analysis of knowledge, which demonstrates that 





Do you know where your hands are? Or where the objects around you are? Or how 
many “7” is? It certainly seems like it, doesn’t it? But the way that our brains work 
means that we need to think about this a bit more. What if things aren’t actually 
where it looks like they are, but they’re still very close to where it looks like they are? 
What if how big we think numbers are is not exactly how big they actually are? We 
can still say that we know these things, but we might have to think about knowing 
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Chapter One:  
Background and Introduction 
 
 
This chapter has two primary aims. The first of these is to introduce the project of 
this thesis and provide a general outline of its argument. This will be addressed in 
section one, in which I’ll discuss, chapter-by-chapter, the key arguments of 
subsequent chapters. In doing so, I hope to make clear both in what sense and on 
what grounds I advance the non-factive analysis of knowledge. The second aim of 
this chapter is to provide an overview of relevant background information. This will 
include extant philosophical discussion of the factivity of knowledge (§2), localizing 
this project within epistemology, especially with respect to epistemological 




1. Chapter Overview 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to argue in favour of a non-factive analysis of 
knowledge. At its most basic, this project might be thought of as reducing to one 
key claim: Non-factive analyses of knowledge more successfully capture our 
intuitive judgements than do factive analyses.1 There are two sorts of ways I’ll argue 
for this claim. First, I’ll argue that non-factive analyses of knowledge can account for 
intuitive judgements that factive analyses cannot account for. That is, in certain 
cases our intuitive judgements about knowledge conflict with factivity. This is the 
most demanding aspect of this project, and encompasses material in chapters two, 
three, and five. Second, I’ll also argue that factive analyses of knowledge do not 
capture any intuitive judgements that a non-factive analysis cannot also capture. 
This is the primary task of chapter four. In short, we might replace factivity with a 
weaker, non-factive constraint on knowledge without losing any ability to capture 
our intuitions. This is what I call the “viability” of the non-factive analysis of 
knowledge. 
Before continuing with an overview of each chapter, I briefly want to note 
two things. First, the above is of course only a rudimentary sketch and is intended 
only to play a familiarizing role. Second, my arguments for non-factive knowledge 
rest largely on empirical evidence. This empirical evidence is used primarily to 
establish specific features of the representational content that forms the basis of 




1 It is worth noting that this isn’t the only argument advanced for non-factive knowledge. Developed 
in parallel with it is a secondary argument that factive analyses invite a skeptical problem that non-
factive analyses might easily avoid. This anti-skeptical argument functions as something of a stopgap 
for the primary argument from intuitive judgements. That is, even if you don’t grant there are 
judgements about knowledge that violate factivity, there remains the problem that factive analyses 




1.1 Chapter Two: Empirical Foundations 
 
Chapter two provides a detailed account of the primary empirical evidence on 
which my subsequent argument against the factivity of knowledge is based. It 
assumes a simple structure, detailing the empirical support for four key claims:  
 
(1) Perception can occur in the absence of consciousness.  
(2) The same information is often represented internally in a multitude of ways.  
(3) The mental content that guides motor action is not reflectively accessible.  
(4) The mental content that guides motor action is not perfectly accurate.  
 
As I’ll discuss in depth, all four of these claims are widely accepted in cognitive 
neuroscience, and enjoy a broad range of support from behavioural, 
neuropsychological, and neuroimaging evidence. The first two of these claims play 
a preliminary, background role. While my subsequent arguments will not directly 
rely on them, without first establishing them, it’s unclear how one might understand 
the subsequent claims. These latter claims, (3) and (4), provide the empirical 
foundation for the argument against factivity. Together, they paint a picture of the 
mental content guiding motor action that appears quite different from what we 
might otherwise assume when considering knowledge and action. The most 
important role in my argument is played by claim (4). As I argue in chapter three, 
this inaccuracy in the mental content guiding motor action, “visuomotor noise,” 
poses an intractable problem for the factivity of knowledge. 
 
1.2 Chapter Three: Against the Factivity of Knowledge 
 
In chapter three I present my primary argument against the factivity of knowledge. 
The argument is structured as three initially plausible assumptions that lead to an 
undesirable conclusion: 
 
(1) The mental content that guides motor action is (a) reflectively inaccessible 
and (b) not perfectly accurate.  
 
(2) Perceptual beliefs guide motor action. 
 
(3) Knowledge is factive. 
 
(C) The everyday perceptual beliefs that guide successful motor action 
cannot be known. 
 
Assumption (1) is the conjunction of claims (3) and (4) from chapter two. Their initial 
plausibility derives from the significant empirical support detailed in chapter two. 
Assumption (2) is initially plausible as it is simply the product of our ordinary 
practice of belief attribution. Under ordinary circumstances, we readily attribute 




in the next section, the initial plausibility of assumption (3) reduces to it being all 
but universally accepted in epistemology.  
The conclusion (C) is undesirable on multiple fronts. First, since we often 
judge that the beliefs we attribute on the basis of motor action are indeed known, 
accepting (C) requires us to go against our intuitive judgements about knowledge. 
Moreover, accepting (C) is a type of skeptical result, insofar as it means accepting 
that we have less knowledge than we ordinarily assume we do. Over the course of 
chapter three, I argue at length, not only that (C) follows from (1)-(3), but also that 
the best option is rejecting assumption (3). That is, this is a real problem, and the 
best solution to this problem is to reject the factivity of knowledge.  
Rather than discussing the details of this argument, here I simply want to 
highlight the key ways in which it supports the overall project of this thesis. While 
one might simply grant that of course an argument against the factivity of 
knowledge motivates the non-factive analysis of knowledge, the specifics are a bit 
more complex than this. To see this, it is important to distinguish between three 
claims: 
 
(i) Factive accounts of knowledge invite a skeptical problem that non-factive 
accounts don’t. 
 
(ii) Factive accounts of knowledge cannot explain judgements about 
knowledge that non-factive accounts can. 
 
(iii) We should reject the factivity of knowledge. 
 
Chapter three will make all these claims, specifically using (i) and (ii) in support for 
(iii). However, it is important that we don’t take (iii), the conclusion of the chapter 
three, to itself support the argument in subsequent chapters. Rather, it is (i) and (ii) 
that play a direct role in the argument for a non-factive analysis of knowledge. In 
fact, in this project, the fact that a non-factive analysis of knowledge works better 
than a factive one is taken to support (iii), not the other way around. 
 
1.3 Chapter Four: The Factivoid Analysis of Knowledge 
 
Chapter four is devoted to the development of the non-factive analysis of 
knowledge. The primary argument I advance in this chapter is that the non-factive 
analysis of knowledge does not suffer from any novel misattribution of knowledge. 
That is, non-factive analyses of knowledge can explain all the same intuitive 
judgements that factive analyses do. As already mentioned, I call this the viability of 
the non-factive analysis of knowledge. In order to demonstrate this, I present three 
candidate non-factive analyses of knowledge. The first of these is a non-factive 
version of justified true belief (JTB), and the second is a non-factive version of 
robust virtue epistemology (RVE). While neither of these non-factive proposals 
solves the problems of the factive analyses on which they are based, the important 
point here is that they don’t encounter any novel misattribution. In short, in 
addition to handling cases, like those involving visuomotor noise, that factive 




counterparts can. This is the central idea behind this chapter, and indeed this 
project. 
Additionally, I also propose a third, especially speculative account of 
knowledge that, while utilizing the RVE framework, represents a radical departure 
from standard epistemology. This account seeks to unify propositional knowledge, 
practical knowledge (knowledge-how), and psycho-cognitive knowledge (the sense 
in which “knowledge” is used in large bodies of empirical literature) all under a 
single concept. The key point here is that this sort of unifying project is something 
with obvious advantages that are only attainable under a non-factive conception of 
knowledge. My intention is by no means to argue that this is a perfect analysis of 
knowledge. Indeed, my design with this chapter is not to advance any account with 
the intention that we take it to be the analysis of knowledge.2 The purpose of this 
chapter is to argue that if there is such a thing as the analysis of knowledge, it is 
going to be a non-factive. 
 
1.4 Chapter Five: Generalization 
 
The final chapter of this thesis covers topics that might be collectively labelled 
“generalization.” The discussions contained within this chapter are largely 
independent from one another. Most of the chapter involves additional empirical 
arguments against the factivity of knowledge. Looking beyond visuomotor noise, 
we find that other bodies of empirical research suggest a similar sort of argument. 
The most promising of these emerges from the noisy analogue magnitude 
representations that guide judgements about numerical and temporal magnitude. I 
also discuss examples from proprioception and other cases of perception. Here it’s 
important to note that the promise of additional arguments against factivity plays a 
key role in the argument presented in previous chapters. The larger the set 
apparent knowledge that cannot be captured by a factive analysis, the more severe 
the skeptical problem invited by retaining factivity. Since my argument against 
accepting the factivity of knowledge relies in part on our desire to avoid any serious 
risk of skepticism, this argument is strengthened by this chapter’s contribution on 
new empirical problems for factivity. Additionally, I end the chapter by briefly 
addressing future prospects for further generalization. 
 
 
2. The Factivity of Knowledge 
 
It is all but universally accepted in epistemology that knowledge is factive: S knows 
that p only if p. As put by Armstrong: 
 
I do not think that there has ever been any serious doubt that it is a 





2 We might of course note that there is no widely accepted analysis of knowledge, and all prominent 




As put by Davidson: 
 
Everyone agrees that what is known must be true. (1988, 177) 
 
As put by Turri: 
 
One of the very few things that epistemologists of all stripes agree on is that 
knowledge requires truth – or as it’s often put, that knowledge is factive. We 
have seen controversy over whether knowledge requires justification and 
whether knowledge requires belief, but not whether it requires truth. (2011, 
141) 
 
As put by Pritchard and Kelp: 
 
Factivity seems to play an important—indeed, indispensable—role in any 
plausible theory of knowledge. (2010, 330) 
 
As put by Plato: 
 
Socrates: And will a man ever have knowledge of anything the truth of 
which he fails to attain? 
Theaetetus: How can he, Socrates? (186c-d) 
 
In short, the idea that knowledge is factive dates as far back as Plato3 and remains 
epistemological orthodoxy to this day. Beyond this, there is little more to say about 
the fact that almost everyone in philosophy accepts that knowledge is factive, and I 
won’t belabour the point more than I already have. Instead, in this section I’ll 
provide a brief overview of the standard arguments taken to motivate factivity, after 
which I’ll discuss two notable examples in which the orthodoxy has, to varying 
degrees, been challenged: Ackerman’s “Pragmatic Analysis” (1973) and Hazlett’s 
“Myth of Factive Verbs” (2010). In doing so, I hope to both introduce the main 
challenges a non-factive analysis of knowledge might face, as well as distinguish 
the claims of this project from those made previously. 
 
2.1 Why Factivity? 
 
The most frequently cited motivation for the factivity of knowledge is that it is able 
to explain our intuition that utterances both like and of the form “S knows that p, 
and not p” seem incoherent or contradictory (Ackermann 1973; Kalpan 2006; 
Tsohatzidis 2012; Hannon 2013). If knowledge is factive, then S knowing that p 
entails p. Thus, such utterances seem contradictory simply because they are 
contradictory. While I will return to this argument shortly (§2.3), as well as in chapter 
four, section four, there is little more to say about it here. In the light of the 
arguments that will unfold in the interim, upon returning to this matter I hope to 
have demonstrated that this doesn’t offer a compelling argument in favour of 
factivity.  
																																																								




Although it’s easy to confuse with the above argument, there is a second, 
distinct argument one might give in defence of the factivity of knowledge. Rather 
than appealing to our linguistic judgements about when utterances seem 
contradictory, one might instead appeal to our epistemic judgements about when 
beliefs are known. Upon surveying all those beliefs we take to be known, it doesn’t 
appear that any known beliefs are false. If we take a known belief and stipulate that 
it’s false, we no longer judge that it is known. For example, if we begin with my 
knowledge that the capital of Scotland is Edinburgh, and then imagine a 
counterfactual in which the capital is secretly moved to Aberdeen, we no longer 
judge that I know that the Edinburgh is the capital. Conversely, if we take a 
seemingly false belief that otherwise seems to fit the bill for knowledge, and 
stipulate that it is true because of this, we then judge that that belief is known. 
All these observations about our epistemic judgements can be explained if 
we take knowledge to be factive, and it’s unclear how we might otherwise explain 
them without factivity. In short, factivity plays a significant explanatory role for our 
theories of knowledge. This is what I think Pritchard and Kelp are getting at when 
they talk about the “important—indeed, indispensable—role in any plausible 
theory of knowledge” played by factivity (2010, 330). Moreover, at least from an 
epistemological perspective, I think this is the primary challenge to any non-factive 
account of knowledge: It needs to replicate the explanatory power of factivity by 
different means. Accordingly, this is the primary challenge my non-factive project is 
geared to face. Especially in chapter four, I’ll argue that non-factive accounts of 
knowledge can be just as explanatorily successful as factive ones, indeed more so. 
Finally, in the support of the factivity of knowledge one might also appeal to 
a general intuitive sense that knowledge is factive. That is, knowledge just seems 
like a factive sort of thing. While I won’t dispute that this general intuition is likely 
widespread, we might note here that general intuition is not all that evidentially 
valuable. It famously might be overridden by both specific epistemic judgements, 
as in Gettier cases (1963), and for anti-skeptical reasons, as in the case of 
infallibilism (see Cohen 1988). As my argument against factivity appeals both to 
epistemic judgements and anti-skepticism, we can consider it to simply override 
any general intuitive sense we might otherwise have about knowledge being 
factive. 
 
2.2 Ackermann’s Pragmatic Analysis 
 
As far as I can determine, a genuinely non-factive analysis of knowledge has been 
proposed exactly once in contemporary epistemology. This is the so-named 
“Pragmatic Analysis” offered by Robert J. Ackermann in his obscure 1973 
monograph Belief and Knowledge. Apart from a perplexed reviewer remarking, 
“He seems to attack the truth condition . . . It is not clear to me why he does this.” 
(Annis 1974, 82), Ackermann’s analysis doesn’t appear to have attracted any 
significant attention, either contemporarily or in the decades since. As I will discuss 
in this section, there is likely good reason for this. To be clear, this thesis is in no 
way inspired by Ackermann’s analysis, nor does it share any meaningful similarities 
beyond being non-factive. In fact, I maintain that it appears that Ackermann’s 




non-factive analysis of knowledge in the wild, I think it is worth discussing here, if 
only for historical purposes. At the very least, it provides a good example of the 
pitfalls such attempts might stumble into. 
In Belief and Knowledge, Ackermann distinguishes between two different 
types of analyses of knowledge. The first type of analysis of knowledge is the 
familiar one on which knowledge entails belief and truth, which he dubs the “Ideal 
Analysis” (1973, 74). However, after introducing the Ideal Analysis, he maintains, 
“There is a line of attack on [the factivity constraint] that has not received much 
attention in the literature” (ibid, 74).4 This is the argument that ultimately leads him 
to a second type of analysis, the non-factive “Pragmatic Analysis” of knowledge 
(ibid, 76). The starting point for this argument is a “partial analysis” he provides for 
first-person knowledge assertions: 
 
To say “I know that p” is to assert that one can meet all relevant non-
metaphysical objections to p. (ibid, 67) 
 
Although Ackermann (somewhat perplexingly) doesn’t refer to it as such, this is 
simply a relevant alternatives account of knowledge, on which “knowing p requires 
ruling out all relevant alternatives to p” (Luper 2016). Most noteworthy about this 
claim is that it has a strong intuitive appeal (see Carter and Pritchard 2016, §1) but 
famously runs into problems when coupled with epistemic closure (Dretske 1970). 
Especially considering that Ackermann fails to even acknowledge these problems, 
we might note this to be the first major shortcoming of the Pragmatic Analysis. 
Ackermann then notes that on the above partial analysis, saying “I know that 
p” can mean asserting either of the following (emphasis mine): 
 
One can meet all current relevant non-metaphysical objections to p. 
 
One can meet all possible relevant non-metaphysical objections to p.  
(1973, 75) 
 
Ackermann observes that the first of these readings is incompatible with the Ideal 
Analysis, as one might correctly assert knowledge despite there existing some 
future objection that ultimately proves p to be false (ibid, 76). However, at this 
point Ackermann does something quite unexpected. Rather that simply discarding 
the first read on the grounds that it conflicts with the truth condition on knowledge, 
he instead proposes the Pragmatic Analysis, which is compatible with this read. He 
summarizes this analysis in the following way: 
 
There are several points to notice about the Pragmatic Analysis. Suppose 
Kap5 can be asserted. It is compatible with this that ~p is true. Now suppose 
that some new relevant non-metaphysical objection to p is discovered which 
can’t be met. (In a sense, this raises the possibility that, compatibly with 
																																																								
4 It’s unclear here whether by using the word “much” Ackermann means to indicate that this argument 
has received some, but little, attention, or if he’s unaware of any such attention but wants to play it 
safe. At no point in the monograph does Ackermann reference any previous attempt to argue against 
factivity. 




current knowledge, ~p might be true.) Kap is no longer true. Should ~p now 
be discovered true, then Kap is certainly not true. We have the same 
situation that we had on the Ideal Analysis, ~p and Kap cannot be jointly 
asserted by a rational agent. The different in the situation is provided by 
involvement with temporality. On both analyses, once ~p is found out to be 
true, one must conclude that a rational agent can’t know that p. The 
difference comes in connection with our attitude towards past knowledge 
claims. On the Ideal Analysis, if ~p is true, one could never have known that 
p. On the Pragmatic Analysis, the situation is somewhat different. (ibid, 76) 
 
Here we might make a few key observations about Ackermann’s argument. First, he 
clearly assumes that the assertability of “S knows that p” to entail that S knows that 
p. This is a perfectly reasonable assumption, as it is widely accepted that 
assertability entails truth (see Turri 2016). This allows Ackermann to use our 
judgements that knowledge assertions in certain cases are acceptable as evidence 
for knowledge in those cases, which is the primary method he employs. Next, and 
most significantly, he takes there to be legitimate cases of knowledge assertion 
even when it turns out the known proposition wasn’t actually true. The following is 
one example he provides: 
 
I used to know that if I pressed button A, the temperature would reach safe 
levels within ten minutes. (1973, 77) 
 
Ackermann imagines this might be asserted by a scientist in response to the 
“unexpected performance” of an apparatus (ibid, 77). Even in the case that the 
scientist’s belief turned out to be false, he considers the above perfectly assertable, 
which entails that the scientist really did have knowledge. Thus, the Pragmatic 
Analysis seems to capture “facts about the way in which we ordinarily conceive of 
knowledge” that factive analyses cannot (ibid, 77). Ackermann goes on to argue 
that Pragmatic Analysis is more explanatory than factive analyses, especially in 
ordinary cases in which we assert knowledge despite not having access to all 
relevant alternatives (ibid, 108-115). In short, Ackermann takes his non-factive 
Pragmatic Analysis of knowledge to be explanatorily successful in a broader range 
of cases than the factive Ideal Analysis. 
Although noteworthy, Ackermann’s argument is obviously flawed. The most 
prominent problem is that he confuses the acceptability of utterances for their 
literal assertability. Yes, we will often say things as in the “temperature button” 
example, stating that we used to know a proposition that later proved to be false, 
and there seems to be nothing unacceptable about this practice. However, it is a 
mistake to think that we literally assert knowledge in these cases. Rather, we are 
instead asserting along the lines that we believed that p or thought we knew that p, 
not that we actually ever had knowledge that p. This becomes especially obvious if 
we move away from our linguistic judgements regarding utterances, and instead 
simply look at our epistemic judgements. If we consider whether the scientist ever 
actually knew that if he pushed button A then the temperature would reach safe 
levels within ten minutes, given that that wasn’t true, our intuitive judgement is 




examples in which “knows” is used in a non-factive way, we don’t actually judge 
that S has knowledge in these cases.  
The obvious lesson here is that while sometimes “knows” is used in a non-
factive way, this does not itself motivate a departure from the factive analysis of 
knowledge. For this, we need cases in which we actually judge a false belief to be 
knowledge.6 We’ll see something quite similar with the “protagonist projection” 
discussed in the following section. 
 
2.3 Hazlett’s “The Myth of Factive Verbs” 
 
Easily the most familiar contemporary objection to the factivity of knowledge is 
Allan Hazlett’s 2010 “The Myth of Factive Verbs.” As with Ackermann, Hazlett’s 
argument is based on non-factive uses of “knows” in ordinary language. However, 
Hazlett’s account differs from Ackermann’s in two major respects. First, Hazlett 
does not maintain that the epistemological concept of knowledge is non-factive. 
Unlike Ackermann, he doesn’t propose, or even suggest, a non-factive analysis of 
knowledge. Second, upon its publication Hazlett’s argument attracted a significant 
amount of attention. Unlike Ackermann, Hazlett’s account is well known, spawning 
a number of objections in the literature. My review of Hazlett will follow these two 
points. First I’ll introduce his argument, after which I’ll discuss one of the major 
objections that has been raised against this argument. In doing so, I’ll contrast 
Hazlett’s claims with the ones I’ll advance here. Distinguishing between Hazlett’s 
claims and my own serves a valuable clarificatory role for this project. As both our 
arguments and conclusions are almost entirely distinct, it would be a mistake to 
consider this project to be a continuation of, or spiritual successor to, the “Myth of 
Factive Verbs” argument. 
Hazlett’s account is based on seemingly acceptable utterances that use 
purportedly factive verbs in non-factive ways. These verbs include “learns,” 
“remembers,” and “realizes,” but here I’ll discuss his argument only as it pertains 
to “knows.” Hazlett maintains utterances like the following seem acceptable, 
despite using “knows” (or “knew”) in a non-factive way: 
 
Everyone knew that stress caused ulcers, before two Australian doctors in 
the early 80s proved that ulcers are actually caused by bacterial infection. 
 
He figures anything big enough to sink the ship they’re going to see in time 
to turn. But the ship’s too big, with too small a rudder …  it can’t corner 
worth [expletive]. Everything he knows is wrong. (2010, 501)7 
 
On the basis of the seemingly acceptable non-factive usage of “knows” and 
“knew” in ordinary language, Hazlett argues that the ordinary concept of 
knowledge is non-factive (ibid, §4). Here I’d like to note that this is one major 
difference between my argument and Hazlett’s, as I make no use of intuitive 
																																																								
6 Of course, one might also make the argument on other theoretical grounds, such as avoiding a 
skeptical risk. As already mentioned, I employ this sort of argument alongside one based on actual 
judgements of knowledge for false belief. 
7 As cited by Hazlett, the first example is adapted from Achenbach (2005), and the second is Brock to 




judgements about the acceptability of utterances, or any other sort of linguistic 
data. However, the most significant difference between Hazlett’s account and my 
own is that Hazlett doesn’t think that the epistemically interesting concept of 
knowledge is non-factive. In fact, he maintains that it is indeed factive, and argues 
on this basis that the ordinary concept of knowledge that underlies “knows” is 
distinct from epistemological concept of knowledge. He summarizes this argument 
in the following way: 
 
If I’m right, then epistemologists may have reason to stop looking at 
linguistic phenomena altogether—at least if they want to keep working on 
anything like the standard analysis of knowledge. The concept of knowledge 
that epistemologists have been interested in since the Meno is a factive 
concept (in the sense that nothing false can be known). But, if I’m right, the 
concept of knowledge that serves as the meaning of ‘knows’ in ordinary talk 
isn’t. This is strong prima facie evidence that traditional epistemology 
shouldn’t be especially interested in the concept of knowledge that serves 
as the meaning of ‘knows’ in ordinary talk. . . For the epistemologist is 
interested in an epistemic concept of knowledge, if she is interested in a 
concept of knowledge at all. What I’m claiming is that epistemologists have 
every right to insist that knowledge (as they understand it) is factive—but the 
price to pay for this (which many will be happy to incur) is to give up the 
linguistic method described above. I’m suggesting, in other words, a divorce 
for the linguistic theory of knowledge attributions and traditional 
epistemology. (ibid, 499-500) 
 
As the aim of this thesis is to argue that the epistemologically interesting concept 
of knowledge is non-factive, and on this basis advance the non-factive analysis of 
this concept, we might observe that my project diverges from Hazlett’s at a 
fundamental level. However, this doesn’t mean that there is nothing to be learned 
from Hazlett’ argument for the non-factive use of “knows.” Here there are two 
aspects of his account I want to discuss. I want to focus primarily on one key 
objection that has been levied against his account, as it highlights a certain pitfall 
that an argument against factivity might fall into. Before this, however, I first want to 
discuss Hazlett’s take on the contradictoriness argument mentioned in 2.1.  
First, Hazlett focuses specifically on the first-person utterance “I know p, but 
not p,” maintaining that it is not contradictory, but Moore-paradoxical8: 
 
‘I know p, but not-p’ is not contradictory, but an utterance of it is Moore 
paradoxical – to know that p is to believe that p, and ‘I believe p, but not-p’ 
is paradigmatically Moore paradoxical. It is possible to mistakenly take a 
sentence, the utterance of which would be Moore paradoxical, for a 
contradiction. An utterance of ‘I know p, but not-p’ is always improper, but 
the sentence is not a contradiction. (ibid, 506) 
  
Beyond this, Hazlett also offers a more general account, on which “S knows that p” 
often implies the truth of p, but doesn’t entail it generally. Following Grice’s (1989) 
																																																								
8 The operative idea here is simply that it seems paradoxical to say things of the form “I believe that 
p, but not p,” but it isn’t contradictory. For a detailed account of Moore’s paradox see Wittgenstein 




account of implicature, he begins by assuming conversational cooperation for our 
utterances involving “knows:” 
 
The explanations I prefer are all more or less Gricean in flavor. I presuppose 
the following: that it is mutually assumed by speakers the people generally 
conform to a principle of conversational cooperation, which requires 
general, and mutually assumed, conformity to at least three maxims: that of 
Quality (‘Do not say anything you believe to be false, or which you don’t 
have reason to believe is true’), that of Quantity (‘Make your contribution to 
a conversation as informative, and only as informative, as is required’), and 
that of Relation (‘Make your contribution to a conversation relevant’).  
(ibid, 511-2) 
 
Beyond this, he also assumes that attributing knowledge to S entails attributing 
epistemic warrant to S. Taken together, these two assumptions allows us to explain 
how knowledge attributions might imply truth. For example, if I say “S knows that 
she’s drinking coffee,” this entails an attribution of sufficient epistemic warrant to S 
for believing that she is drinking coffee. This means that if I have any reason to 
suspect that S really isn’t drinking coffee, it would be a violation of the maxim of 
quantity to withhold it. Therefore, by attributing knowledge to S without 
mentioning any contrary evidence, I imply that S’s belief is true. In this way, Hazlett 
provides a way in which we might explain the seeming contradictoriness of 
utterances like “S knows that p, and not p” without positing factivity. While I will 
argue later that there is an even simpler explanation for this seeming contradiction 
(chapter 4, section 4), here it is worth noting how Hazlett’s account pushes back on 
the idea that factivity plays an indispensible explanatory role for these cases. 
To close my discussion of Hazlett I’d like to discuss one key objection that 
has been raised against his account.9 In doing so, I hope to highlight a major pitfall 
associated with the denial of factivity, which my argument will take care to avoid. 
One of the requirements of Hazlett’s argument is that non-factive uses of 
“knows” in ordinary language are literal. If the speakers of utterances, as in the 
examples above, don’t literally mean “knows” or “knew” to be non-factive, we of 
course don’t need to posit a non-factive concept of knowledge to explain these 
usages. However, one major challenge for Hazlett’s account is that it does not 
appear that “knows” is actually used literally in the types of cases he cites. As 
argued by Buckwalter, they can instead be explained as cases of “protagonist 
projection” (2014a, 391). First described by Holton (1997), protagonist projection 
refers to the practice of using sentences to non-literally convey the beliefs of 
others: 
 
I suggest that these sentences work by projecting us into the point of view 
of the protagonist; let us call the phenomenon protagonist projection. In 
each case the point of view into which we are projected involves a false 
belief. We describe the false belief using words that the protagonists might 
use themselves, words that embody their mistake. So we deliberately use 
words in ways that do not fit the case. (ibid, 626) 
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Protagonist projection offers a compelling explanation of the non-factive usage of 
“knows.” When we say that what someone “knows” is wrong, we are projecting 
ourselves into the perspective of the protagonist, using words she might use, not 
literally maintaining the protagonist actually knows. Beyond simply offering this as a 
rival explanation for Hazlett’s observations, Buckwalter conducted a series of 
empirical studies probing the intended meaning of the utterances that provide the 
basis for Hazlett’s argument. For example, in one experiment Buckwalter asked 
participants whether Hazlett’s “ulcer” example meant 
 
(A) Everyone thought they knew.  
(B) Everyone really did know. (2014a, 397) 
 
Participants overwhelmingly selected option (A), indicating that they did not take 
this utterance to literally mean that people once had knowledge of a falsehood 
(ibid, 397). Rather, these non-factive uses of “knew” and “knows” appear to be 
best understood as cases of protagonist projection. The speakers in these cases are 
simply using non-literal language to convey the mistaken beliefs of the 
protagonists, specifically that they have knowledge. 
Given the role protagonist projection might play in the acceptability of the 
non-factive usage of knows, it is important that my account avoids this problem. 
The primary way I do this is by avoiding linguistic data entirely. As my argument is 
not based on the usage of “knows” in language, it is difficult to object to it via 
protagonist projection. It is conceivable that one might attempt to adapt this 
objection to the apparent epistemic judgements that false beliefs are known 
proposed in the course of my argument. However, for this reason, among others, 
my argument is not based solely on our intuitive judgements. As mentioned before, 
it is also comprises of a key anti-skeptical component.  In this manner, it is able to 
circumvent the objection that an unidentified variant of protagonist projection plays 
a role in my argument. 
 
2.4 Pritchard and Kelp: “Weakening” Factivity 
 
As a potential response to the “paradox of knowability,” Fitch’s (1963) argument 
that all truths being knowable (along with a few plausible assumptions) 
paradoxically entails that all truths are known, Pritchard and Kelp briefly entertain 
the option of “weakening the factivity principle” (2010, 329). Although they quickly 
conclude that this route is unsuccessful, I mention this here because I also commit 
to something in my argument that I call “weakening factivity,” and I want to clarify 
that I don’t at all mean by this what Pritchard and Kelp do. I use “weakening 
factivity” interchangeably with “replacing factivity with a weaker constraint on 
knowledge.” Crucially, as this is done with the explicit purpose of counting certain 
false beliefs as knowledge, this means that falsehoods can be known. Conversely, 
on their version of weakening, while knowledge does not entail true, falsehoods 





There is a potential logical gap—at least by semantic anti‐realist lights—
between the claim that there cannot exist any cases in which an agent knows 
a falsehood and the factivity claim that knowledge entails the truth of the 
proposition known. (ibid, 330) 
 
Again, here I’ll argue that there are certain, in fact many, false beliefs that we 
should still count as known. Accordingly, my “weakening” of factivity goes much 
further than Pritchard and Kelp have in mind here. 
 
 
3. Method: Analytic and Naturalistic Components 
 
In this section, I’ll discuss the philosophical method employed by this project, and 
in doing so clarify a few of the basic assumptions it will commit to. At least 
cosmetically, the method I’ll employ might be divided into two components: (1) the 
analytic component and (2) the naturalistic component. The analytic component is 
quite standard, involving the testing of proposed necessary conditions on 
knowledge against our intuitive judgements and basic theoretical requirements. 
The naturalistic component is more novel, most notably in its conclusion that even 
the most fundamental questions of analytic epistemology in fact reduce to 
empirical questions. Accordingly, while I’ll discuss both the analytic and naturalistic 
components in this section, I’ll devote significantly more time to the latter. 
 
3.1 The Analytic Component 
 
This project is analytic in the sense that it is fundamentally interested in the analysis 
of the concept of knowledge, primarily in whether factivity is a necessary condition 
on knowledge. While it so happens that this analysis will involve a number of 
empirical findings, it is important to note that I take knowledge to be a concept, 
not a natural kind (see §3.2). Here I want to briefly highlight the analytic nature of 
the two primary arguments advanced in this project. These are (1) the argument in 
chapter three in favour of rejecting the factivity condition on knowledge and (2) the 
argument in chapter four that the non-factive analysis of knowledge is more 
successful that the factive analysis. I’ll discuss the analytic features of each 
argument in turn. 
In chapter three, I argue that we should drop the factivity constraint on 
knowledge in favour something weaker. Both the nature of this claim and the 
argument I present for it are unmistakably rooted in the analytic project. First, the 
claim itself is about how best to analyse the concept of knowledge. On this claim, 
knowledge is best analysed as a non-factive concept, and epistemologists have 
made a mistake in assuming that knowledge is a factive concept. Moreover, the 
argument I provide for this claim is equally analytic in nature. This argument is 
largely conceptual, and rests on familiar assumptions of analytic epistemology: 
 
1. Necessary conditions on knowledge should track our intuitive judgements about 
whether an agent has knowledge. 
 





This first assumption comes with the disclaimer that at least sometimes we observe 
troublesome patterns of intuitive judgement that we may not want necessary 
conditions on knowledge to track. I discuss this in chapter three (§5). Nevertheless, 
in my argument against factivity, I maintain that not only does it seem that we 
judge certain false beliefs to be known, but that these judgements are certainly not 
like those we might exclude from the analysis of knowledge. This second 
assumption is fundamental to this project: Necessary conditions on knowledge 
should not entail that large swaths of putative knowledge are in fact unknown. As I 
will discuss throughout the following chapters, if one is comfortable with 
skepticism, many of my conclusions might avoided. 
 Chapter four builds on the analytic endeavour started in chapter three by 
outlining what the non-factive analysis of knowledge might look like. Again, it 
assumes that the purpose of such an analysis is to track our intuitive judgements 
without giving way to skepticism. Beyond this, I don’t think there’s anything else 
interesting to say at this point. 
 
3.2 The Naturalistic Component 
 
As “naturalism” in epistemology is used to describe a general inclination towards 
reducing the distance between epistemological theory and empirical science (see 
Rysiew 2017 for a review), my project can certainly be classified as committing to a 
sort of naturalism. Here I hope to make clear the exact commitment to naturalism I 
have in mind by contrasting the naturalism of this project with a few foundational 
naturalistic accounts of epistemology. Before doing this, however, I first would like 
to provide a preliminary overview of the basics of the naturalistic component of my 
account. Most importantly, it is important to note that I do not take naturalism to 
be something that is in competition with conceptual analysis, or even something 
that is extra-analytic. Rather, I think we might best understand empirical findings as 
a tool indispensible in the practice of analysis. Contemporary psycho-cognitive 
research is highly relevant to fundamental analytic questions, like whether 
knowledge is factive, and thus these questions cannot be properly adjudicated 
without taking this research into consideration. If other conceptual assumptions are 
largely agreed upon, this can mean that fundamental analytic questions can reduce 
to empirical ones. This is perhaps the most important lesson to be gained from this 
project. Even more significant than the singular claim that knowledge is non-factive, 
this project suggests that even the most fundamental philosophical claims are 
subject to empirical critique and revision. 
One way we might cash out this lesson is that empirical research can 
establish key premises in conceptual arguments. This of course is not at all 
unprecedented. An excellent illustration of how empirical findings can ground 
conceptual arguments comes from the debate whether knowledge-that and 
knowledge-how are conceptually distinct. One of the major arguments that 
knowledge-how does not reduce to knowledge-that uses empirical observation to 
support the premise that we might retain knowledge-how even after losing any 
associated knowledge-that (Wallis 2008; Adams 2009; Brown 2013). My intention is 




Beyond involving empirical research in some substantive way, it is not 
widely agreed upon what makes an epistemological account “naturalistic.” Here I 
will discuss three of the most familiar articulations of naturalism in epistemology, 
those of Quine, Kornblith, and Goldman. Beyond simply providing an overview, I’ll 
also contrast each which the version of naturalism I’ll advance. 
 
3.2.1 Quine’s “Epistemology Naturalized” 
 
Modern discussion of naturalism in epistemology begins with Quine’s 1969 essay 
“Epistemology Naturalized.” Here I’ll primarily discuss Quine’s core claims and 
contrast his version of naturalism with my own, along with the motivations of and 
objections to his account. 
The defining feature of Quine’s naturalism is its radical reimagining of the 
relationship between epistemology and natural science. Going well beyond the 
idea that epistemological theorizing might benefit from input from the empirical 
sciences, Quine recommends that epistemology be subsumed by the natural 
sciences entirely, assuming a position as a sub-field of psychology: 
 
Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of 
psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, 
viz., a physical human subject. This human subject is accorded a certain 
experimentally controlled input—certain patters of irradiation in the assorted 
frequencies, for instance—and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as 
output a description of the three-dimensional external world and its history. 
The relation between the meagre input and the torrential output is a relation 
that we are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always 
prompted epistemology; namely, in order to see how evidence relates to 
theory, and in what ways one’s theory of nature transcends any available 
evidence. (1969, 82-3) 
 
Quine’s motivation for this proposal lies largely in his view that “epistemology is 
concerned with the foundations of science” (ibid, 69). The idea here is that if we 
want to give an account of how sense data can ground scientific theories, the best 
way to do this is to empirically observe how sense data actually results in scientific 
theory. I think there’s a lot to like about this idea, which I’ll discuss shortly. Before 
this, however, we should address the shortcomings of Quine’s account.10 First, 
there is the glaring issue that Quine’s conception of epistemology was, even at the 
time of his essay, obsolete. The epistemological program that Quine uses as a 
framing device is “rational reconstruction,” Carnap’s (1928) endeavour to “account 
for the external world as a logical construction of sense data” (1969, 74), which as 
noted by Kelly, “had already been abandoned” when Quine wrote Naturalized 
(2014, 24). Accordingly, whatever the extent to which my naturalism might agree 
with Quine’s, it is obvious that I will not share in his motivations. 
Next, perhaps the greatest shortcoming of Quine’s account is that it 
eliminates epistemology as a philosophical discipline entirely, recasting it as a 
																																																								





psychological one. This famously raises a serious problem with epistemic 
normativity, as it seems that psychology, and thus psychologically constrained 
epistemology, is wholly descriptive (Kim 1988; for a response see Quine 1992, 19). 
However, what concerns me more about the idea of reducing the discipline of 
epistemology to psychology is that epistemological concepts and psychological 
concepts often vary considerably. Perhaps the best example of this is the concept 
of knowledge itself, which as a technical psycho-cognitive concept is largely 
unrecognizable to epistemologists. This is simply because epistemology and 
psychology want a concept of knowledge to do different things. Roughly, 
psychology, as well as other related scientific disiplines, needs a concept that can 
capture a broad range of experimental data, whereas epistemology needs a 
concept that can capture a broad range of epistemic judgements (see chapter four, 
section three for more on this). Were psychology to annex epistemology, 
presumably this would mean abandoning all those aspects of epistemology that are 
not psychologically interesting. My suspicion is that the analysis of knowledge 
would be the first thing to go. As I have no interest in this, my project has no 
intention of following the Quinean reduction of epistemology to psychology. 
A final contrast I want to draw between my account and Quine’s is that I 
don’t take epistemology to study a “human subject,” or any “natural 
phenomenon.” As will come up again in the next sub-subsection, I do not take 
knowledge to be a natural kind. This means that, although empirical research can 
be extremely useful, the study of knowledge cannot be a fundamentally empirical 
one. 
Despite the many ways in which my project is not at all “naturalized” in the 
Quinean sense, there is one key feature they share: They both recognize that 
epistemological questions might reduce to empirical ones. For Quine, this question 
was how sense data provides a foundation for science. For my project, this question 
is whether knowledge is factive. Whether it is a factive or non-factive concept that 
best fulfils the basic theoretical requirements of the analysis of knowledge 
(capturing epistemic judgements and avoiding skepticism) is contingent about 
specific facts about how our cognitive systems represent information. 
To close, I want to note an especially interesting point of contact between 
Quine and this project, as Quine seems to foreshadow what I discuss as claim (2) in 
chapter two: 
 
Our retinas are irradiated in two dimensions, yet we see things as three-
dimensional without conscious inference. Which is to count as the 
observation—the unconscious two-dimensional reception or the conscious 
three-dimensional apprehension? In the old epistemological context the 
conscious form had priority, for we were out to justify our knowledge of the 
external world by rational reconstruction, and that demands awareness. 
Awareness ceased to be demanded when we gave up trying to justify our 
knowledge of the external world by rational reconstruction. What to count as 
observation now can be settled in terms of the stimulation of sensory 
receptors, let conscious fall where it may. (Quine 1969, 84) 
 
As we’ll see in chapter two, this is a very rudimentary account of the multiple 




Nevertheless, Quine manages to not only highlight the basic idea that mental 
representation is not unitary, but he also anticipates the challenge my account will 
face in basing an epistemological account on content that doesn’t rise to full 
conscious awareness (see chapter 3, section 3). At least in this sense, we might say 
that I, with Quine, will reject the “old epistemological context” on which 
“conscious form had priority.” All the false beliefs I argue are known have, to a 
significant extent, content that falls below the level conscious awareness.   
 
3.2.2 Kornblith: Knowledge as a Natural Kind 
 
Next, I’ll discuss the version of naturalism espoused by Kornblith, after which I’ll 
contrast it with my own. As with Quine, while there are certain areas of overlap, the 
methodology I employ in this project differs substantively from that recommended 
by Kornblith. 
Unlike Quine, Kornblith’s framing of epistemology corresponds with the 
contemporary significance placed on the study of knowledge. However, he still 
maintains a quite heterodox stance on what this object of study actually is. 
Kornblith rejects the idea that epistemology should be interested in the concept of 
knowledge at all, thereby writing off the analytic project entirely: 
 
My insistence that epistemology should not concern itself with our concept 
of knowledge requires that I depart, in important ways, from some common 
practices. I will not, for the most part, be comparing my account of 
knowledge with my intuitions about various imaginary cases; I will not be 
considering whether we would be inclined to say that someone does or 
does not have knowledge in various circumstances. I do not believe that our 
intuitions, or our inclinations to say various things, should carry a great deal 
of weight in philosophical matters. (2002, 1-2) 
 
In place of the study of a concept, Kornblith suggests that epistemology transform 
itself into the study of the phenomenon of knowledge, thereby casting knowledge 
as a natural kind (emphasis mine): 
 
Where should we turn, and how should we proceed, if we are to investigate 
the phenomenon of knowledge itself? It is not necessary to found a new 
discipline here, for there is already a good deal of empirical work on the 
subject. One of the more fruitful areas of such research is cognitive ethology. 
There is a large literature on animal cognition, and workers in this field 
typically speak of animals knowing a great many things. They see animal 
knowledge as a legitimate object of study, a phenomenon with a good deal 
of theoretical integrity to it. Knowledge, as it is portrayed in this literature, 
does causal and explanatory work . . . If cognitive ethologists are even 
roughly right, then talk of animal knowledge is not a mere façon de parler; 
rather, there really is such a thing as animal knowledge. Knowledge 
constitutes a legitimate scientific category. In a word, it is a natural 
kind. (ibid, 28-9) 
 
At this point there are several key ways in which we might contrast the naturalism of 




as in any way supplanting the analysis of knowledge, but rather playing a crucial 
role within the analytic project. A second, very much related contrast is that I don’t 
take knowledge to be a natural kind, being committed to the study of knowledge 
the concept. 
Beyond these coarse differences of method, there is a more layered and 
interesting contrast to be made. Like Kornblith, I think the scientific use of 
“knowledge” is epistemologically interesting and ought to be taken seriously. 
Indeed, in chapter four I formulate an analysis of knowledge that seeks to unify the 
epistemological and scientific (“psycho-cognitive”) concepts of knowledge. In this 
way, we might explain how the concept of knowledge might play dual 
epistemological and scientific roles. Here we might again note a significant contrast 
with Kornblith. First, I am ultimately still interested in concepts of knowledge, while 
Kornblith is not. Second, the empirical literature Kornblith focuses on, cognitive 
ethology, is rather unlike anything you’ll see in this project, which for the most part 
fits under the broad purview of “cognitive neuroscience” (discussed in the next 
section). 
There is a final contrast I’d like to discuss here, which relates to the final 
account of knowledge that Kornblith endorses. Despite not being interested in the 
concept of knowledge at all, Kornblith comes to the familiar conclusion that 
knowledge is “reliably produced true belief” (ibid, 28). Remarkably, it appears that 
the phenomenon of knowledge might be described via reliabilism, a well-trodden 
theory of the concept of knowledge. Not being an expert in cognitive ethology, I 
cannot speculate as to whether this accurately captures how “knowledge” is used 
within that field. However, I can note such an account doesn’t even come close to 
capturing the explanatory roles the technical concept of knowledge plays in 
empirical literature generally. Again, I discuss this in chapter four, section three, 
focusing primarily on the usage within cognitive neuropsychology. While we might 
concur with Kornblith that the psycho-cognitive concept of knowledge is robust, 
doing real theoretical work, it clearly doesn’t come with a belief or truth condition. 
Traditional epistemological theory must make significant concessions in order to 
capture the myriad of different cases in which psycho-cognitive knowledge plays 
explanatory and predictive roles. “Reliably produced true belief” simply doesn’t cut 
it. 
In contrasting this project with Kornblith’s naturalism, I hope to have 
highlighted a few key features of my take on naturalism. Most interesting here is 
the idea that the technical concept of knowledge we find in empirical literature is 
not identical with the standard epistemological concept, nor might it be captured 
with a standard epistemological account. However, this doesn’t mean that this 
concept is not of epistemological interest. 
 
3.2.3 Goldman’s “Scientific Epistemology” 
 
Far more so than either the respective versions presented by Quine and Kornblith, 
Goldman’s naturalism, which he dubs “scientific epistemology” (1993a), somewhat 
closely matches the naturalism of my project. Here I’ll highlight some of the central 




To begin with, I should note that Goldman’s naturalism extends far beyond 
epistemology (see 1992; 1993b). However, here I’ll stick to his epistemological 
naturalism. Put simply, the “scientific epistemology” proposed by Goldman is far 
more conservative than the previously discussed proposals from Kornblith or 
(especially) Quine. To begin with, not only does Goldman frame epistemology in 
terms of the study of knowledge (contra Quine), but also he takes conceptual 
analysis to be the appropriate means of studying knowledge (contra Kornblith11). 
Goldman is notable in this respect as the only naturalist I’ll discuss here to have 
(famously) advanced multiple analyses of knowledge over the course of his career 
(1967; 1993a). He views the analysis of knowledge as a largely a priori conceptual 
project, which might benefit from modest empirical input, articulated clearly in the 
opening to his 1988 paper “Psychology and Philosophical Analysis:” 
 
It is often said that philosophical analysis is an a priori enterprise. Since it 
prominently features thought experiments designed to elicit the meaning, or 
semantic properties, of words in one's own language, it seems to be a purely 
reflective inquiry, requiring no observational or empirical component. I too 
have sometimes acquiesced in this sort of view. While arguing that certain 
phases of epistemology require input from psychology and other cognitive 
sciences, I have granted that the more 'conceptual' stages of epistemology 
are strictly philosophical and (hence) non-empirical. In this paper I want to 
qualify this position. I shall suggest that psychological theories can have a 
bearing on philosophical analysis; they can support the plausibility or 
implausibility of specific analyses. (195) 
 
Goldman imagines a very narrow role for psychology here, as by “support the 
plausibility or implausibility of specific analyses” all he means is that psychology 
can provide a broader and more robust account of our intuitive judgements than 
can individual introspection. He specifically argues for a relevant alternatives 
account of knowledge based on the fact that this is most congruous with 
“cognizers’ judgements and categorizations” (ibid, 199), as evidenced by 
psychological observation. The idea here is that since psychology might describe 
factors that contribute to our judgements generally, it can specifically help describe 
factors that contribute to our judgements about knowledge. 
It is here I’d like to draw a first contrast between Goldman’s naturalism and 
my own. While I too am interested in the analysis of knowledge, I think empirical 
evidence might do more analytic work than Goldman allows for. First, I think this 
evidence, emerging more from cognitive neuroscience than psychology proper, 
might highlight not merely previously hidden facts about our judgements, but 
rather previously hidden facts about cognition about which we might form new 
judgements. For example, as I argue in chapter three, empirical evidence highlights 
previously unconsidered cases, about which it appears we judge false beliefs to be 
known. Now of course it is conceivable that these cases might have been 
concocted as putative counterexamples in the absence of any empirical 
observation. However, it is not only unlikely that they might have been rendered as 
richly as via cognitive neuroscience, but I think the very fact these cases are actual, 
																																																								




and in fact ordinary, sways our judgements. Beyond this, I think empirical evidence 
does a superb job of highlight skeptical problems, as it lends itself to the actual 
description of our actual knowledge. Thus, if, say, neuroscientific evidence suggests 
that most all of our ordinary knowledge has feature X, we can be sure to avoid any 
analysis of knowledge on which feature X is taken to preclude knowledge. 
Goldman’s naturalism is of course not limited to the analysis of knowledge, 
and he takes the primary epistemological relevance of empirical observation to fall 
outside the analytic project. Instead, Goldman sees cognitive science as especially 
valuable in answering the question, “What are the sources and prospects for 
human knowledge and rationality?” (1993b, 1). This wouldn’t be all that relevant for 
our purposes, except that Goldman maintains that empirical observation can “help 
set the standards for rationality” (ibid, 31). Here, the idea is that evidence from 
cognitive science can help to not only explicate what it means for an agent to 
possess evidence, but also give us a “realistic perspective” on the actual extent to 
which we ordinarily possess evidence (ibid, 31).  
The reason I draw attention to Goldman’s claim that empirical evidence can 
help set the standards for rationality is that I’ll argue along similar lines for 
standards of knowledge. Specifically, in chapter four, I’ll argue in favour of 
replacing the factivity condition with a “truthlikeness” condition on knowledge, on 
which beliefs can be known only if there are very close to being true. As, “very 
close to being true” is incredibly vague, I offer that the level of truthlikeness 
necessary for knowledge might be set by the level of accuracy of the cognitive 
processes that produce knowledge. In this manner we might understand how the 
standards of knowledge are, at least partially, an empirical matter, as we need to 
observe the specific cognitive processes that produce knowledge in order to 
determine the level of truthlikeness necessary for knowledge. 
A final similarity between my naturalism and Goldman’s can be found in the 
epistemological significance he places of folk practice: 
 
Whatever else epistemology might proceed to do, it should at least have its 
roots in the concepts and practices of the folk. If these roots are utterly 
rejected and abandoned, by what rights would the new discipline call its 
‘epistemology’ at all? (1993a, 271) 
 
Perhaps even more so than Goldman, who takes these “folk pathways,” as he calls 
them, to be subject to revision (ibid), this project places a substantial value on our 
epistemic folk practices. Specifically, I put preserving our ordinary practices of 
belief and knowledge -attribution as a key epistemological priority, and argue for 
the preservation of these practices even at the cost of factivity. 
In short, while Goldman offers an account of naturalism somewhat milder 
than mine, his is easily the closest of the three discussed here. Most noteworthy is 
his commitment to the analytic project and his suggestion that empirical evidence 
has a role to play in analysis. The arguments I’ll present in the following chapters 
not only highlight the empirical component of the analysis of knowledge, but also 
suggest that, if anything, Goldman was too conservative in his assessment of how 






4. Cognitive Neuroscience 
 
In this section, I want to briefly attempt to introduce and categorize the types of 
empirical evidence I’ll utilize throughout this project (primarily in chapters two and 
five). As I provide discussion of specific details as they become relevant, here I’ll 
limit discuss to those broad generalities necessary to understand the specific 
details. The best way I can think to do this is by simply providing a brief overview of 
cognitive neuroscience as a discipline. This isn’t to say that all the empirical 
research I’ll cite falls nicely under the label “cognitive neuroscience, rather only that 
the (i) methods of cognitive neuroscience exhaust the empirical methods I’ll 
discuss, (ii) this project will view observations produced by these methods through 
the lens of cognitive neuroscience, and (iii) the primary theoretical marker of 
cognitive neuroscience, the “multiple levels” approach to inquiry, closely correlates 
with the multi-level arguments I advance in subsequent chapters. Accordingly, we 
might understand that my goal with this section is to provide a rough overview of 
the empirical contents of this project, not describe a topography on which we 
might easily map each of the hundreds of individual studies we’ll encounter. 
Cognitive neuroscience is, as put by Boone and Piccinini, the “new 
mainstream approach to studying cognition” (2016, 1509). Here I’ll provide a brief 
overview of its approach and empirical methods, especially as it relates to my 
project. As a discipline, cognitive neuroscience is defined largely by a “multiple 
levels of analysis” approach to the study of human cognition (Ochsner & Kosslyn 
2013, 2). This approach has been categorized as supplanting that of traditional 
cognitive science, with its conspicuous lack of interest with descriptions at the 
neural/mechanistic level (Boone and Piccinini 2016). The multi-level approach of 
cognitive neuroscience was pioneered by vision scientist David Marr, who argued: 
 
To understand what vision is and how it works, an understanding at only one 
level is insufficient. It is not enough to be able to describe the responses of 
single cells, nor is it enough to be able to predict locally the results of 
psychophysical experiments. Nor it is enough even to be able to write 
computer programs that perform approximately in the desired way. One has 
to do all these things at once. (1982, 329) 
 
Here I don’t want to suggest that either my project or cognitive neuroscience as a 
whole is committed to the specifics of Marr’s computational approach. The point 
here is simply that this commitment to multiple levels of analysis is the definitive 
feature of cognitive neuroscience. The result is theory that encompasses 
description at the behavioural, psychological, and neural levels (Ochsner & Kosslyn 
2013), which affords it certain advantages over parallel approaches: 
 
The resulting multilevel descriptions have many advantages over the one- or 
two-level accounts that are typical of traditional approaches in allied 
disciplines such as cognitive psychology. These advantages include the 
ability to use both behavioral and brain data in combination—rather than 
just one or the other taken alone—to draw inferences about psychological 




connect to, and must make sense in the context of more types of data than 
theories that are couched solely at the behavioral or at the behavioral and 
psychological levels. (ibid, 2) 
 
The multi-level approach that defines cognitive neuroscience, or at least something 
resembling it, is also a key feature of this project. Epistemological analysis is of 
course the “top” level, which is informed by observation at the behavioural level, 
which is in turn informed by more direct observation of the brain itself. We see this 
illustrated most dramatically in section three of chapter five, in which an 
epistemological argument against the factivity of knowledge is grounded in 
empirical descriptions of the representational content of individual neurons, with 
observations at the behavioural level also playing a key intermediary role. In a 
sense, one might think of my approach as “tacking on” the epistemological level of 
inquiry to the extant cognitive-neuroscientific levels, thereby grounding 
epistemology in the multi-level empirical descriptions provided by cognitive 
neuroscience. In short, this is the idea at the heart of my project: Not only can 
standard epistemology accommodate a sort of multi-level naturalism, but 
epistemological analysis stands to benefit greatly from it. 
As cognitive neuroscience adheres to a multi-level approach to cognition, it 
incorporates multiple types of empirical evidence, including behavioural, 
neuroimaging, neuropsychological, and neurophysiological (Ochsner & Kosslyn 
2013). As the first two of these are likely familiar already, they require little 
explanation. Behavioural studies typically look at the behaviour of healthy 
individuals to draw conclusions about our cognitive architecture. I discuss specific 
techniques used in behavioural studies as they become relevant (see chapter two). 
It’s likely you’re also already oriented with the concept of neuroimaging studies, 
which “use functional imaging methods to describe the network of processes active 
in the healthy brain when engaged in a particular behavior” (ibid, 3). As the details 
of functional neuroimaging techniques aren’t relevant for our purposes, I won’t 
discuss them here. 
Neuropsychological evidence is that associated with the techniques of 
cognitive neuropsychology, a predecessor and rival to cognitive neuroscience that 
now has largely been subsumed by it (Ochsner & Kosslyn 2013). As with cognitive 
neuroscience, cognitive neuropsychology utilizes data from neuroscience to inform 
theories of cognition (Caramazza 1992). However, unlike cognitive neuroscience, 
the only neuroscientific data of interest to cognitive neuropsychology comes from 
“patterns of performance produced by brain-damaged subjects” (ibid, 1980). 
Again, I’ll discuss the specifics as they become relevant, but the core idea here is 
that brain lesions can impair specific cognitive systems while leaving others intact: 
 
By studying the ways in which behavior changes as a result of the unhappy 
accidents of nature (e.g., strokes, traumatic brain injuries) that caused lesions 
of language areas, memory areas, and so on, we can discover the processing 
modules that constitute the mind. (Ochsner & Kosslyn 2013, 2) 
 
Any evidence that indicates specific cognitive architecture on the basis of these 




Finally, there is neurophysiological (or “electrophysiological”) evidence. As 
with neuroimaging, neurophysiological studies observe neural activity given 
specific inputs to draw conclusions about cognitive architecture. However, rather 
than relying on functional imaging, neurophysiological studies use electrodes 
implanted in the brain to directly measure the activation of either single neurons or 
neural populations (Carpenter 1990, 14). This is especially useful in identifying the 
neurons and neural populations that represent specific stimuli, along with the 
nature of these representations (ibid).  
The empirical evidence I present in the argument against factive knowledge 
spans behaviour, neuroimaging, neuropsychology, and neurophysiology. In this 
way too we might understand the naturalistic method of this project to mirror that 
cognitive neuroscience. Again, to be clear, this doesn’t mean that all the empirical 















As discussed in the previous chapter, my argument against the factivity of 
knowledge rests in large part on empirical claims. In this chapter, I discuss the 
following four claims regarding mental content, which form the foundation for my 
account: 
 
(1) Perception can occur in the absence of consciousness. 
 
(2) The same information is often represented internally in a multitude of ways. 
 
(3) The mental content that guides motor action is not reflectively accessible. 
 
(4) The mental content that guides motor action is not perfectly accurate. 
 
These claims are all supported by a wealth of empirical evidence, which I will 
outline for each. (1) and (2) might be dubbed “preliminary claims,” as both feature 
only indirectly in subsequent chapters. Rather than relegating these preliminaries to 
the status of implicit assumptions, I have opted to discuss each at length, in the 
hopes of eliminating any confusion that might otherwise arise. Claims (3) and (4) 
assume a more primary status in this project, and will together constitute a crucial 
premise in the following chapter’s argument against the factivity of knowledge. 
This chapter will follow a simple format, with one section devoted to each 
claim in turn. This will include a detailed explanation of the claim and 
corresponding empirical support, which will include some combination of 
behavioural, neuropsychological, neurophysiological, and neuroimaging evidence. 
For the most part, relevant objections and philosophical accounts will be reserved 
for the next chapter, and understood specifically in terms of how they might impact 
my argument against factive knowledge. However, I will flag both particularly 




0. Reflective Access 
 
Before discussing the above empirical claims, I first want to briefly clarify what I 
mean by “reflective access.” Most crucially, I think framing reflective access in 
epistemic terms would be a mistake, especially for this specific project. That is, 
while reflective access can certainly result in knowledge, I will not take it to reduce 
to a form of knowing (see, for example, Littlejohn 2015). Rather than in epistemic 
terms, it is more useful to think of the reflective accessibility of mental content in 
relation to our capacity to report that content, incorporate it into our reasoning, 
and so forth. That is, I will be using the term in the sense that reflectively accessible 




more in line with the usage we might find in the empirical study of reflective access 
(see, for example, Higgins and Johnson 2012). 
 
 
1. Preliminary: Unconscious Perception 
 
There is a wealth of evidence suggesting that our cognitive systems often represent 
information despite us lacking all awareness of such representation. As my 
argument in chapter three will take this claim as something like a background 
assumption, I would like to take the time to discuss it now. This section will be 
devoted the phenomenon of perception without conscious awareness, 
“unconscious perception,” and its empirical status. In short, while some dissent 
might be found, it is widely held that perception can occur without awareness, and 
multiple lines of empirical evidence support this conclusion. 
To begin with, it is important to distinguish between distinct claims that might 
be appropriately labelled “unconscious perception.” First, there is the claim that 
perception can decouple from phenomenology entirely, and that we might form 
perceptual states without any associated conscious experience. While this claim is 
well supported in its own right (see Matthen & Prinz 2015), this is unnecessarily 
strong for our purposes. The cases I focus on in the next chapter involve ordinary 
perceptual beliefs, and the information represented is certainly accompanied by 
conscious experience. Accordingly, I will use a weaker, less controversial sense of 
“unconscious perception,” on which we might perceive things without conscious 
awareness (ibid, p. 372).12 Further, if we take conscious awareness to be akin to 
something like reflective access,13 this leads us to a more precise formulation of my 
first preliminary assumption: 
 
UNCONSCIOUS PERCEPTION: Not all perceptually acquired mental 
content is reflectively accessible.  
 
Multiple lines of empirical evidence support the claim that perception can occur 
without reflective access, and there are three classes of evidence I will discuss: 
behavioural observations for individuals with neurological disorders 
(neuropsychological studies), behavioural observations for healthy individuals, and 
neuroimaging from healthy individuals. 
First, there are specific neurological conditions that might result in 
perception without reflective access. As these unconscious perceptions can be 
much more conspicuous than those in healthy individuals, such cases are especially 
instructive. Here I will focus on the unconscious perceptions we might observe in 
the case of blindsight, in which “patients with an impaired visual cortex [can] 
perform visually in their blind field without acknowledging that performance” 
(Kroustallis 2005, 31). First, Pöppel observed that when patients with scotoma 
(regions of blindness in the visual field) were asked to guess the location of visual 
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mine, it is open to criticism that mine is not. This sort of point will reappear in chapter three.  




targets placed within those blind areas, and then indicate by looking in the 
direction of their guess, their responses correlated with the position of the targets 
(1973). Despite reporting no conscious perception of the target positions, the 
saccades (eye movements) of their guesses were not random, but systematically 
related to target position (ibid).  
Even more remarkable are observations of the patient known as “DB” (for a 
complete case study see Weiskrantz 1986). In addition to displaying the same 
correlation between saccade and target location, DB was able to accurately reach 
for targets located in his scotoma, and even demonstrated “excellent 
performance” in discerning between “X” and “O” figures (Sanders et al. 1974, 
708). It is worth repeating that from the perspective of DB, these attempts would 
have presented as nothing more than guesses, seemingly reaching at random into 
his blind spot. He had no conscious perceptions of the targets. As summarized by 
the researchers that first documented this behaviour (emphasis mine): 
 
The present results indicate that visual stimuli can be localised with 
considerable accuracy and that certain aspects of their orientation and spatial 
distribution can be differentiated if they are larger than a critical size when they 
are presented in a "blind" region. The patient’s performance was systematically 
related to both the size and the duration of the stimuli although there was no 
acknowledged awareness of this capacity . . . Throughout these experiments 
he insisted that he saw nothing except in his intact field. (ibid, 708) 
 
In short, blindsight offers a compelling case for unconscious perception. It has been 
observed in a multitude of subsequent studies (for a review of evidence and 
criticisms, see Cowey 2004), for tasks as complicated as navigating around a series 
of obstacles (de Gelder et al. 2008), all with subjects reporting no conscious 
awareness of their perception, or even conscious experience of any kind.14 The key 
for our purposes is that the behaviour of individuals with blindsight indicates that 
they form perceptual representations to which they have no reflective access. While 
this provides a valuable illustration of what exactly perception without reflective 
access might look like, and seems to confirm that it does indeed occur, these 
extraordinary cases can only get us so far. Accordingly, I will now turn to evidence 
of unconscious perception in ordinary individuals.  
The first set of observations involving unconscious perception (unrelated to 
neurological damage) I will discuss are those obtained under visual masking 
paradigms. Under such an experimental paradigm, “a clearly visible brief display 
can be rendered invisible (masked) when presented in close spatial and temporal 
proximity with other visual stimuli” (Davis & Kim 2011, 1990). Masking stimuli might 
be presented before the target stimuli (“forward masking”), after the target stimuli 
(“backwards masking”), or concurrently with it (“lateral masking”) (see ibid; 
Wilkinson et al. 1997). In many such experiments, stimuli masked from awareness 
can nevertheless be observed to impact behaviour. It is this feature of visual 
masking that allows for compelling demonstrations of unconscious perception. 
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A typical masking study might employ a priming paradigm in order to 
demonstrate the behavioural influence of unconscious perceptions: After being 
briefly presented with a masked stimulus (“primed”), subjects are presented with a 
second “target” stimulus, the processing of which will vary with the representation 
of the masked stimulus (see Van den Bussche et al. 2009). For example, in one 
backwards-masking study (Alameda et al. 2003), participants were briefly (57 or 84 
ms) shown a priming stimulus (in this case a word or phrase), followed by a masking 
stimulus, followed by a target stimuli comprised of Arabic numerals. The 
researchers observed that participants named target stimuli more quickly (i.e. 
“747”) when they were preceded by an associated priming stimulus (i.e. “Boeing”) 
(ibid). This sort of result indicates that the masked stimuli are still represented by 
the subjects. That is, the subjects’ behaviour suggests perceptual representation of 
stimuli for which there is no reflective access. Studies confirming these types of 
results abound (for a meta-analysis see Van den Bussche et al. 2009). 
Next, there is “crowding,” an effect similar15 to lateral masking, in which “a 
shape can be more difficult to identify when other shapes are near it” (Parkes et al. 
2001, 739). For example, in one study, several Gabor patches were placed around 
a central patch, rendering the orientation of the central patch invisible to conscious 
perception when viewed peripherally (ibid). Remarkably, however, despite being 
unable to report the orientation of a single patch in the array, subjects were still 
able to accurately report the average orientation of the patches (ibid). This too 
indicates an unconscious perception of the orientation of the individual patches. 
While subjects clearly didn’t have access to representations of individual 
orientation, the fact they could access the average orientation suggests that in 
these cases “the orientation signals in primary visual cortex are pooled before they 
reach consciousness” (ibid, 739). 
Crowding effects have also been observed by utilizing priming. One such 
study elicited what is known as “orientation-selective adaptation” from crowded 
stimuli, an effect in which subjects exhibit quicker response times in identifying the 
orientation of a target stimulus when they are first primed with a stimulus of the 
same orientation as the target (Rajimehr et al. 2003). In this study, subjects 
displayed orientation-selective adaptation to crowed stimuli, “even when 
perceptual awareness of orientation had been confounded by crowding” (ibid, 
1199). “Performance of subjects in reporting the orientation of crowded illusory 
lines was at chance level,” confirming that there was no conscious perception of 
the orientation of the crowded stimuli (ibid, 1199). Again, this strongly suggests 
that subjects acquired perpetual representations of the orientation of the priming 
stimuli and simply lacked reflective access to those representations. This effect has 
also been observed for stimuli rendered (consciously) invisible by other means, 
such as “motion-induced blindness” (Montaser-Kouhsari et al. 2004).  
In short, “unresolvable orientations substantially influence perception at 
multiple levels,” (Rajimehr 2004, 663). Perhaps the most compelling illustration of 
this orientation-selective adaptation comes from a study by He and MacLeod, 
which didn’t render orientation features consciously imperceptible by masking or 
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crowding, but simply by making them to fine to be consciously resolved (2001). 
Even when subjects were primed with stimuli of alternating black and white lines so 
fine that they were “perceptually indistinguishable from a uniform field,” subjects 
still displayed adaptation to the orientation of these stimuli (ibid, 474). Again, these 
results support the claim that we might form perceptual states to which we lack 
reflective access: 
 
Our observations imply that extremely fine details, even those too fine to be 
seen, can penetrate the visual system as far as the cortex, where they are 
represented neurally without conscious awareness. (ibid, 474)  
 
Another valuable illustration of unconscious perception comes from interocular 
suppression, in which “dissimilar images are presented to the left and right eyes, 
which leads to the suppression of one of the images from conscious perception” 
(Kaunitz et al. 2014; see Faivre et al. 2014 for a comparison with crowding). For 
example, one study found that “interocularly suppressed (invisible) erotic pictures” 
could still impact the attention of participants (Jiang et al. 2006, 17048). Another 
study found that a brightness illusion in which two identical circles appear to have 
different levels of brightness because of their surroundings persisted even when 
the background was suppressed beyond conscious perception (Harris et al. 2011). 
There is even evidence for high-level representation occurring without awareness, 
with one study finding that “emotional facial expression continues to be processed 
even under complete suppression” (Adams et al. 2010, 205). In short, as with the 
previous examples, interocular suppression presents compelling evidence that 
subjects form perceptual representations of visual stimuli they do not consciously 
perceive and cannot access. 
The final type of behavioural evidence of unconscious perception I will 
discuss here comes from the phenomenon of inattentional blindness, “the failure to 
consciously perceive otherwise salient events when they are not attended” (Ward & 
Scholl 2015, 722). In one famous example of the effect, subjects were shown a 
complex video stimulus involving a number of people and asked to attend to a 
specific event (this amounted to some variation of counting basketballs being 
passed between specified individuals) (Simmons and Chabris 1999). During the 
video, either a woman holding an umbrella or dressed in a full gorilla costume 
would walk across the screen, but this highly unusual event failed to be consciously 
perceived by many participants (ibid). Depending on the configuration of the 
experiment, as few as 8% of those evaluated even noticed the gorilla, 
demonstrating that “without attention, we may not even [consciously] perceive 
objects” (ibid, 1059 & 1068). This effect has been demonstrated by numerous 
studies (Mack & Rock 1998; Lathrop et al. 2011; Seegmiller et al. 2011; Pitts et al. 
2012; Drew et al. 2013; Schnuerch et al. 2016), and while I have no need to commit 
to the claim that conscious perception cannot occur without attention (see for 
example Mack & Rock 1998), it is at least clear that conscious perception often 
does not occur without attention. 
Nevertheless, a solid chunk of evidence suggests that “stimuli that suffer 
[inattentional blindness] may be processed extensively by the perceptual system,” 




inattentional blindness (ibid, 20). Mack and Rock describe a series of experiments 
that demonstrate this utilizing a priming paradigm (see ibid, chapter 8). As with the 
previous cases in which stimuli were suppressed from conscious perception by 
other means, stimuli rendered consciously imperceptible via inattentional blindness 
also result in priming effects, demonstrating they are indeed perceived. Again, this 
is supported by the findings of multiple other studies (Koivisto & Revonsuo 2007; 
Lathrop et al. 2011). Additionally, there is also even evidence for semantic 
processing of hidden stimuli. That is, the “meaning of objects undetected due to 
inattentional blindness interferes with the classification of attended stimuli” 
(Schnuerch et al. 2016, 459). Again, this result is further evidence for perception 
without reflective access. 
The behavioural observations presented up to this point might be 
summarized in the following way: 
 
There is now ample evidence in the literature that sensitive, indirect 
methods of testing often reveal that perceptions not consciously 
experienced seem to be encoded, and facilitate or inhibit subsequent 
perception when that same or a related stimulus object is subsequently 
presented to the observer. (Mack and Rock 1998, 173) 
 
While this sort of behavioural evidence is most valuable for our purposes, there is 
an independent line of neurological evidence for unconscious perception, which I 
want to close out the section by at least mentioning. “Representation of stimulus 
orientation” can be detected by fMRI, even when that stimulus is rendered 
consciously invisible by forward and backwards masking (Haynes and Rees 2005, 
868). To be clear, this means that orientation of an invisible stimulus unconsciously 
perceived by a subject can be accurately predicted from fMRI of that subject (ibid). 
“Amygdala activation” has been observed to correspond with face stimuli that 
were interocularly suppressed (Williams et al. 2004, 2898; see also Pasley 2004). 
Finally, stimuli hidden by inattentional blindness also appear to produce an 
observable neural signal (Pitts et al. 2012). In short, for much of the behavioural 
evidence suggesting that consciously invisible stimuli are still represented, there is 
corresponding neurological evidence that confirms this. 
In summary, a wealth of evidence strongly supports the claim that 
perception can be unconscious, particularly on the weaker reading of the claim on 
which some perceptual states are merely inaccessible. This idea, that we have no 
reason to assume reflective access to all our perceptual content, is crucial to keep 
in mind going forward. If you go in operating under the assumption that all our 
perceptual content is are accessible, it’s unclear how any subsequent sections or 
the chapters beyond might be made sense of.  
 
 
2. Preliminary: Multitudinous Representation 
 
It is natural to imagine that perceptually acquired information, such as the location 
of an object, is represented internally exactly once, corresponding with a single 
mental state. So conceptualized, this view, “supported by subjective experience, is 




represented in a unitary framework” (Colby & Goldberg 1999, 320). However, if we 
look beyond the subjective experience of perception, we find compelling evidence 
that this naïve conception is incorrect. Perceptual information is not represented 
singularly, but multitudinously: 
 
The space around us is represented not once but many times in parietal 
cortex. These multiple representations encode locations and objects of 
interest in several egocentric reference frames. Stimulus representations are 
transformed from the coordinates of receptor surfaces, such as the retina or 
the cochlea, into the coordinates of effectors, such as the eye, head, or 
hand. The transformation is accomplished by dynamic updating of spatial 
representations in conjunction with voluntary movements. This direct 
sensory-to-motor coordinate transformation obviates the need for a single 
representation of space in environmental coordinates. (ibid, 319) 
 
In this section, I will discuss this multitudinous representation, focusing specifically 
on the representation of perceptually acquired spatial information used in motor 
action.16 Accordingly, the claim I intend to support might be thought of as 
something along these lines: 
 
MULTITUDINOUS SPATIAL REPRESENTATION: Perceptually acquired spatial 
information is represented multiple times by our cognitive systems, in 
multiple frames of reference. 
 
Before presenting a selection of the empirical evidence in support of this claim, I 
should provide a bit of disambiguation by elaborating on different sorts of spatial 
representations, certain features they exhibit, and the relationship between them. 
The core idea here is that “processes in the sensorimotor chain can be described in 
terms of internal representations of the target or limb positions and coordinate 
transformations between different internal reference frames” (McIntyre et al. 2000, 
2823). 
The first representations we form of perceptual stimuli are coded in the 
reference frame of the relevant sensory receptor: “Visual stimuli are initially coded 
in retinal coordinates, tactile stimuli relative to the skin surface, and auditory stimuli 
relative to the head” (Pritchett et al. 2012, 437). As visual perception is what I am 
most interested in for the purposes of this and subsequent chapters, here I will 
focus on initial representation of visual stimuli in the reference frame of the retina, 
“retinocentric representation.” With every saccade (movement of the eye between 
fixations), “any location information encoded in the retinocentric reference frame 
that is predominant in the visual system is obliterated” (Schneegans & Schöner 
2012, 89). Thus, these low-level representations are constantly updating. 
Through a series of coordinate transformations, these retinocentric 
representations are transformed into other, more stable representations. The 
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ordinary beliefs comprised of perceptually acquired spatial information, going beyond this wouldn’t 




details of this process are still the subject of current research.17 However, this isn’t 
that important for our purposes since here it’s only important to recognize that we 
don’t form unitary representations. On a basic model, retinocentric signals from 
each eye are first combined into a binocular retinocentric representation, which is 
then transformed into representations in egocentric (body-centered) and finally 
allocentric (world or object -centered) (Wade and Swanston 1996). Egocentric 
reference frames might include shoulder-centered (Flanders et al. 1992), eye-
centered, or hand-centered coordinates (Chen et al. 2014). Conversely, allocentric 
representations are those representations “of the spatial location of an object 
relative to that of another external object, independent of the ego’s position or 
orientation, whether present, imagined, or remembered” (Filimon 2015, 2). 
Additionally, we might note that (i) representations from different sensory 
modalities need to be transformed into common reference frames before being 
useful, (ii) a process that contributes to motor variability—both points that are 
important for later discussion: 
 
Using multiple sensory modalities for planning similar movements is 
potentially problematic, as different sensory signals arrive in different 
reference frames. Specifically, early visual pathways represent stimulus 
location relative to current gaze location (a retinotopic representation), 
whereas proprioceptive signals represent hand location relative to the 
shoulder or trunk (a body-centered representation). To utilize these signals, 
some of them must be transformed between reference frames. Although 
sensory transformations may appear mathematically simple, we found that 
transformations can incur a cost by adding bias and variability into the 
transformed signal. (Mcguire & Sabes 2009, 1056) 
 
There are multiple lines of evidence that support this general picture of 
multitudinous representation, and here I will look at three: neuropsychological, 
behavioural, and neuroimaging.  
Much as with the example of blindsight in the previous section, here too I 
will begin with evidence for multitudinous representation that emerges from a 
specific neurological disorder, this time spatial hemineglect. However, unlike in the 
previous section, this disorder doesn’t simply offer evidence that those with 
hemineglect exhibit multitudinous representation, but that we all do. Operating 
under the core assumption of cognitive neuropsychology, that lesions don’t 
fundamentally alter the architecture of the brain but merely disengage specific 
cognitive systems (discussed in the previous chapter), spatial hemineglect offers a 
valuable insight into ordinary cognition.  
When individuals suffer lesions to a hemisphere of the brain, they often 
present with a limited ability to “explore the side of space contralateral to the 
lesion (contralesional), and to report stimuli presented in that portion of space” 
(Vallar 1998, 87). Interestingly, however, if lesions are unilateral (present in only one 
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there are actually no allocentric representations, only egocentric (Filimon 2015), that transformations 
can occur directly from retinocentric to allocentric (Souman et al. 2010), and that multiple reference 
frames are used simultaneously in movement planning (McGuire and Sabes 2009). Again, the 




hemisphere of the brain) these limitations are often isolated to contralesional 
space, with “patients’ performance . . . comparatively preserved in the side 
ipsilateral to the lesion (ipsilesional)” (ibid, 87). When patients with unilateral lesions 
experience diminished cognitive capacities in contralesional space, it is known as 
“spatial hemineglect.” For our purposes, spatial hemineglect can be extremely 
informative, as cognitive capacities often breakdown in systematic ways, with 
damage often impacting “specific sectors of space with reference to a given 
coordinate system” (ibid, 87). That is to say, as spatial neglect often impacts a 
patient’s ability to form representations in certain reference frames, spatial 
hemineglect provides compelling evidence that these spatial representations are 
indeed distinct, with lesions selectively disrupting certain reference frames. 
Consider the following example from Driver et al. (1994): Subjects with left 
spatial neglect, resulting from damage to the right hemisphere of the brain, were 
shown a stimulus comprised of a line of equilateral triangles aligned at the base. 
For certain iterations, a small gap would be present on either the left or right side 
of the middle triangle. However, the stimulus was always presented at one of two 
possible diagonal orientations, so that the gap would always appear at the same 
location on the screen. Remarkably, despite this, the participants demonstrated a 
much higher failure rate for identifying gaps in the triangle when they were on the 
left. This indicates the stimuli were represented in an object-centred reference 
frame that Driver et al. called “axis-based coordinates,” in reference to a vertical 
axis one might imagine running vertically through the centre triangle (ibid, 1362). 
After all, the location of the gap was “the same in every possible reference-frame 
except the axis-based coordinates,” on which left neglect can then explain the 
results (ibid, 1362). In short, these observations provide a dramatic illustration of 
the powerful effects exerted by the axis-based reference-frame chosen during 
shape perception” (ibid, 1362). Similar experiments have found specific stimuli 
represented in multiple other reference frames, even varying with distance from the 
body (see Humphreys et al. 2013; Li et al. 2014).  
Next, I will discuss behavioral evidence for multitudinous spatial 
representation. Studies that evaluate pointing errors can be especially valuable for 
this purpose, as we might expect different error patterns depending on whether 
spatial information is represented singularly or multitudinously. Here, I will first 
provide a brief account of the approach as a whole, followed by a specific example 
of one such study, and a summary of the conclusions we might make with respect 
to multitudinous representation.  
To begin with, these behavioral studies typically involve pointing at a virtual 
target or a target that is only displayed before the act of pointing begins. The idea 
here is that this eliminates the possibility of “movement corrections based on 
tactile feedback,” which would otherwise contaminate observation of “the 
underlying frames of reference putatively used by the brain to specify the 
endpoint” (Battaglia-Mayer et al. 2003, 1009). Next, these studies exploit the fact 
that error in representation of spatial information would manifest differently 
depending on the reference frame. Consider a toy example (modified from 
McIntyre et al. 2000, §3): Say we have a cognitive system with two possibilities for 
(2D) spatial representation: a singular reference frame of Cartesian coordinates or a 




constant systematic error (bias) will manifest differently in Cartesian vs. polar 
coordinates, there are certain patterns of pointing error we might expect for spatial 
information represented in each. For example, in the case of multiple pointing 
attempts at a given target over the course of a study, trials stacking up along a 
radially outward trajectory will be indicative of inward bias (“overshoot”) in polar 
coordinates. While human processing of spatial information is of course much more 
complicated than a binary choice between two coordinate systems, the same 
principle still holds. Certain error patterns can be indicative of specific sequences of 
spatial representation and coordinate transformation, plus specific sources of error. 
One such study conducted by McIntyre et al. analysed the error for subjects 
pointing at targets (which were presented and removed before the pointing phase) 
in two lighting conditions: (1) a “lighted condition” in which subjects could barely 
see their fingers, and (2) a “dark condition” in which subjects couldn’t see their 
fingers at all (ibid, 2835). For the lighted condition, the error pattern indicated “a 
view-centered reference frame for the representation of the final pointing position” 
(ibid, 2839). The dark condition resulted in a far more complex error pattern that 
“at first glance do not point to a clearly defined reference frame” (ibid, 2841). 
However, subsequent simulations showed that at least a portion of the error 
pattern could be explained by “the cascading effects of two transformations, one 
centred at the eyes and the second at the shoulder” (ibid, 2851). That is, pointing 
error in the dark condition suggests the utilization of three distinct spatial 
representations with two coordinate transformations in between. 
These findings by McIntyre et al. are by no means unique, and they 
themselves highlight “data from three different experiments support the hypothesis 
of a two-stage transformation” (ibid, 2851; citing Carrozzo et al.1999; Baud-Bovy & 
Viviani 1998). Similarly, Flanders et al. concluded that, for these specific pointing 
tasks, “the neural representation of target parameters is transformed from a 
retinocentric representation to a shoulder centered representation” (1992, 309). 
More generally, the analysis of point error has produced evidence that, given test 
conditions, (1) “specification of the final position of the hand occurs in a viewer-
centered reference frame”, (2) “eye and hand information combine into a common 
egocentric binocular frame of reference,” and (3) “irrespective of the specific frame 
of reference used to plan the movement, the different spatial parameters of 
reaching are not treated in a unitary manner, but are processed in parallel and 
largely independent of each other” (Battaglia-Mayer et al. 2003, 1010). The 
specifics themselves aren’t as relevant for our purposes as what they collectively 
demonstrate: multitudinous spatial representation. 
Beyond the neuropsychological and behavioral, direct observation of the 
brain has also yielded a wealth of evidence for multitudinous spatial representation. 
Here I will briefly discuss how neuroimaging studies support the claim that spatial 
information is represented in multiple ways. These sorts of studies typically 
involving using fMRI to monitor brain activity while subjects perform specific tasks, 
which will vary depending on the target representations (for reviews see Galati et 
al. 2010; Boccia et al. 2014). For example, a study by Zaehle et al. (2007), which 
investigated differences in the neural substrates for egocentric vs. allocentric 
representations, asked participants questions that were designed to elicit either a 




might begin, “The blue triangle is to the left of the green square. The green square 
is above the yellow triangle. The yellow triangle is to the right of the red circle,” 
and then ask, “Is the blue triangle above the red circle?” (ibid, 99). An egocentric 
query, on the other hand, would define position in strictly egocentric terms. In 
observing the corresponding neural activity, the researchers concluded that “data 
show separate neural circuits mediating different spatial coding strategies” (ibid, 
91). Similarly, other studies found that “allocentric and egocentric reach 
mechanisms use partially overlapping but different cortical substrates” and 
“different networks of areas subtend egocentric and allocentric strategies” (Chen et 
al. 2014, 12515; Boccia et al. 2014, 236). Beyond a simple egocentric/allocentric 
division, neuroimaging studies also suggest that “body referencing, i.e., the 
integration of spatial body knowledge . . . into visual and somatosensory maps” is 
distinct from other egocentric representations, and that “long-term cognitive 
representation of stable spatial features of a familiar environment” distinct from 
allocentric representation generally (Galati 2010). In short, neuroimaging studies 
don’t only provide compelling evidence for multitudinous spatial representation, 
but they support the same representational divisions as independent behavioural 
and neuropsychological studies. This further strengthens the claim that spatial 
information is represented multiple times, in multiple ways. 
In conclusion, there is a strong empirical case for multitudinous 
representation. This claim, and particularly the egocentric/allocentric distinction, 
foreshadows elements of the discussion in the following section, which examines 
observations demonstrating that the representations of conscious perception are 
not shared by motor action. Here we might note that this result is not at all 
unexpected, as successfully acting on objects might require representations in 
egocentric coordinates, whereas making perceptual judgements about objects 
might require representations in allocentric coordinates (see Milner and Goodale 
2008, §3-4). For example, if I want to reach out and grasp my coffee mug, the ideal 
coordinate system for representing the location of the mug is something 
egocentric, like hand-centered. Conversely, if I want to judge whether that mug is 
left or right of the coffee maker, the ideal coordinate system for the mug is 
something allocentric, like coffee-maker-centered. The core idea here is that visual 
judgement and visually guided motor action require representations with distinct 




3. Motor Action 
 
In the previous two sections, I introduced what I have considered preliminary 
claims. While the argument in chapter four won’t explicitly hinge on them, and any 
references to them will be sparse, one might struggle to understand my project 
without them in the background. Especially as they might be somewhat unfamiliar 
to an epistemological audience, it was important to provide these background 
assumptions a bit of visibility. With these in mind, I will now introduce the empirical 
claims that will together form a key premise in the next chapter’s argument against 




motor action, discussing the empirical evidence that the representations used for 
action are distinct from those of conscious perception. The next section will focus 
on noise and bias in that same content. 
In their seminal 1992 paper, Goodale and Milner proposed that there are 
separate visual pathways for conscious perception and action. That is, “the set of 
objects descriptions that permit identification and recognition may be computed 
independently from the set of descriptions that allow an observer to shape the 
hand appropriately to pick up an object” (20). They based this proposal on both 
neuropsychological and neurophysiological 18  evidence for independent ventral 
(recognition, “what”) and dorsal (action, “how”) streams of visual processing, 
noting that the two systems have different “output requirements,” needing 
representations with different properties to successfully function (ibid, 20). Over the 
past three decades, multiple lines of evidence have converged on the idea that 
“visual control of action is distinct from [conscious] visual perception” (Westwood 
and Goodale 2011, p. 804)19. In this section, I will draw heavily from this research 
programme to support the following claim: 
 
INACCESSIBLE MOTOR GUIDANCE: The mental content that guides 
motor action is reflectively inaccessible. 
 
Before detailing the evidence for this claim, let me first provide a bit of a 
methodological disclaimer. While the question of whether conscious perception 
guides motor action has certainly been debated within philosophy (see Clark 2001, 
2007, 2009 for the affirmative; Wallhagen 2007 & Mole 2009 for the negative), this 
section will strategically ignore this literature. The reason for this is simply that I 
wish to construct an argument against factivity that rests directly on empirical 
claims, committing myself only to those philosophical assumptions that are implicit 
in the empirical research. Of course, philosophical objections to the empirical claim 
presented in this section are still highly relevant, and I will return to them in the 
next chapter, when discussing objections that one might raise against my account. 
Keeping this in mind, I will now turn to the empirical case that motor action is 
guided by inaccessible content, discussing in turn evidence from neuropsychology, 
behavioural studies, and neuroimaging. 
The neuropsychological evidence that led Goodale and Milner (1992) to posit 
distinct visual pathways for conscious perception and action centres around two 
distinct neurological conditions, optic ataxia and visual agnosia. Both conditions 
result from lesions to the brain, and each constitutes one half of a double 
dissociation between representations for conscious perception and representations 
																																																								
18 These were studies in which monkeys had electrodes surgically implanted into their brains, which 
were then monitored the activity of specific neurons as the monkeys performed pre-trained tasks (see 
Caminiti et al. 1990 for a detailed account of standard methods). Due to the horrifying ethical 
implications of such experimentation, I have opted to exclude them from my own account.  
19 Note that much of the literature pertaining to this vision-for-perception/vision-for-action distinction 
uses “perception” in a narrow sense, meaning something approximating “perceptual experience.” As 
I will use a broader sense of perception, closer to “gaining information via perceptual capacities,” I 
will clarify the use of the narrow sense by specifying conscious perception  (see Milner and Goodale 





for motor action: Patients with optic ataxia display all the behaviours associated 
with ordinary conscious perception, but struggle to perform successful motor 
actions. On the other hand, those with visual agnosia display behaviours that 
indicate limited (conscious) perceptual capacities, but this doesn’t present a 
problem for successful motor action. Taken together, this suggests that the two 
visual systems are largely distinct, as one can be damaged without that damage 
impacting the other. 
Let’s begin with optic ataxia. As already mentioned, the condition results from 
lesions to the brain (for description of lesion sites see Perenin & Vighetto 1988, 
646-7). At the behavioural level, patients with optic ataxia struggle to successfully 
reach for visual targets (“misreaching”) (McIntosh 2010). For some this can occur 
even when visual targets are viewed directly, but more often misreaching only 
occurs for peripheral targets (ibid). For example, one such patient “performed large 
reach errors with the left hand to peripheral targets presented both in the left and 
right visual fields, and with the right hand mainly in the left visual field.” (Ferrari-
Toniolo et al. 2014, 60). However, what makes the condition rather remarkable is 
that despite consistent misreaching, patients displaying optic ataxia often “have 
intact visual fields, stereoscopic vision, oculomotor control, proprioception, motor 
abilities, and cerebellar function” (Andersen et al. 2014, 968). Despite being able to 
provide an accurate “verbal estimate of the distance or the relative position of 
objects,” patients nevertheless struggle to successfully act on those objects 
(Perenin & Vighetto 1988, 648). For Milner and Goodale, as visual perception is 
intact while motor action is impaired, this suggested a dissociation between the 
two. For our purposes, the crucial bit is that patients with optic ataxia don’t seem to 
lack any of the reflectively accessible perceptual content we might expect from a 
“normal” individual. As deficits are “independent of visual space misperception” 
(Perenin & Vighetto 1988, 643), i.e. conscious perceptual experience is unaffected, 
as are motor abilities, misreaching in optic ataxia provides evidence that reflectively 
inaccessible representations guide motor action (which lesions can adversely 
effect). 
Next, visual agnosia provides evidence that motor action is guided by 
reflectively inaccessible spatial representations, via the converse dissociation. Here 
I will focus on the famous example of the patient known as “D.F.,” who developed 
multiple (conscious) perceptual deficits after suffering “diffuse brain damage as the 
result of the carbon monoxide poisoning” (Milner et al. 1991, 421).20 Milner and 
Goodale summarized her case in the following way:  
 
Despite her profound inability to recognize the size, shape and orientation of 
visual objects, DF showed strikingly accurate guidance of hand and finger 
movements directed at the very same objects. Thus, when she was presented 
with a pair of rectangular blocks of the same or different dimensions, she was 
unable to distinguish between them. When she was asked to indicate the width 
of a single block by means of her index finger and thumb, her matches bore no 
relationship to the dimensions of the object and showed considerable trial to trial 
variability. However, when she was asked simply to reach out and pick up the 
block, the aperture between her index finger and thumb changed systematically 
																																																								




with the width of the object, just as in normal subjects. In other words, DF scaled 
her grip to the dimensions of the objects she was about to pick up, even though 
she appeared to be unable to 'perceive' those dimensions. (1992, 22) 
 
Most remarkable for our purposes is that D.F.’s lack of reflectively accessible spatial 
representations did not impede her ability to successfully act on them. D.F. 
displayed severe visual deficits in the conscious perception of motion and depth in 
addition to orientation (see Milner et al. 1991), which led to her spatial judgements, 
such as the “orientation of a large open slot,” to be “severely impaired”  (ibid, 
417). However, her motor action still appears as if guided by accurate 
representations of spatial information, suggesting it is guided by perceptual 
content “not accessible to her perceptual awareness” (ibid, 418). In short, as she 
seemed to lose certain reflectively accessible spatial representations without a 
corresponding loss in successful motor action, we can understand D.F.’s case as 
clear evidence that the spatial representations that guide motor action are 
reflectively inaccessible. 
Moving beyond lesion studies, we also find evidence for reflectively 
inaccessible guidance of motor action in the response of “normal” individuals to 
certain visual illusions. Namely, while somewhat controversial, a number of illusion 
studies seem to demonstrate dissociation between conscious perception and 
action. Key for our purposes is that visual illusions can impact reflectively accessible 
spatial content without impacting corresponding motor action, suggesting motor 
action is guided by inaccessible content immune to the illusion. Aglioti et al. first 
described dissociation in this context in their seminal 1995 paper, and Haffenden et 
al. produced similar findings (1998). However, as methodological objections have 
been voiced against these studies (Franz et al. 2000, 2008; for defence see 
Westwood & Goodale 2011, §3.2), here I will discuss an example study that 
replicates the results while adhering to the procedural recommendation of Franz et 
al. (2003).  
In a study conducted by Ganel et al., participants were observed reaching 
for cylindrical objects placed on an illusion-inducing surface (2008). The objects, 
which differed in length, were placed on the surface in such a way that lengths 
would be judged incorrectly, and unsurprisingly, “participants erroneously 
perceived the physically longer object as the shorter one (or vice versa)” (ibid, 221). 
Nevertheless, their motor actions were unaffected by the illusion: “their grasping 
was remarkably tuned to the real size difference between the objects” (ibid, 221). In 
short, these results indicate that “action and perception can be fully dissociated 
when real and illusory object size are pitted against” (ibid, 223). For our purposes, 
this provides further evidence for the claim that motor actions are guided by 
reflectively inaccessible spatial information: Despite the accessible spatial content, 
on which participants formed their judgements, representing object size incorrectly, 
the content that guided their motor actions represented the size correctly. 
Therefore, it appears that inaccessible spatial content guided the motor action 
unaffected by the illusion. 
Finally, neuroimaging studies offer compelling support for the claim that the 
mental content guiding motor action is reflectively inaccessible. This follows from 




are distinct from those of motor action. First, returning to the example of D.F., 
results of fMRI performed on her “confirm directly that D.F.’s visual form agnosia is 
associated with extensive damage to the ventral stream, and that her spared 
visuomotor skills are associated with visual processing in the dorsal stream” (James 
et al. 2003, 2463). More broadly, evidence from neuroimaging provides an 
independent case that the mental content that guides motor action is reflectively 
inaccessible, because, as argued by Kozuch (2015, see §4), such evidence suggests 
no representations are both conscious and capable of directly guiding motor action 
(“efficacious”). 
Kozuch first points out that, “while the ventral stream probably produces 
conscious representations, these representations appear to not feed directly into 
motor action” (ibid, 582). Beyond studies involving lesion cases, he highlights 
evidence that motor action doesn’t appear to increase activity in ventral stream 
areas of the brain. For example, one such study by Culham et al. (2003), using fMRI 
to observe ventral and dorsal activity during motor action, found that while 
reaching-and-grasping tasks resulted in greater dorsal activity than reaching alone, 
ventral activity did not increase. From this, they concluded, “These results suggest 
that dorsal areas . . . but not ventral areas . . . play a fundamental role in computing 
object properties during grasping” (ibid, 180). Conversely, Kozuch notes that, while 
“there is no reason to doubt that the dorsal stream produces representations that 
feed directly into motor action,” it does not appear that such representations are 
conscious (2015, 585). Returning to lesion studies, the primary evidence he cites for 
this comes from fMRI of patients with optic ataxia. In these cases, lesions to specific 
dorsal areas responsible for guiding motor action “fail to bring about deficits in 
visual consciousness” (ibid, 588). This, of course, strongly suggests that these 
representations that guide motor action do not contribute to conscious perception. 
This account is strengthened by the findings of a neuroimaging study by 
Cavina-Pratesi et al. (2007), which observed activity in ventral and dorsal areas for 
tasks such as “grasping, reaching, size discrimination, pattern discrimination, [and] 
passive viewing” (1). They found that dorsal activity displayed no modulation for 
perceptual tasks not involving motor action, whereas ventral activity did (ibid). 
Conversely, ventral activity didn’t modulate with motor tasks, while dorsal activity 
did (ibid). In short, “these areas were differentially activated depending on whether 
the task was grasping or perceptual discrimination” (ibid, 1). They concluded:  
 
The human visual system does not construct a single representation of the 
world for both visual perception and the visual control of action. Instead, 
areas in the ventral stream mediate the visual perception of objects whereas 
areas in the dorsal stream mediate the visual control of action directed at 
those same objects. (ibid, 12) 
 
To summarize, a wealth of empirical evidence from neuropsychology, behaviour, 
and neuroimaging together create a compelling case for Milner and Goodale’s two 
visual systems hypothesis. Most relevant for this project is how this helps 
demonstrate that the mental content that guides motor action is reflectively 
inaccessible. In a broad sense, this follows from the inaccessibility of information 




to two visual systems, we might understand this evidence as still supporting the 
inaccessibility claim introduced in this section, as I’ve been careful to frame this 
discussion to illustrate. In doing so, I hope to have shown that there is a strong 




4. Visuomotor Error 
 
In the previous section, I introduced a claim that will form one half of a bipartite 
empirical assumption in the next chapter’s argument against factive knowledge. In 
this section, I will discuss the second half of this assumption, the comparatively 
simpler claim that the mental content that guides ordinary motor action is not 
perfectly accurate. Of course, there is a trivial sense in which this claim is correct, as 
sometimes unsuccessful motor action might be attributable to inaccurate mental 
content: We might say an unsuccessful catch was caused by “misjudging” the 
trajectory of the object in flight, and so forth.21 This is not what I have in mind. 
Rather, my claim is that even successful motor action can be guided by mental 
content that is not perfectly accurate, and moreover that we have compelling 
empirical reason to suppose this is typically the case. In short, this claim can be 
formulated in the following way: 
 
VISUOMOTOR ERROR: The mental content that guides successful motor 
action is not perfectly accurate. 
 
The empirical support for this claim assumes a fairly simple structure. The mental 
content that guides motor action will inevitably contain some degree of systemic 
error. Sometimes this error will be significant enough that the corresponding motor 
representation cannot guide successful action. However, much more relevant for 
our purposes is that most of the time this error will not reach levels that it precludes 
successful action. Such error might lead to slight variability in reach vectors or grip 
aperture and might be observable in a controlled setting, especially in settings 
where visual feedback is supressed, preventing mid-action corrections. However, 
this error is beyond our awareness when we perform motor actions. In the next 
chapter, I will argue for the epistemological significance of this fine-grained error. 
Here I will only introduce the empirical case for it, which involves two types: 
Random error (noise) and systematic error (bias).22 
Let’s begin with noise. Upon even the most cursory reflection, we might 
recognize that motor action is unavoidably, “universally, sometimes frustratingly, 
variable” (Churchland et al. 2006a, 1085).  This variability is most obvious for tasks 
like throwing, for which even miniscule variances can impact the success of an 
action. However, even for more mundane tasks such as reaching or grasping, the 
variability inevitable for motor action is unmistakable. While of course some 
																																																								
21 Here we might note that, given the considerations from the previous section, “misjudging” might 
not be the best term. 
22 To be clear, this is not to say that all noise might be considered random error (or all bias systematic 




variability might be attributed to environmental factors, it nevertheless persists 
even when “external conditions, such as the sensory input or task goal, are kept as 
constant as possible” (Faisal et al. 2008, 292). Movement variability that is 
independent of external conditions can be attributed to noise, “random or 
unpredictable fluctuations and disturbances that are not part of a signal,” acquired 
at various visuomotor stages (ibid, 292). For example, certain noise is associated 
with the “movement execution stage,” on which “planned motor commands are 
sent to the muscles so that the movement is actually made” (van Beers et al. 2004, 
1050). Known as “execution noise,” this can be attributed to the physiology of 
muscle fibers themselves, (see Faisal et al. 2008), and is therefore acquired 
independently of the mental content that guides motor action. Execution noise, 
however, is not the only internal source of variability in motor action, and there is 
compelling evidence for noise in the mental content itself.  
Much of the variability we might observe in motor action is attributable to 
noise that is acquired before movement execution begins. This is “planning noise,” 
visuomotor noise that “arises from noisy sensor estimates of hand and target 
position and during the coordinate transformations required” to specify a particular 
movement (Apker et al. 2010, 2655).23 While it is unclear the exact proportion of 
motor variability that can be explained by planning noise, both behavioural (see 
ibid) and human neurophysiological (see Churchland et al. 2006a/b) evidence 
suggests it is a primary contributor to variation in ordinary reaching tasks. In short, 
it is clear that planning noise plays a non-trivial role in the variability of motor 
action. This, I maintain, is sufficient to conclude that the mental content guiding 
motor action is not perfectly accurate. In order to illustrate why, it might be helpful 
to first look at an example study. 
In an experiment designed specifically to investigate the interaction 
between planning and execution noise, Apker et al. observed subjects as they 
reached for various virtual targets projected in three-dimensional space, tracking 
how their movements varied depending on both target location and whether their 
hand was visible during the task (2010). While details of their analysis are likely both 
too technical and unnecessary for the purposes of my project, the basic idea is this: 
We would expect different error patterns in reaching tasks depending on the 
source of the error (execution or planning noise). Thus, by observing the actual 
patterns in reaching error, one can determine the relative contributions of 
execution and planning noise. Given the observed distribution of reaching error, 
this particular study concluded that “visual planning–related noise plays a dominant 
role in determining anisotropic 24  patterns of endpoint variability in three-
dimensional space” (ibid, 2654). Specifically, errors in these reaching tasks were 
“elongated along the depth axis” in such a way that they indicated “increased 
planning noise associated with localizing targets in depth” (ibid, 2662 & 2664). 
Interestingly, this evidence even suggests that the visual feedback from seeing 
one’s hand during motor action “does not reduce sensory uncertainty in depth” 
(ibid, 2661). As Apker et al. point out, this is consistent with the findings of 
																																																								
23 Note that while here I will be take “planning noise” to include “sensory noise” (noise involving 
initial target and hand position representation), the two are often discussed as distinct (see Shi and 
Buneo 2012).  




independent research into vision suggesting inaccuracy in depth localization (ibid, 
2662; citing McIntyre et al. 1998; van Beers et al. 1998, 2002; Viguier et al. 2001). 
This, when taken together with other studies that focus specifically on noise 
(Churchland et al. 2006a/b; Apker and Buneo 2012; Shi and Buneo 2009, 2012; 
Osborne et al. 2005) constitute a strong empirical case for the ubiquity of planning 
noise. 
I think it is clear that the best way to understand this noise, present in both 
initial sensory information and subsequent representation of spatial information in 
successive coordinate systems, is as inaccuracy, however minor, in the mental 
content that guides motor action. First, planning noise affects the representation of 
spatial information and subsequent motor commands used to guide motor action, 
which is just to say it affects the mental content that guides motor action. While 
noise in motor commands isn’t directly relevant for our purposes, noise in the 
representation of the spatial information that precedes these commands is. This 
noise, like that in the representation of the depth of visual targets described by 
Apker et al. (2010), might be easily understood as a sort of inaccuracy. The noise in 
representation of the depth of a target in 3D visual field is nothing more than 
representational deviation from the actual position of the target. Our 
representations of target position deviate from the actual position. This is inherited 
by our motor commands and ultimately results in slight motor error. Put simply, the 
mental content that guides motor action is not perfectly accurate, slightly 
misrepresenting the spatial properties of objects under action. 
In case it isn’t clear that this noise should be understood a sort of error or 
inaccuracy, the slight misrepresentation of spatial information, let’s consider what 
seems to me the only obvious alternative: inexactness. Rather than less accurate 
representations, one might instead say that planning noise results in less 
determinate representations of spatial information. Perhaps we don’t slightly 
misrepresent quantities such as position and size, but instead inexact ranges, 
correlating with noise levels. While this might seem tempting, there are two 
reasons to resist this. First, as argued by Hellie (2005), it seems intuitive that we at 
least represent colours maximally determinately, but that doesn’t preclude noise in 
the perception of colour. This doesn’t make sense if noise is understood as 
increasing indeterminacy. Moreover, there is a larger problem for positing 
inexactness. If we say that motor representations are inexact to the point that this 
inexactness can explain motor variability attributable to planning noise, then it’s 
unclear how these representations might be used to explain any specific motor 
action. If a representation of, say, an object’s location is inexact to the point that 
reaching for either of two distinct points A or B is consistent with this 
representation, how do we explain the fact that an individual reached for point A 
during trial 1 and point B during trial 2? How can the same inexact representation 
explain two distinct actions? The entire purpose of motor representations is to 
explain motor action, something they can’t do if we say they’re so inexact that 
they’re consistent with any number of distinct actions. Clearly, if we frame noise as 
inaccuracy, we can explain such observations. For trial 1, the subject represented 
the object as being located at A, and so forth. However, if the representations are 
inexact, we can no longer appeal to them to explain specific action at a desired 




Ultimately, a compelling body of evidence points to the role of planning 
noise in motor variability. For ordinary motor actions, planning noise levels won’t 
be high enough to impede our successful motor action or even for us to notice. 
However, as any noise in the representation of the spatial information used to 
guide action amounts to inaccuracy, a non-zero difference between, for example, 
represented object location and actual object location, we can understand a clear 
sense in which the mental content guiding motor action is simply not perfectly 
accurate. 
Beyond error attributable to noise, there is also compelling empirical 
evidence for systematic bias in the mental content that guides motor action. As I 
will discuss in more detail in chapter five (§2), it has been widely observed that 
representations of spatial information are biased towards our center of vision 
(Müsseler et al. 1999; Sheth and Shimojo 2001; Kerzel 2002; Adam et al. 2008; 
Fortenbaugh & Robertson 2011). 25  This “foveal 26  bias,” on which participants 
“systematically [mislocalize] the target closer to the center of gaze” (Sheth and 
Shimojo 2001, 329), is often studied using perceptual judgements (see Odegaard 
et al. 2015). However, there is also evidence for foveal bias in visual representations 
that guide motor action. For an example of this, let’s look at a series of experiments 
performed by Bock, on which participants pointed at projected targets, with 
movement restricted to an arc in the horizontal plane (1986). As participants’ hands 
were occluded from their view, when they pointed in the direction of a target, they 
had no visual feedback to correct for initial misrepresentation of target location; 
thus, any such misrepresentation became “manifest as pointing errors” (ibid, 476)27. 
Bock’s results from these experiments first confirmed “a tendency to point 
consistently past the targets by a constant amount, which was independent of 
target position for a given subject, but varied among subjects” (ibid, 477). He 
concludes that the collective effect of pointing past the target  “suggests that the 
eccentricity 28  of visual targets on the peripheral retina is over-estimated,” 
specifically observing an average of 3.83° of overestimation of target location 
radially (ibid, 481). Similar results have been observed by other studies (Prablanc et 
al. 1979; Lewald 1997; Henriques et al. 1998; Ross et al. 2015). 
Now, of course, this bias is much more pronounced in the experimental 
conditions than we might expect for everyday action, as we normally can make use 
of visual feedback during the course of motor tasks. However, the key here is that 
while visual feedback might minimize the effects of foveal bias, it does not 
eliminate it entirely (see Brenner et al. 2008).29 In this way, we might understand 
																																																								
25 Sheth and Shimojo (2001, 329) note that these sorts of observations date to at least the nineteenth 
century (citing Helmholtz 1866).  
26 The fovea is the center of vision on the retina. 
27 It is worth noting, as Bock points out, that pointing error in these studies can also be caused by 
“deficits of motor control,” not just misrepresentation of target position (ibid, 476). Therefore, these 
sorts of studies must and do take care to “study visual localization in paradigms where no time 
constraints are imposed upon the movements, and where pointing accuracy is independent of 
movement amplitude,” in order to minimize the contributions of deficits in motor control (ibid, 477).  
28 The angle on the retina from the fovea 
29 Additionally, some might worry that this bias is specifically in retinocentric representations, and 
motor action is guided by representations transformed from retinocentric coordinates. However, as 




that all the ordinary representations of locations in space that guide motor action 
will be slightly biased towards the centre of visual space. Along with planning 
noise, this bias amounts to an additional sense in which the mental content that 





With this chapter, I hope to have provided sufficient empirical groundwork for my 
subsequent argument against factive knowledge. As will become apparent shortly, 
the critical claim here is the inaccuracy of the mental content that guides motor 
action. Without inaccuracy of mental content, and therefore false beliefs, there is 
no argument against factivity. However, it is important to not lose sight of the role 
played by claim (3), that this content is not accessible upon reflection. In order for 
my argument to be even remotely plausible, it must be the case that we cannot 
access the erroneous content, given that we don’t seem to notice it. In the parallel 
arguments against factivity I present in chapter five, this inaccessibility is more 
complicated, as we have some reflective access to content but not the error of that 
content. However, everything is simplified greatly if we can just observe, as with 




2007), we have no reason to think such misrepresentation would not persist in the content that guides 
motor action. Indeed, Bock (1986) posited such misrepresentation specifically because of observation 





Against the Factivity of Knowledge 
 
 
In this chapter, I will present an argument in favour of replacing factivity with some 
weaker constraint on knowledge. I have opted to formulate this argument as a 
series of initially plausible assumptions from which an undesirable conclusion 
naturally follows. The factivity of knowledge is one of these assumptions, and the 
primary empirical claims discussed at length in the previous chapter will form 
another. Beyond this, we need only assume our ordinary practice of belief 
attribution to reach a conclusion inconsistent with our ordinary practice of 
knowledge attribution. I will argue at length that factivity is the easiest of these 
assumptions to do away with.  
In so arguing against factive knowledge, this chapter will assume a simple 
structure. In the first section, I will introduce the three plausible assumptions and 
show how an undesirable conclusion directly follows. In the sections following, I will 
anticipate a variety of objections, as well as responses to this putative problem 
other than my preferred move of replacing factivity: In section two, I will argue that 
we have multiple reasons to retain the empirical claims advanced in chapter two, 
most compelling of which is an independent conceptual argument to the same 
end. In section three, I enumerate the exact cost of discarding either our ordinary 
practice of belief or knowledge attribution, and anticipate certain objections that 
might arise at this stage, most significant of which is the idea that the mental 
content specified in assumption (1) is simply not the same type of content of 
interest to epistemologists and/or implicit in assumption (2). Section four will be 
devoted to the assumption that knowledge is factive, and I intend to demonstrate 
that replacing it with a weaker constraint comes at a modest epistemological cost, 
and is therefore the most attractive response. In the final two sections, I address 
additional concerns one might have with this argument. Section five addresses the 
objection that empirical evidence suggests that ordinary knowledge-attributing 
practices are often unreliable, and section six discusses concerns with the 
argument’s blend of naturalistic and folk epistemology.  
 
 
1. The Basic Argument 
 
This section and the rest of this chapter concern three initially plausible 
assumptions, the reasons we might have for retaining or rejecting these 
assumptions, and the relationship between them. These assumptions are as follows: 
 
(1) The mental content that guides motor action is (a) reflectively 
inaccessible and (b) not perfectly accurate.  
 





(3) Knowledge is factive. 
 
There isn’t much to say on the initial plausibility of these assumptions. The entire 
preceding chapter was devoted to establishing the expansive empirical case for (1). 
Recall that we find compelling neuroimaging (James et al. 2003; Culham et al. 
2003), neuropsychological (Westwood and Goodale 2011), and ordinary 
behavioural evidence (Aglioti et al. 1995; Ganel et al. 2008) for (1a) stemming from 
Milner and Goodale’s broader claim that the visual guidance of motor action is 
distinct from conscious perception (Goodale and Miler 1992; Milner and Goodale 
1995; 2008). Similarly, a wealth of empirical evidence suggests the mental content 
that guides motor action displays both random error (noise) (Osborne et al. 2005; 
Apker & Buneo 2012) and constant error (bias) (Bock 1986; Ross et al. 2015). While 
this error doesn’t ordinarily preclude successful action, it is nevertheless clear we 
cannot consider such content to be perfectly accurate, therefore establishing the 
initial plausibility of (1b). While I will return to the matter in section three, the 
initially plausibility for (2) is quite simple to explain, as it follows directly from our 
ordinary practice of belief attribution. Namely, we are perfectly willing to attribute a 
perceptual belief to an agent on the basis of her motor action alone. For example, 
we might attribute to S the belief that an object was “there30” on the exclusive 
basis of her attempt to act on that object, successful or otherwise.31 Of course, 
assuming the reliability of ordinary mental state attribution might be immediately 
thought to be in some sort of tension with the naturalistic approach on which we 
establish assumption (1), and I will return to this sort of concern in sections five and 
six. Until then, even if they appear to emerge from opposite poles of the 
methodological spectrum, which they do, we can at least agree on the initial 
plausibility of both. Finally, the initial plausibility of assumption (3) is simply a matter 
of it being all but universally accepted in epistemology, as discussed in chapter 
one. Beyond that, there is little to say on the matter. Regardless of whether we 
ultimately wish to retain all three assumptions, it should be clear each is at least 
initially plausible. 
The problem with committing to these three assumptions is that, as I will argue, 
it leads to following undesirable conclusion: 
 
(C) The everyday perceptual beliefs that guide successful motor action 
cannot be known. 
 
Before explaining why the above assumptions lead to this conclusion, let me first 
say a bit on what makes this conclusion so undesirable. To put it simply, accepting 
such a conclusion requires us to go against our ordinary practice of knowledge 
attribution. When an agent performs a successful motor action, we readily attribute 
all sorts of perceptual knowledge to her. Distinguishing it from incidental contact 
																																																								
30 To be clear, this isn’t the belief it is “there” in the sense that there is an object, but rather a specific 
belief about the location of that object. 
31 It may be worth noting that this holds even for cases we wouldn’t attribute such a belief on the basis 
of S’s gaze orientation. If an object isn’t in her direct line of sight, and instead on the periphery of her 
visual field, we withhold any attribution of a belief regarding the object’s position until she attempts to 




and involuntary movement, successful object-directed action requires32 an agent 
knows the object’s location and size, and most likely its orientation. We have no 
problem attributing knowledge of, for instance, object location on the basis of 
successful action, and our intuitive judgements will invariably be that she knew that 
the object she successfully acted upon was there. Why was she able to successfully 
reach out in the direction of the coffee cup? Because she knew it was there, which 
is to say her belief that the cup was there counts as knowledge. Why was she able 
to successfully grasp the handle? Because she knew it was oriented towards her, 
which is to say that her belief that the cup was oriented towards her counts as 
knowledge. Whatever instance of successful motor action we might consider, it 
seems obvious that the beliefs that guide those actions are usually known. We 
cannot retain this ordinary practice of knowledge attribution if we accept (C). 
Instead, we are faced with a skeptical result, as a non-trivial swath of our putative 
knowledge would actually be unknown. At the very least, such a result is 
undesirable. 
To understand why the above three assumptions lead to this conclusion, 
let’s start with (1) and (2). Assumption (1) specifies two properties of the mental 
content that guides motor action, and (2) specifies that belief states guide motor 
action. That is, (2) says, or might be understood to say, that whatever mental 
content guides motor action is belief content. Accordingly, (1) specifies two 
properties of the belief states that guide motor action. Per (1a), the beliefs that 
guide motor action are reflectively inaccessible, and per (1b), those beliefs aren’t 
perfectly accurate. At this point, one might interject that such a result already 
seems an undesirable conclusion, as we don’t want to deny reflective access to 
perceptual beliefs that guide successful motor action. This discussion I will leave for 
section three. All I will say here is that it’s important to not confuse such a claim 
with the more troubling one that the perceptual beliefs that we seem to obviously 
have reflective access to regarding the location, size, and orientation of objects are 
actually inaccessible. In keeping with Goodale and Milner’s description of the two 
visual systems, I am not saying that we don’t actually have access to such beliefs. 
Rather, I am saying that that accessible belief content is not the belief content that 
guides motor action. Beyond our accessible perceptual belief content, there is 
inaccessible content that guides motor action, and, of course, is also not perfectly 
accurate.33 
Next, if we grant assumption (3) that knowledge is factive, it follows that 
beliefs described by (1) and (2) cannot be known. In order to see this, let’s consider 
an object at location (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧), which is represented as being at location (𝑥 + 𝛿! , 𝑦 +
𝛿! , 𝑧 + 𝛿!).34 As discussed in the previous chapter, the noise and bias inevitable in 
																																																								
32 As will be discussed in section four, this is a bit hasty. However, even if we don’t want to go so far as 
to say these beliefs must be known, we can at least agree that these beliefs are often known. The 
same problem follows from this.  
33 As we’ll see in chapter five, this picture is further complicated by the potential for inaccessible noise 
in otherwise accessible content. 
34 Two notes here: First, as discussed in the previous chapter, it is likely that this sort of spatial 
information might be represented in spherical, not Cartesian coordinates. However, which reference 
frame or coordinates are actually used doesn’t matter for this point. Additionally, while objects 




these beliefs results in fine-grained inaccuracies in the representation of spatial 
information, such as object location. That is to say, 𝛿! values will be non-zero, and 
objects will be represented as being somewhere that they are not. Under a factive 
conception of knowledge, beliefs with such content cannot be known. If a belief 
represents an object as being located somewhere it is not, regardless of the 
magnitude of this misrepresentation, that belief is false. 
Of course, we need to proceed with caution. One might object that this is 
an unrepresentatively strong take on factivity, and that we often allow for a certain 
level of approximation for known beliefs. After all, we seem to have no trouble 
attributing knowledge for S’s belief that a cup is at the edge of the table, even if it 
is in fact offset a single micron from the edge, and likely for much larger offsets as 
well. Doesn’t this suggest that factivity is weaker than the above formulation would 
suggest? While such sentiment is understandable, I don’t think this is correct. The 
approximation here is a matter of language, not belief content. Were we to probe 
our agent’s belief that the cup is on the edge of the table, it’s unlikely we’d find she 
actually believed the cup was on the exact edge of the table. 35  The English 
sentence, “The cup is on the edge of the table,” is entirely compatible with the 
belief that the cup is in the region of the edge, but not the exact edge, and I 
expect this is normally the belief we hold when uttering such a sentence. Moreover, 
if in the course of probing the belief’s contents it was instead revealed that S 
actually did believe that the cup was on the exact edge of the table, with not a 
single micron of offset or overhang, we would then rescind our judgement that she 
knew that the cup was on the edge of the table, and explain this judgement by 
appealing to the factivity condition.36 Accordingly, it seems that our tolerance for 
approximation doesn’t extend to the position of objects as represented in the 
content of belief. While we may have no problem attributing knowledge in cases 
where the sentences used to describe beliefs are only approximately true, this 
doesn’t appear to hold when the belief contents themselves are only approximately 
true.37 
We can further illustrate this by considering that what it means for 
knowledge to be factive is simply that S knowing that p entails p. Imagine we allow 
for approximate truth in factive knowledge. Then for a case in which S knows that p, 
where p is approximately true, from factivity this entails p. However, because p only 
approximates the truth, there will be some proposition p*, which describes the way 
the world actually is, for which p ∧ p* is a contradiction. Accordingly, we might 
																																																																																																																																																													
run the same argument with 3D regions in space, but the math involved in describing the space 
occupied by even the simplest shapes is prohibitively complex for our purposes.  
35 I’m playing it a bit fast-and-loose here with the properties of mental content, relying only on 
hypothetical belief reports and not something more robust. Nevertheless, I think this is acceptable for 
the purposes of illustration.  
36 We might imagine she has any amount of justification (etc.) for her belief. If the cup isn’t exactly at 
the edge, we still judge that her belief is false and therefore unknown.  
37 These types of cases pose their own interesting problem, as it seems we’re willing to attribute 
knowledge for the approximately true, inaccessible beliefs that guide motor action, but not 
approximately true beliefs like the one that the cup is exactly on the edge of the table. For now I will 
simply say this problem doesn’t impact the latter’s ability to evidence our intolerance for approximate 




understand that if knowledge is factive, beliefs that are only approximately true 
cannot be known, regardless of how close to truth they might be. 
In this manner, we can understand why the beliefs described by (1) and (2) 
cannot be known under (3). However, even when faced with the mere approximate 
truth of the everyday perceptual beliefs that guide motor action, I would submit 
that our intuitive judgement is that such beliefs ought to count as knowledge. In 
section three, I will return to the question of whether we should indeed consider 
such beliefs to be known. Until then, it should at least be clear that this result is 
certainly undesirable. Yet it is the direct consequence of three assumptions, for 
which the rejection of any one appears undesirable in its own right. In the following 
sections I will argue that rejecting factivity is the easiest solution to this problem, by 
a wide margin. In the process of arguing for this, I will also address objections as 
they arise, with the intention of strengthening the claim introduced in this section 
that these three assumptions indeed pose a problem that cannot be solved without 
either the outright rejection of at least one or the begrudging acceptance of (C). 
 
 
2.  Why Retain the Empirical Assumption? 
 
Setting aside concerns about whether the problem described in the previous 
section is a real problem, the most pressing of which I will return to in section three, 
dropping (1), the empirical assumption that the mental content that guides motor is 
both reflectively inaccessible and not perfectly accurate, likely seems the most 
attractive solution. After all, assumption (1) describes a sort of mental content that 
might be somewhat unfamiliar from the perspective of mainstream epistemology. 
While here I will avoid the more difficult question of whether epistemologists even 
ought to be concerned with such mental content, again circling back to this in the 
next section, as a descriptive matter, it is clear that inaccessible, perceptually 
acquired content with fine-grained error properties is outside the standard 
epistemological wheelhouse. Moreover, while certainly supported by a wealth of 
evidence, it’s not as if (1) enjoys the same degree of empirical support as, say, the 
claim that the speed of light in vacuum is constant. In this light, simply disregarding 
assumption (1) likely seems an appealing option.  
In this section, I will present four reasons for resisting the impulse to 
disregard (1). The first is simply that the primary philosophical arguments that have 
been levied against the broader project of Milner and Goodale, one by way of an 
objection to Clark (2001), don’t impact the narrower claim of (1a), and there doesn’t 
appear to be any clear, extant philosophical objection relevant to (1b). Second and 
more generally, I think the impulse to disregard (1) on the basis of its empirical 
nature is fundamentally misguided. However, even if we discount the 
epistemological value of such empirical claims, we still have multiple compelling 
conceptual reasons to commit to (1). Not only might a counterfactual do similar 
theoretical work to the empirical evidence detailed in the previous chapter, albeit 
not as convincingly, but we might additionally construct independent conceptual 
arguments for both (1a) and (1b). In doing so, I hope to demonstrate that rejecting 




As mentioned in the previous chapter, beginning with his 2001 paper, Clark 
has used the Goodale and Milner program to argue for a claim similar to (1a). Clark 
first notes that philosophers generally commit to the following “Assumption of 
Experience-Based Control (EBC)”: 
 
Conscious visual experience presents the world to the subject in a richly 
textured way, a way that presents fine detail (detail that may, perhaps, 
exceed our conceptual or propositional grasp) and that is, in virtue of this 
richness, especially apt for, and typically utilized in, the control and guidance 
of fine-tuned, real-world activity. (ibid, 496) 
 
However, Clark argues that the Goodale and Milner program provides compelling 
evidence that this is mistaken, and instead offers an alternative, the following 
“Hypothesis of Experience-Based Selection (EBS)”: 
 
Conscious visual experience presents the world to a subject in a form 
appropriate for the reason-and-memory-based selection of actions. (ibid, 
512)  
 
The crucial omission from EBS is of course motor control: While conscious visual 
experience guides the selection of action, what I’ll discuss below in the context of 
“providing reason for action,” it doesn’t guide action itself. As the claim that EBC is 
mistaken and conscious visual experience isn’t an apt guide for motor action is 
quite close to (1a), I clearly need to say something about objections to Clark’s 
account. Here I will look at Wallhagen (2007), after which I will consider Mole’s 
(2009) objection directed at Milner and Goodale. In both cases, I will argue that 
neither of these objections threatens (1a). 
Let’s being with Wallhagen’s objection to Clark. Most relevant for our 
purposes is Wallhagen’s account of D.F.’s visual agnosia, the foundational evidence 
for Milner and Goodale discussed at length in the previous chapter. Wallhagen 
argues that Clark is mistaken in concluding that D.F.’s case suggests that EBC is 
incorrect, as it is plausible that D.F. actually retained her capacity for conscious 
visual experience of “the shapes, sizes and orientations of things” (2007, 556). 
Instead, Wallhagen contends that D.F. simply is unable to “form a perceptual 
judgment about aspects of form,” which doesn’t itself entail that D.F. lacks a 
conscious visual experience of the same (ibid, 556). Additionally, while not in direct 
response to the illusion studies discussed in the previous chapter as evidence for 
(1a), Wallhagen makes similar claims for visual illusions. Specifically, Wallhagen 
contends that while our conscious perceptions represent visual illusions accurately, 
“subjects simply do not notice that their visual states have this content” (ibid, 554). 
Regardless of the extent to which this this threatens Clark’s account or is 
even correct, these objections pose no threat to (1a) for the simple reason that 
Clark’s claim is far stronger than (1a). For the purposes of my argument against 
factivity, we don’t need to assume that the mental content guiding motor action is 
independent of conscious visual experience, although that would certainly get the 
job done. Rather, all that is necessary is that such content is inaccessible. 
Wallhagen does nothing to suggest the content guiding D.F.’s motor action is 




aspects of perceptual stimuli, to bring those features under concepts” (ibid, 556), 
which is to say, access those features. The same holds for Wallhagen’s account of 
visual illusions. Even if we grant that subjects in the action-under-illusion 
experiments (chapter two, section three) consciously experience the correct size of 
the objects they act on, this doesn’t suggest that they have reflective access to the 
correct size of those objects. As with D.F., their perceptual judgements indicate 
they do not. In short, because (1a) is a claim only about reflective access, not 
conscious visual experience, it is not subject to Wallhagen’s objections to Clark, 
which only target the latter. 
If we turn to Mole (2009), we find something similar. Mole’s objections are 
pointed directly at Milner and Goodale’s claim of two distinct visual systems, and 
he argues that both action-under-illusion and visual agnosia can be understood in 
terms of a single visual system. First, Mole argues that results from illusion studies 
can be explained in terms of contradictory conscious representations, without 
needing to posit separate visual pathways for each. In this case, the perceptual 
information such as object size that guides motor action is “represented through 
embodied demonstratives” (Mole 2009, 1002). For example, when a subject thinks 
“‘This disc is this big’ . . . the content of the ‘this’ is specified by a bodily gesture, 
such as the grip aperture of a grasping hand” (ibid, 1002), which can account for 
why such contradictory content isn’t obvious. Mole argues similarly in the case of 
D.F. As he maintains that “the content of an experience can be given through an 
embodied demonstrative” (ibid, 1008), Mole concludes that we can understand 
D.F.’s gestures as providing the phenomenal content that guides action, thus 
eliminating the need to posit a separate, unconscious visual system guiding action. 
However, again, even if we grant that Mole is entirely correct here, this account 
does not threaten assumption (1a) as it seems implausible to suggest that subjects 
in illusion studies or D.F. have reflective access to the content specified by 
embodied demonstratives. After all, in both illusion studies (Ganel et al. 2008) and 
descriptions of D.F. (Milner et al. 1991) there are no indications that perceptual 
reports change after action occurs. Moreover, it’s not immediately clear how we 
might ever upon reflection gain access to the spatial information represented by 
these embodied demonstratives. As with Wallhagen’s objections to Clark, even if 
we grant Mole’s claim that embodied demonstratives provide the content that 
guides motor action, it appears such content is still reflectively inaccessible. 
Next, I think we should resist any impulse to disregard (1) simply on the 
basis that it is an empirical claim. For my project specifically, this relates back to the 
naturalistic method discussed in chapter one. Since one of my primary aims is to 
increase the points of contact between epistemology and relevant empirical 
sciences, I certainly don’t consider disregarding difficult empirical evidence to be a 
serious option. Beyond this, as a more general matter, I cannot imagine that there 
is a legitimate philosophical rationale behind ignoring strong, relevant empirical 
evidence. Of course, one might argue that against specific empirical evidence on 
the basis that it is either irrelevant or too weak, but this is not at all the same thing 
as disregarding it. As the previous chapter was devoted to arguing for the strength 
of this evidence in great detail, and this chapter might be understood as arguing 
for its relevance, there does not appear to be any good reason to ignore the 




Furthermore, even if we disregard assumption (1) in its capacity as an 
empirically derived descriptive claim about actual mental content, we might take 
inspiration from this claim to construct a counterfactual that does similar theoretical 
work. Consider some case in which an evil demon or scientist or whomever alters 
someone’s mind so that the mental content that guides her motor actions is both 
reflectively inaccessible and not perfectly accurate in the precise way as described 
in the previous chapter. We can then run the same sort of argument as provided in 
the previous section, but now specifically for her beliefs. My thought is that we still 
want our theories of knowledge to be capable of handling these beliefs, from which 
the argument can continue as if we had actually accepted (1). Of course one might 
object that we don’t actually need our theories of knowledge to handle these 
beliefs, but as far as I can tell, this is analogous to the objection that beliefs with 
content described by (1) are not of epistemological interest, with the same 
arguments for and against (which will be discussed in the next section). 
Nevertheless, I do recognize that this type of argument doesn’t seem as 
convincing. Moreover, we might also note that this route doesn’t allow for an anti-
skeptical stopgap argument, which requires that our actual beliefs have the 
properties described by (1).  
Finally, I would maintain that we have compelling conceptual reason to 
posit (1) entirely independent of any empirical considerations. Let’s begin with (1a). 
If we consider any object-directed motor action, the precision required for that 
action to be successful seems to confound the mental content we can access upon 
reflection: While any accessible content seems too imprecise to guide successful 
action, and is just as compatible with failure, any content precise enough to guide 
an action to success seems implausible to posit as accessible. Take the example of 
catching a baseball in flight. Of course, before, during, and after the catch, there is 
a host of mental content that we might report on.38 We might report the ball is 
“above us” or “about 20 feet up” or “arching towards us.” At the moment of the 
catch, we might report the ball was “right above us” or “directly in front of us.” 
However, none of this is precise enough to credit with guiding with successful 
action, and is just as consistent with placing our hand in the region of the ball but 
failing to catch it. Moreover, when we try to dial up the precision of this content so 
that it might be credited with guiding a successful catch, it is no longer plausible to 
say such content is reflectively accessible. Whatever the precise location of the ball 
at the moment of contact with our hand, we do not have reflective access to it. 
However, this doesn’t preclude our ability preform a successful catch. That is to say, 
the mental content guiding that catch is, at least to some degree, reflectively 
inaccessible. Of course, this isn’t due to any feature unique to catching a ball. Any 
time we reach for an object, it is implausible to say that we have reflective access to 
the precise location and size information necessary to result in consistently 
successful action, and not a series of flailing, grasping motions in the general 
direction of that object. In short, on account of nothing more that the discrepancy 
between the precision required for successful motor action and imprecision of our 
reflectively accessible mental content, we have compelling conceptual reason to 
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conclude with (1a) that the mental content that guides successful motor action is 
reflectively inaccessible. 
Furthermore, I think we also have compelling conceptual reason for positing 
(1b). Or, more precisely, I think something like (1b) seems overwhelmingly intuitive. 
Were we capable of directly observing the mental content that guides motor 
action, it would be a remarkable surprise to learn that we represented object 
location with perfect accuracy. Of course, without appeal to empirical evidence it is 
difficult to say conclusively that we might commit fine-grain motor error attributable 
to misrepresentation. However, this too seems overwhelmingly plausible. If we 
grant this, it follows that we cannot appeal to inexactness as an alternative to 
inaccuracy, for, as argued in the previous section, such inexact representations are 
unable to explain how a particular misrepresentation might result in a particular 
motor action. In this manner, we might understand the conceptual case for (1b) as a 
simply matter of it seeming extremely likely. Perhaps this isn’t independent reason 
to accept (1b), like we have for (1a). However, I do think it makes it that much more 
difficult to dismiss (1b) offhand. The empirical evidence confirms what we strongly 
suspected.  
In the end, for the multiple reasons presented in this section, as well as the 
significant empirical case presented in the previous chapter, it would be a mistake 
to reflexively reject assumption (1). Beyond this, such a move comes at the cost of 
divorcing knowledge from empirical descriptions of mental content, on the basis of 
preserving a constraint on knowledge. I will return to this matter in section four, and 
argue that it is fundamentally mistaken to commit to this cost on such a basis. 
 
 
3. Why Retain Ordinary Belief and Knowledge Attribution? 
 
Given that you are inclined to grant assumption (1), either on the basis of the 
empirical evidence, conceptual argument, or counterexamples that might do 
comparable theoretical work to (1), it is still unlikely that you are willing to reject the 
factivity of knowledge. Instead, I think it is most likely you might object to some 
part of the claim that our ordinary belief and knowledge attribution practices pose 
any real problem for factivity, even given that we assume (1). Moreover, even if you 
do agree with my argument that (1)-(3) leads to (C), it is likelier you consider the 
cost of revising our belief and/or knowledge -attributing practices lower than that 
of rejecting factivity. In this section, I intend to address both of these potential 
responses, using my answers to obvious objections to both clarify the costs of 
rejecting (2) or accepting (C), and strengthen the argument outlined in section two. 
While different approaches might encounter different problems, every one comes 
at the cost of divorcing knowledge and action. 
This section will assume the following structure: To begin, I will clarify what 
content I have in mind for the perceptual beliefs that guide motor action. After this, 
I will consider three possible ways one might attempt to block my argument at this 
point. First, one might reject assumption (2) outright, maintaining that I am 
mistaken in taking beliefs to be the mental states that guide motor action. Next, I 
consider what appears to be the strongest objection to my account, which argues 




also simply opt to accept (C) outright. Beyond the shared cost of divorcing 
knowledge and action, each of these responses encounters specific problems, 
which I will also discuss in detail. 
As discussed in section one, the implications of accepting (1) and (2) seem 
simple enough: (1) specifies certain properties of the mental states that guide 
motor action, but doesn’t specify which states those are. (2) specifies that beliefs 
are the mental states that guide motor action, but doesn’t specify any properties of 
belief states (beyond, of course, whatever properties we implicitly take to be 
fundamental for belief states). Therefore, if we grant (1) and (2), we can conclude 
that the belief states that guide motor action have content with the specified 
properties of the content that guides motor action: The content of these beliefs is 
not reflectively inaccessible, and they are not perfectly accurate.  
This move is reminiscent of that from Butterfill and Sinigaglia, who maintain 
that the “contents of intentions can be partially determined by the contents of 
motor representations” (2012, 119). Now there is some disagreement on what 
exactly motor representations are (see Ferretti 2016). However, the key here is that 
motor representations in some way “represent action outcomes” (Butterfill and 
Sinigaglia 2012, 120). For example, when I reach for an object, that reach is guided 
in part by my motor representation of that reaching motion, in addition to my 
representation of the location of that object. Accordingly, Butterfill and Sinigaglia 
are making a parallel move here, arguing that specific content that guides motor 
action needs to be counted in the content of the intentional states. While they 
aren’t concerned with belief states specifically, their motivation is broadly the same 
as mine. If we want to say that any given mental state explains action, the content 
of that mental state needs to include those representations that guide or 
“coordinate” action (ibid, 119). 
Let’s consider an example of the content of a perceptual belief regarding an 
object’s location under object-directed action. Say, under everyday conditions, S 
reaches to grasp object O. If we freeze this example mid-reach, we have no 
problem attributing a belief of O’s location to S, and would likely express this as, “S 
believes that O is there.” Part of the content of S’s belief will be given in some 
manner by her conscious perceptual experience, that reflectively accessible content 
she might report, use in her reasoning, and cite as a reason for her action. 
However, as I have argued at length, this reflectively accessible content is 
insufficient to guide her ordinarily successful actions. In order for this belief to 
explain her action, we must also say that part of the belief’s content is determined 
by that inaccessible, slightly inaccurate content that guides her action. In this 
manner, we might understand the content of her belief to be determined by both 
accessible and inaccessible content.39 Of course, there is nothing special about 
object location, and the same argument works for size and orientation as well. 
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stream and the other to the dorsal. I think we should resist this move for the reason that this would 
result in multiple beliefs described by the same sentence, which refer to the same features of the 
same objects and jointly explain behavior. For the sake of simplicity, I want to say this is just one belief 
with content determined by both ventral and dorsal streams. Moreover, such a move doesn’t avoid 




One benefit of this move is that it allows us to continue to cite the same 
beliefs as both guiding motor action and providing reason for motor action. As a 
matter of ordinary practice, we commonly treat beliefs like those that an object is 
“there” as simultaneously guiding action and providing reason for action. In an 
example of reaching for a coffee mug, not only would we say that the belief 
regarding the location of that mug, S’s belief that the mug is there, but we might 
also cite this belief as providing reason for her action. In addition to her desire to 
drink coffee, etc., one reason she acted on the mug is that she believed that it was 
there. Given that the mental content that guides motor action is reflectively 
inaccessible, this feature is only preserved if we take both it and reflectively 
accessible perceptual content to together determine the content of the perceptual 
beliefs in question. 
The first way one might object to this picture, while still accepting (1), is by 
maintaining that the mental content that guides motor action does not determine 
the content of belief states, but rather some other type intentional state. 40 
Perceptual states seem like the best candidate for this move. Motor action could 
then be explained in terms of these perceptual states, whose contents have the 
properties specified by (1), without any unseemly epistemological consequences. 
However, there are at least two problems with such an account, the first of which is 
the cost. As this amounts to just denying (2), it comes at the expense of our 
ordinary practice of belief attribution: If beliefs don’t guide motor action, then our 
practice of attributing beliefs on the basis of motor action would seem to be 
flawed. Motor action could never be explained in terms of belief, and more 
generally, any behaviour would be unexplainable in terms of belief to the extent 
that the behaviour consisted of motor action. Here I will go no further than simply 
describing these costs. In the next section I will return to them, and argue that such 
consequences represent a much higher cost than rejecting factivity. 
Moreover, this response has another problem in that it only works if the 
properties described by (1) are unique to the mental content that guides motor 
action. If, for example, it turned out that all our perceptually acquired mental 
content was also subject to noise, or any noise-like fine-grained error, we would no 
longer be able to relegate such content to non-belief states.41 As it happens, we 
have good reason to think that something like this might be the case. First, the 
intuitive plausibility of (1b), outlined in the previous section, generalizes to all visual 
perception, not just that used for guiding motor action, and of course we might 
construct a counterexample in which all perceptual content is subjected to fine-
grained misrepresentation. Moreover, as empirical evidence suggests, “the very 
different neural processes of [conscious] perception and action are limited by the 
same sources of noise” (Osborne et al. 2005, 412). While still not reflectively 
																																																								
40 One might motivate this by maintaining that when we attribute beliefs on the basis of motor action, 
we have very different content in mind than that described by (1). Namely, implicit in those belief 
attributions is an assumption that these beliefs have reflectively accessible content determined 
exclusively by the believer’s conscious perceptual experiences. If it turns out that this assumption is 
incorrect, and that there are no beliefs with than content capable of actually guiding motor action, 
then we should withdraw these attributions. 
41 Of course we could, but this would eliminate the category of perceptual belief entirely. Within the 





accessible42, noise in conscious perception can be observed in the variability of our 
perceptual judgements (see Fiehler et al. 2010) and, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, foveal bias is widely documented in perceptual judgements (see 
Odegaard et al. 2015). I will return to this matter in detail in section two of chapter 
five. As other objections can avoid this problem without incurring any additional 
cost, this doesn’t appear the best route to take. 
I will now turn to a second objection to my argument, which improves upon 
simply denying that beliefs guide motor action. One might grant that beliefs, with 
content as described by (1), do indeed guide motor action, but maintain that these 
aren’t the sorts of beliefs epistemology is concerned with. The most common 
response I’ve encountered to this non-factive project runs along these lines, 
specifically maintaining that the beliefs in question are too fine-grained to be of 
epistemological interest. As I understand the objection, there are two ways it might 
be formulated: Epistemology might be uninterested in extant beliefs with fine-
grained properties, or it might be uninterested in fine-grained descriptions of 
extant beliefs. On the former, there are just some beliefs that have fine-grained 
properties, whereas others do not, with epistemology only concerned with those 
without fine-grained properties. On the latter, we might describe any belief in 
either coarse or fine -grained terms, with epistemology only concerned with coarse-
grained descriptions. It is important to make this distinction because the associated 
cost is different for the two formulations. For the first formulation, as the beliefs that 
guide motor action would have fine-grained properties alleged to put them 
beyond the realm of epistemology, (C) is an inevitable conclusion. As with the 
previous objection, this would serve to divorce belief from motor action. On the 
other hand, the second interpretation would allow for course-grained descriptions 
of those beliefs that guide motor action, effectively filtering out their fine-grained 
properties and allowing for (1)-(3) without accepting (C). Accordingly, this appears 
to be the more promising of the two routes. 
Regardless of which formulation you take, I think this objection is 
fundamentally mistaken in attributing this ostensible extra-epistemological nature 
to grain. Simply put, it is unclear to me in what sense the belief content guiding 
motor action could be said to be excessively fine-grained beyond epistemological 
relevance. I suspect what is meant here is just that the scale of spatial quantities I’m 
using is marginally finer than some might be used to, resulting in the individuation 
of beliefs that otherwise might be identical.43 For example, say I successfully reach 
for and grasp the same object twice. On the first attempt I represent the object’s 
position as exactly where it is, but for the second attempt I represent it as one 
micron radially outward from its actual position. I want to say that these beliefs have 
different content; under factivity only the first counts as knowledge; therefore we 
should replace factivity with a weaker constraint that counts both as knowledge. 
The objection is that epistemology isn’t interested in individuation that is this 
spatially determinate. Rather, on an epistemological account, these beliefs are 
considered identical. My response to this objection is that its account of 
																																																								
42 Note that Hellie (2005) suggests, at least in the case of color, that this noise is actually somewhat 
accessible upon careful reflection, although this seems questionable. 
43  I don’t think this objection can be understood in terms the content in question being non-




epistemological boundaries is simply incorrect. It mistakenly takes a problem with 
inaccessible content to be one with fine-grained content. 
We can understand the mistake in chalking the problem up to grain if we 
return to beliefs with “exact” content, like those discussed in section one, and 
filling in some details. Let’s say someone believes that a cup is on the exact edge 
of a table, with not a single Planck length (ℓ!) of offset or overhang, as is revealed 
by probing her belief contents. Perhaps she is able to report on the contents of her 
belief in terms of a Planck length. All that matters is that she believes the cup is on 
the exact edge. Now lets say the cup is actually 2ℓ! removed from being on the 
exact edge. Now first I think our intuitive judgement in such a case is that this belief 
is then false. It does not have the same truth conditions as the belief that the cup is 
2ℓ! off the edge. Next, if asserted out of something like stubbornness, we would 
say the belief is unjustified. However, let’s say instead our believer has an extremely 
powerful microscope that can resolve distances down to the Planck length, and 
observes that the cup is on the exact edge, but immediately after looking away a 
freak earthquake moves the cup by 2ℓ! . We would now judge that she has a 
justified false belief. Moreover, if we instead say the cup is on the exact edge, we 
might construct a Gettier-style case where a calibration error of 2ℓ! is offset by the 
freak earthquake moving the cup 2ℓ! just as she looks away, giving her a justified 
true belief we don’t judge to be known. The point in all this is that all our familiar 
judgements and epistemological framework seem to be preserved, even if we 
individuate beliefs down to the Planck length. If epistemology isn’t supposed to 
work with beliefs simply because they involve fine-grained spatial descriptions, we 
certainly need an account of why it sure looks like it does. 
Rather than epistemology not extending to fine-grained beliefs, I think it is 
much more plausible that a problem involving access is being mistaken for a 
problem involving grain. That is, the correct objection is that epistemology isn’t 
concerned with beliefs with reflectively inaccessible content. After all, while the 
seemingly benign Planck length example involves reflectively accessible content, 
the beliefs I’m concerned with do not. We cannot report on their content nor use 
them in our reasoning. This I think is the most difficult objection for my account to 
handle, with the most difficult formulation given in terms of content description: 
Epistemology isn’t concerned with descriptions of belief content on which that 
content is not reflectively accessible, and therefore we shouldn’t require our 
theories of knowledge to handle such descriptions.44 However, while I will concede 
that one consequence of my account is that some of the time some belief content 
will be inaccessible, I don’t think this is as disastrous a result as it might appear. In 
order to see this, it’s important to recall what beliefs I’m claiming will have partially 
inaccessible content. 
As discussed above, my claim isn’t that under object-directed motor action, 
for some motor representation of objection O being at (x,y,z), we might say that S 
unconsciously believes that O is at (x,y,z). While I don’t think this belief attribution is 
necessarily misguided, it does seem that if S has no access to this content, there 
might be a case that these aren’t the sorts of beliefs that epistemology is interested 
																																																								
44 After all, at least in the case that a theory of knowledge results in this “content unawareness,” it 




in. However, we might instead capture the mental content that guides motor action 
(and provides reason for motor action) with demonstrative beliefs. Taking 
inspiration from both Mole (2009) and Butterfill & Sinigaglia (2012), we might say 
that S believes that O is there, with both reflectively accessible content from 
perceptual experience and reflectively inaccessible motor representations filling in 
the content. We might also do this for size (S believes that O is that big.) and 
orientation (S believes that O is in that orientation.). 
In doing this, there are two key points I want to highlight. First, it certainly 
seems that a theory of knowledge should be capable of handling such cases. To 
begin with, we might note that these beliefs seem to align with specific knowledge-
wh attributions: 
 
LOCATION (K-WH): S knows where O is. 
 
SIZE (K-WH): S knows what the size of O is. 
 
ORIENTATION (K-WH): S knows what the orientation of O is. 
 
Far from being epistemologically uninteresting, these types of knowledge 
attributions have been subject of a good deal of contemporary epistemological 
discussion (see Parent 2014). Moreover, consistent with the fact that (at least) most 
knowledge-wh seems to reduce to knowledge-that (see ibid), we might express this 
knowledge in an explicitly propositional format: 
 
LOCATION (K-THAT): S knows that O is there. 
 
SIZE (K-THAT): S knows that O is that big. 
 
ORIENTATION (K-THAT): S knows that O is in that orientation. 
 
I think it is perfectly reasonable that we should expect our theories of knowledge to 
be capable of handling these types of knowledge attributions. At the very least, I 
can think of no obvious reason why we should exclude such attributions from the 
analysis of knowledge.  
Second, I want to highlight that, as we saw with Mole (2009), we don’t seem 
to have a problem with the content of demonstrative beliefs being somewhat 
reflectively inaccessible. In most everyday contexts, when S believes that object O 
is “there,” it seems unreasonable for us to expect S to be capable of reporting 
much of anything on the content of this belief, especially anything precise and 
quantitative that corresponds with the spatial information represented by her visual 
system. Of course, this doesn’t mean that excluding reflectively inaccessible 
content and/or demonstrative belief attribution from our theory of knowledge is 
not an available option to preserve factive knowledge, but only that the beliefs 
described by (1) and (2) aren’t obviously beyond the domain of epistemology. 
Accordingly, any such argument must overcome the problem of explaining why 




Nevertheless, one might still hold that, all things considered, we shouldn’t 
require our theories of knowledge to handle such beliefs. As with simply rejecting 
(2), it seems we must leave this open as an option. However, this move does come 
with certain costs. First, as with the previous objection, this will still serve to divorce 
epistemology from motor action. As discussed at length, the mental content that 
guides motor action will always be reflectively inaccessible, regardless of how much 
we pixelate our description. Moreover, as with rejecting assumption (1), this 
position has the added cost of distancing the epistemologically viable descriptions 
of belief content from empirically informed descriptions of mental content. I will 
return to both these problems in section four, and argue that they represent a 
higher cost than is associated with including this content and accordingly replacing 
factivity with something weaker. 
To close out this section, I would like to discuss one final route one might 
take in objecting to my account, simply accepting the conclusion (C) that those 
beliefs that guide our motor actions are unknown. Perhaps if the beliefs that guide 
motor action have the properties specified in (1), they actually can’t constitute 
knowledge after all, and it was only because we were mistaken about their content 
that we ever considered them to be known. This objection, like those preceding it, 
also has the cost of divorcing motor action from knowledge. However, there are 
two additional problems that make this a weaker objection than the previous one. 
First, I think our intuitive judgement is that these beliefs are indeed known, even 
when we specify their (slight) inaccuracy and inaccessibility. Returning to the 
example of D.F., I think it’s clear we want to say she knows object position, size, 
and orientation when she successfully acts on them, even though she has no 
reflective access to this information. Moreover, I don’t think stipulating less noise 
than precludes successful action changes this judgement. 
However, even if it turns out this intuition is not widely shared, we still have 
a compelling reason to resist accepting (C). Specifically, it opens the door for a 
form of skepticism, on which a wide swath of our putative knowledge would likely 
fail to be known. First, as noise is a product of the physical limitations of our 
perceptual system (Faisal et al. 2008; Dhawale et al. 2017), we might reasonably 
expect it for all demonstrative mental content that amounts to a belief of one’s 
perceptions. Examples of this include belief that an object is that colour (as in Hellie 
2005) or beliefs involved in perceptual judgements regarding an object’s location 
(as in Fiehler et al. 2010; Odegaard et al. 2015). In these sorts of cases, belief 
content will be determined by noisy perceptual content, which cannot be known 
under factive knowledge. I will discuss this in much more detail in chapter five. 
Moving beyond perceptual belief, we find an independent skeptical threat 
in our representation of numerical magnitude. Just as in the case of perception, 
although perhaps more surprisingly, magnitude representation is also variable and 
noisy. As I will discuss at length in chapter five (§4), it is widely accepted that our 
representations of numerical magnitudes, which guide numerical discrimination 
tasks and arithmetic calculation are inherently noisy (see Ansari and Vogel 2013), 
and they display the same trial-to-trial variability (Feigenson et al. 2004) we see in 
motor action and perceptual judgement. It even appears our representations of 
numerical magnitudes vary with gaze orientation (Brunamonti et al. 2012) and visual 




one presented in this chapter, except this time it is not our perceptual knowledge 
of the spatial properties of objects under action that is threatened, but our a priori 
knowledge of numerical magnitude.  
The fact that accepting (1)-(3) and (C) opens the door for this skepticism is 
itself a reason to look for a safer objection to my argument. Additionally, like those 
objections discussed previously, it still manages to divorce our concept of 
knowledge from action. As it appears to violate our intuitive judgements for 
knowledge and invites skepticism about a non-trivial proportion of our putative 
knowledge, while still accruing the same costs as arguing that the beliefs I’m 
interested in are uniquely beyond the interest of epistemology, this doesn’t seem 
the most viable route. 
To conclude, in this section I have looked at three ways one might respond 
to my argument, in terms of (2) and (C): One might simply reject (2), accept (C), or 
argue that the belief descriptions I take for (2) fall outside the domain of 
epistemology because they involve reflectively inaccessible content. This third 
objection appears the most viable, and comes with the consequences of both 
divorcing epistemology from motor action and distancing epistemology from 
empirically informed descriptions of mental content. In the next section, I will argue 
that there is a fundamental problem with preserving any theoretical constraint on 
knowledge at such a cost. In this manner, we might understand rejecting factivity as 
the best solution to the problem introduced in section two. 
 
 
4. Retaining Factivity 
 
Up to this point, I have explored the costs and problems associated with four 
potential responses to the argument introduced in the first section: First, one might 
simply reject assumption (1), which has the obvious cost of divorcing our account of 
knowledge from the empirically informed description of mental content. The 
primary problem with this move is that it seems we might employ conceptual 
arguments to do similar theoretical work. Next, one might reject assumption (2) 
outright. This comes with the costs of abandoning our ordinary practice of belief 
attribution and divorcing action from belief (and therefore knowledge). Moreover, 
this move has the problem of being unable to generalize beyond beliefs that guide 
action. After this, I looked at what I consider the strongest objection to my account, 
the “exclusionary response” that we shouldn’t require a theory of knowledge to 
handle beliefs with inaccessible content. This too has the cost of divorcing 
knowledge from both action and the empirical description of mental content, with a 
potential problem of accounting for why these demonstrative beliefs are beyond 
the purview of the epistemology of knowledge. Finally, one might simply accept 
(C). Beyond the cost of divorcing action from knowledge, this response comes with 
the significant problem of opening the door for a form of skepticism, not just of 
perceptual knowledge but even a priori mathematical knowledge. 
 With all this in mind, this section will argue that rejecting factivity is the best 
response to the problem presented in section one. In order to do this, I will 
proceed in the following way: First, I will make clear exactly what I mean by 




is more or less simply that it is revisionary. After this, I will contrast this cost with the 
two reoccurring costs from other responses, divorcing knowledge from (i) action 
and (ii) empirically informed descriptions of mental content. In both cases, I will 
argue that a very similar problem emerges if we accept either of these costs in 
order to preserve the factivity of knowledge: Accepting either cost on the basis of 
preserving factivity fundamentally misunderstands the theoretical work we intend to 
be done by a necessary condition of knowledge. 
First, I want to discuss what I mean with “replacing factivity” or “non-factive 
knowledge.” I do not have in mind that under a non-factive theory of knowledge, 
all justified (etc.) beliefs would suddenly be counted under knowledge, or anything 
like that. More generally, I do not have in mind that any beliefs we previously 
judged to be unknown would now count as knowledge under a non-factive 
conception, or that any beliefs judged to be known would now fail to qualify as 
knowledge.45 It is important not to take non-factive knowledge to be the same sort 
of claim as, for example, factive justification, on which whether you commit to 
factive justification will determine which beliefs you take to be justified (for 
example, Sutton 2007). As I understand it, not only might non-factive knowledge 
capture our current intuitive judgements regarding knowledge, it would allow us to 
do exactly that without insulating epistemology from empirical descriptions of 
mental content. 
As discussed in chapter one, the most attractive feature of factivity is this 
ability to capture and explain our intuitive judgements regarding knowledge. It 
provides the basis for a simple theoretical structure of knowledge and does a 
significant amount of theoretical work in explaining which beliefs are known and 
which are not. However, there doesn’t appear to be any reason why factivity is the 
only condition on knowledge that could do this same work. Imagine we replace it 
with a pseudo-factive accuracy condition, on which the standard of accuracy is 
extremely high, as I do with the “truthlikeness” condition in the next chapter. Such 
a condition, which would yield a type of analysis we might call “factivoid,” would 
certainly preserve everything known under factive knowledge, as anything that 
fulfils factivity will also fulfil pseudo-factivity. Moreover, if we require accuracy on 
par with that of the content that guides successful motor action, it doesn’t seem 
any ordinary, coarse-grained beliefs would be at risk of now being mistakenly 
counted as knowledge. There is of course, as with any analysis of knowledge, the 
worry that we might imagine some contrived counterfactual in which the factivoid 
conception over-attributes knowledge, and I will have to let this worry stand for 
now.46 Nevertheless, at least initially there doesn’t seem to be any prima facie 
reason to think that something like a pseudo-factive accuracy condition couldn’t do 
																																																								
45 Of course, it is likely that this isn’t entirely preventable. For any given non-factive analysis of 
knowledge, we might anticipate some contrived cases that that analysis is unable to handle. However, 
as this also holds for factive accounts of knowledge, this would hardly be attributable to replacing 
factivity.  
46 The only problem cases I can foresee will involve approximately true beliefs in the exact results of 
precise measurements (like the “2ℓ!” example from section three). However, it doesn’t sound 
unreasonable to posit that owing to the approximating nature of measurement itself, it is never 
appropriate to form “exact” beliefs on the basis of measurement. Thus, we might say these beliefs are 
never justified and (hopefully) preëmpt any problems they might cause for my nascent non-factive 




the same theoretical work as factivity. Again, I will discuss this matter at length in 
the next chapter. 
Accordingly, the cost of rejecting factivity cannot be understood in terms of 
a loss of theoretical work, or a failure to capture our intuitive judgements. Rather, 
the cost is that of any nascent revisionist theory: It is presently unclear what exactly 
a factivoid theory of knowledge might look like, and determining this will require 
serious philosophical effort. Many, I’m sure, might be skeptical that such an effort 
would even be successful. Furthermore, were it successful, it would then dictate the 
revision of all those epistemological accounts that presuppose that knowledge is 
factive (which is to say, most of them). This is certainly a non-trivial cost. However, I 
think it would be a profound mistake to accept either of the rival costs, (i) or (ii) 
above, as a preventative measure. In both cases, the reason is rather simple: The 
presumptive purpose of necessary conditions on knowledge is to track either our 
intuitive judgements or perhaps some objective features of cognition. 
Let’s begin with the problem of accepting a divorce of action from 
knowledge. While this is also a cost of rejecting (2), accepting (C), here I will focus 
on the cost as it specifically holds for the exclusionary response, as I think this is the 
strongest route one might take. In any case, the terms of this “divorce” might be 
thought of as something like accepting (C). If the beliefs that guide motor action 
are to be excluded from our theories of knowledge on the grounds that their 
content is partially inaccessible, then of course those beliefs cannot be known. 
Furthermore, if, as I also argued in the previous section, the demonstrative beliefs 
that guide our motor action are the same ones that provide reason for motor 
action, there is a further divide between action and knowledge. Not only does it 
follow that the beliefs that guide successful motor action cannot be known, but the 
beliefs that provide reason for rational motor action also cannot be known. In this 
way we can understand the full extent of separation between knowledge and 
action: The beliefs that guide successful motor action and provide reason for 
rational motor action cannot be known. 
The problem associated with accepting this cost is that this goes against 
both our general intuitions and intuitive judgements regarding the relationship 
between knowledge and action. These are beliefs that we intuitively judge to be 
known, and intuitively we want to say that our theories of knowledge should be 
able to accommodate these beliefs. This problem is most pronounced if we take 
something like the “Action-Knowledge Principle” as an epistemic norm, on which 
you should “treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting only if you know that 
p” (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, 577). For the case of motor action, the results 
would be devastating. Every reason for motor action, being unknowable, would 
necessarily violate this principle. Of course, we need not commit to “Action-
Knowledge” for this to be a problem. Whether we account for rational action in 
terms of knowledge, warrant (Gerken 2011), or its irreducible self (Levy 2013), the 
common thread is that, intuitively, the beliefs that guide and provide reason for 
acting (but especially the latter) are ones that are ordinarily known, or at least 
knowable. 
Of course, one might respond that even if we need to sacrifice our intuitions 
and intuitive judgements with respect to knowledge and action, this is ultimately 




terms, we can now see the fundamental problem with such a move. The very 
reason we posit necessary conditions for knowledge is to capture our intuitions and 
intuitive judgements. We expect these conditions to covary with our judgements, 
and in cases they don’t, we should not exclude recalcitrant beliefs, but rather take 
them as a reason to revise those conditions. To suggest that we privilege a 
condition like factivity over our intuitions and intuitive judgements fundamentally 
misunderstands the relationship between the two. 
I think the only clear sense in which this might be incorrect is if we don’t 
take knowledge to be some extant concept, the nature of which is evidenced by 
intuition and intuitive judgement, but rather some kind, natural or otherwise, much 
closer to a scientific than folk concept. Kornblith’s account knowledge as a natural 
kind, discussed in chapter one, presents a good example of this, as Kornblith 
explicitly rejects the idea that intuitive judgement has a major epistemological role 
to play (2002). However, if you go this route, it’s unclear how you might possibly 
accommodate the cost of divorcing knowledge from empirical accounts of mental 
content. Rejecting empirical claims on the grounds of retaining factivity is obviously 
antithetical to such a naturalistic project. Moreover, even on a weaker version of 
epistemological naturalism, like Goldman’s, it is still unimaginable that one might 
be willing to accept the cost of divorcing epistemological from the empirical 
description of mental content. In short, whether one commits to analytic or 
naturalistic assumptions about the study of knowledge, we can understand that, 




5. Folk Knowledge Attributions 
 
The above argument has relied on the assumption that the analysis of knowledge 
should seek to preserve our ordinary knowledge-attributing practices. It is on the 
basis of our ordinary knowledge attributions that I conclude both that (i) we seem 
to judge that the false beliefs that guide motor action are still known and (ii) we 
face a skeptical problem if we don’t consider these beliefs to be known. However, 
there is a concern here that I place too high a value on the preservation of these 
epistemic folk practices, a concern that is likely heightened by the very naturalism 
that my argument requires. After all, there is a body of empirical evidence that 
suggests that our ordinary practices of knowledge attribution can sometimes be 
quite troublesome, leading some like Gerken (2017) to propose an epistemological 
method on which these practices play a more constrained role. It is tempting to 
simply chalk this up to a fundamental disagreement in method. After all, it’s not as 
if the primacy I’m granting ordinary knowledge attributions is especially unusual. 
However, I think simply resting my argument against factivity on the 
methodological assumption that we fully preserve folk attributions leaves the 
argument in a rather weak position. In the light of an independent empirical case 
against the full incorporation of folk attributions, the more natural conclusion would 
seem to be that the familiar methodological assumption is flawed, and that I’ve 
simply misidentified a novel argument for restricting the epistemological role of folk 




The purpose of this section is to address this type of concern. In order to do 
so, I’ll follow Gerken’s account somewhat closely, first looking at the troublesome 
folk practices he identifies, and then the methodological revisions he proposes. In 
doing so, I intend to demonstrate that this sort of account does not pose any real 
problem for my argument against factivity. In short, our ordinary practice of 
attributing knowledge in the cases of the false beliefs that guide motor action are 
not problematic like other folk judgements might be. Therefore, even following 
Gerken’s proposed restrictive method, the folk practice in that case is not easily 
discarded.  
Gerken’s methodological recommendations derive from three “shifty patterns 
of knowledge ascriptions” we might observe empirically47: 
 
The first one is an alternatives effect—roughly, the inclination to deny S 
knowledge that p in the face of a salient alternative, q. The second effect is 
a contrast effect—roughly, the idea that whether an alternative, q, to S’s 
knowledge is “in contrast” partly determines our inclination to ascribe 
knowledge. The third effect is a practical factor effect—roughly, the effect of 
salient practical factors on our inclination to ascribe knowledge. (ibid, 20) 
 
In order to illustrate each of these effects, I’ll formulate a version of each specifically 
involving knowledge attributions associated with motor action. 
 
Base Example:  At a coffee shop, under ordinary circumstances, 
Sanna repeatedly reaches for and successfully grasps her cup of 
coffee. Does Sanna know where her cup is? 
 
Salient Alternatives Example48:  At a coffee shop, under ordinary 
circumstances, Sanna repeatedly reaches for and successfully grasps 
her cup of coffee. However, if a cunning prankster (1) secretly 
replaced Sanna’s glasses with ones that that made it appear to her 
that the cup was actually much closer than it was and (2) without 
Sanna wising to the prank, expertly placed the cup in Sanna’s hand 
whenever Sanna went to pick it up, Sanna wouldn’t know where her 
cup is. As it happens, Sanna hasn’t checked the veracity of her 
glasses, nor her surroundings for such a prankster. Does Sanna know 
where her cup is? 
 
Contrast Effect Example 49 :  At a coffee shop, under ordinary 
circumstances, Sanna repeatedly reaches for and successfully grasps 
her cup of coffee. There are other cups on the table that look 
																																																								
47 See Shaffer & Knobe (2012), Nagel et. al (2013), Buckwalter (2014b), and Buckwalter & Schaffer 
(2015) for empirical evidence for the alternatives effect; Shaffer & Knobe (2012) and Gerken & Beebe 
(2016) for the contrast effect, and Pinillos (2012) and Sripada & Stanley (2012) for the practical factor 
effect.  
48 This is based on the format of Nagel’s (2010) adaptation of Cohen’s (2002) table example.  





indiscriminable from her cup. Does Sanna know where her cup is? 
Does Sanna know what cup is hers? 
 
Practical Factor Example 50 :  At a coffee shop, under ordinary 
circumstances, Sanna repeatedly reaches for and successfully grasps 
her cup of coffee. Rather unexpectedly, an evil scientist bursts 
through the doors, with a cup-grasping robot in tow. This robot is 
designed to grasp at coffee cups, guided by representations of a 
mug’s location transmitted into it from an external source. The evil 
scientist announces that he has taken Sanna’s entire extended family 
hostage. The only way they will be released safely is if the robot 
successfully grasps Sanna’s coffee cup on the first try, guided by a 
real-time uplink of Sanna’s dorsal-stream representation of the mug’s 
location. Does Sanna know where her cup is? 
 
Were these all paradigmatic examples of their respective effects, we might expect 
to not judge that Sanna has knowledge in light of the salient alternative, judge that 
Sanna doesn’t know what cup is hers despite knowing where her cup is, and judge 
that Sanna doesn’t know where her cup is when the safety of her entire extended 
family is at stake. Of course, I’m not going to claim that here I’ve captured the 
troublesome judgements sometimes associated with these effects. My intention 
here was simply to highlight their respective formats. Even at this point we might 
note that our attributive practice in the case of motor action is nothing like these 
three effects, which I’ll discuss more shortly. 
On the basis of the troublesome patterns of folk judgement displayed in 
these three effects, Gerken suggests that the role of folk judgements in 
epistemology needs to be constrained. He introduces multiple methodological 
principles on this basis, the most relevant of which is the “Principle of Principle:” 
 
Intuitive judgments provide significant evidence only if they can be 
theoretically integrated in a principled manner. Similarly, rejections of robust 
patterns of intuitive judgments must be principled. (2017, 60) 
 
At this point, there are two distinctions to be made between our folk attributive 
practices associated with motor action and those that Gerken highlights. First, it is a 
rather simple matter to integrate these practices into epistemological theory. As I 
demonstrate in the next chapter, not only is the non-factive analysis theoretically 
viable, but it is even theoretically advantageous, most notably allowing us to unify 
the epistemological and scientific uses of “knowledge” under a single concept. 
Moreover, knowledge attributions associated with motor action are far more 
ubiquitous and robust than those in the alternatives, contrast, and practical factor 
effects. The fragility of folk judgements under these effects is underscored by my 
apparent inability to reproduce them in the “coffee shop” examples. We might 
easily contrast this with our attributions involving motor action. Under ordinary 
circumstances, we simply judge that the beliefs that guide successful motor action 
																																																								




are known. This is not some rare and elusive “effect” elicited by a narrow range of 
conditions, but a familiar fact of daily life. 
In short, I think we can confidently conclude that the folk knowledge-
attributing practices I seek to preserve in arguing against factivity simply do not 
display the hallmarks of folk practices we might want to revise. They are robust and 
ordinary, and the analysis of knowledge might accommodate them without too 
much trouble. Moreover, as we’ll see in chapter five, we find equally robust and 
ordinary folk practices for both perceptual judgement and numerical magnitude, 
which also violate the principle of factivity. All this suggests that these are exactly 
the sorts of practices we want necessary conditions on knowledge to track. They 
are not anomalies we might easily discard. 
 
 
6. Naturalistic and Folk Epistemologies 
 
To close out this chapter, I want to briefly address an additional worry one might 
have about my methodology. The argument against factivity I’ve presented 
requires a blend of naturalistic and folk commitments. On the one hand, we need 
to accept a highly empirical description of mental content, but on the other hand 
we also need to accept our folk practices of forming judgements about this 
content. The tension between these two commitments is immediately obvious, and 
might lead someone to question why we should seek to marry naturalistim and folk 
practices in the first place. Perhaps the apparent problem for the factivity of 
knowledge is only a vestige of an unholy marriage between two disparate methods.  
My response to this sort of concern is simply that I don’t think that either 
naturalistic or folk elements are necessary to construct an argument against 
factivity. First, if we abandon folk practice entirely and commit to a singularly 
naturalistic account of knowledge, it is almost certain that this account will need to 
be non-factive, given that this is how “knowledge” is used is psycho-cognitive 
research (see chapter four, section three). Next, I think that our folk tendency to 
attribute knowledge to beliefs that are very close to true, guide successful motor 
action 51  but have minute, fine-grained error is independent of any empirical 
description of mental content. As I argued above (§2), I think that the theoretical 
work done by “Two Visuals Systems” and planning noise might also be done by 
conceptual argument, albeit perhaps not as convincingly. In short, I think that one 
might construct an argument against factivity either only on the basis of epistemic 
folk practice or only on the basis of a hard-line epistemological naturalism. 
This then seems to raise the question of why I’ve opted for an argument 
that utilizes both naturalistic and folk components. The simple answer here is that 
my intention is to advance the strongest argument against factivity that I can 
devise. Moreover, as discussed in chapter one, I think both empirical findings and 
folk practices have key epistemological roles to play, and it is when we consider 











As it currently stands, the above argument against factivity has two key weak 
points. First, I have not satisfactorily established that factivity might be replaced 
with a weaker condition that might do the same theoretical work, or even discussed 
much of what this condition might actually look like. This is the primary task of the 
next chapter. Second, I have not satisfactorily established that there is a skeptical 
problem associated with retaining factivity. This is the task of chapter five. 
To conclude, I will simply restate what I have argued here: According to a 
substantial body of evidence, the mental content that guides motor action slightly 
misrepresents the world. On the simplest read, this means that the beliefs that 
guide motor action are never true (i.e. anti-factive). However, as we still want these 
beliefs to count as knowledge, we must replace factivity with something weaker 
that can accommodate these beliefs. Various objections to this picture all either 
come at the cost of ignoring relevant empirical research and/or preventing the 
beliefs that guide and provide reason for action from ever being known. Accepting 
these costs on the basis of retaining a constraint on knowledge is a fundamental 
mistake, as we expect such constraints to track our intuitive judgements and 
(possibly) properties of cognition, not the other way around. Accordingly, we can 
understand the best option in this case is to accept that visuomotor noise 











Chapter 4:  




In the previous two chapters, I advanced an empirical argument against the factivity 
of knowledge. A large part of this argument rested on the conjecture that a non-
factive analysis of knowledge might do the same epistemological work as a factive 
one. While I hinted at what such an analysis might look like, the details were far 
from complete. The purpose of this chapter is to fill in these details. Here I will look 
at three candidate analyses of knowledge, discussing them in order from most to 
least conservative. The purpose of these discussions is not to find a perfect analysis 
of knowledge, as such a result is beyond my present capacity to deliver. Rather, the 
intent of this chapter is to demonstrate that what I will call “factivoid” analyses of 
knowledge are viable. That is, an account of knowledge might shift from factive to 
factivoid without encountering any new problems with the under-attribution or 
over-attribution of knowledge.52 Moreover, as non-factive knowledge allows us to 
accommodate both empirical data and ordinary attributions in cases like motor 
action, it is clearly preferable to a factive conception. Additionally, as will become 
clear in the final section, it also allows for more flexible theories of knowledge, 
which might accommodate both epistemological and scientific usage of 
“knowledge.” 
This chapter assumes a straightforward structure. After a brief, preliminary 
clarification on what I mean by “factivoid,” I will simply discuss each candidate 
analysis in turn. Each section will be devoted to one such analysis, and structured in 
the same manner. First, I will introduce the analysis and give background on its 
origins. After this, I will first consider problems that that analysis might have with 
under-attributing knowledge, followed by a consideration of problems it might 
have with over-attribution. In each case, I intend to show that moving from factive 
to factivoid results in no new under or over -attribution of knowledge. Finally, in 
section four, I return to claim that factivity is needed to explain specific linguistic 
intuitions (introduced in section two of chapter one). 
The first analysis I will discuss is justified truthlike belief. This is the most 
conservative analysis of the three, the primary purpose of which is to demonstrate 
that a non-factive constraint on knowledge might do all the same theoretical work 
as factivity. After this, I introduce a non-factive version of robust virtue 
epistemology. This analysis also serves to illustrate the viability of a non-factive 
replacement for factivity. Additionally, it also offers an explanation for the sort of 
non-factive constraint required. Finally, on an especially speculative basis, I use the 
framework of robust virtue epistemology to offer a broader account of knowledge, 
which is able to unify both epistemological and psycho-cognitive senses of 
“knowledge.” 
																																																								
52 To be clear, a theory T under-attributes knowledge for proposition p just in case (i) we judge that p 
is known and (ii) T entails that p is unknown. Conversely, T over-attributes knowledge for p just in case 






0. “Factivoid” vs. “Non-Factive” 
 
Before detailing candidate factivoid analyses of knowledge, I first want to clarify 
what I mean by “factivoid” and distinguish it from “non-factive.” As a non-factive 
state is simply a state that can link an agent to either truth or falsehood, a non-
factive analysis of knowledge is simply an analysis on which knowledge that p does 
not entail p. In order for a non-factive analysis of knowledge to even seem 
plausible, we must place certain restrictions on which sorts of falsehoods might be 
known. The restriction I will use here is that, in addition to true propositions, only 
truthlike false propositions might also be known (see §1.1). Roughly, false beliefs 
might be known, but only if they are very close to the truth. A factivoid account of 
knowledge is one for which only true or truthlike propositions are known. So 
defined, a factivoid analysis of knowledge is a type of non-factive analysis of 
knowledge, seemingly the only type that even makes it past the smell test.  
 
 
1. Justified Truthlike Belief 
 
In this section, I will introduce the first of three candidate non-factive analyses of 
knowledge, justified truthlike belief (JTlB). As this is nothing more than a 
modification of justified true belief (JTB), it is the most conservative of the three 
non-factive accounts I will discuss in this chapter. Since it is based on JTB, it will of 
course retain all the same problems of JTB. Nevertheless, JTlB as a theory is 
instructive because it illustrates the viability of weakening factivity specifically and 
factivoid knowledge generally. We might substitute in a weaker condition for 
factivity in a way that doesn’t introduce any new under or over -attribution of 
knowledge. The idea here is that if we hold the justification and belief conditions 
fixed, we can observe that a properly formulated non-factive account can do all the 
same work as a factive account, while also handling the cases introduced in the 
previous chapter. 
In discussing the analysis of knowledge as justified truthlike belief, this 
section will proceed in the following way: First, I will introduce the truthlikeness 
condition on knowledge, and explain what it might mean for a belief to itself be 
truthlike. After this, I will consider possible problems with under and over -
attribution. As all true beliefs will be truthlike, there isn’t a risk of under-attributing 
knowledge. However, there is a worry that it might over-attribute knowledge in 
cases, like those noted in the last chapter, of approximately true false beliefs that 
are more reflectively accessible. I will argue at length that such cases don’t actually 
present a problem for even this, the simplest non-factive account. 
 
1.1 The Truthlikeness Condition 
 
The most straightforward way we might adapt to non-factive knowledge is to 
replace the factivity constraint with a weaker necessary condition. My proposal for 




The beliefs that guide motor action are problematic for standard 
epistemological theory because of their asymptotic relationship with the truth: They 
are often very close to truth. Learning processes might reduce noise, getting them 
even closer to the truth (see Dosher and Lu 2017). Under ordinary conditions we 
even judge them to be known. Nevertheless, given the coarse-grained, binary 
nature of the concept of truth, they still count as false. In order to capture this 
proximity to the truth displayed by some false beliefs and not others, we need a 
more fine-grained concept. The best option I see here is to simply go with a 
concept that corresponds roughly with the “distance” of a proposition from the 
truth. Thankfully, one such concept, truthlikeness, has already been described.53  
First coined by Karl Popper (1963), “truthlikeness” is used interchangeably 
with verisimilitude as a gauge of the approximation of truth. Popper first introduces 
the concept as a means of evaluating the extent to which scientific theories 
correspond with the truth:  
 
I believe that we simply cannot do without something like this idea of a 
better or worse approximation to truth. For there is no doubt whatever that 
we can say, and often want to say, of a theory t2 that it corresponds better to 
the facts, or that as far as we know it seems to correspond better to the 
facts, than another theory t1. (ibid, 232) 
 
Popper takes truthlikeness to be not just a property of scientific theories, but of 
individual statements as well, defined as “something like the difference of the truth-
content and the falsity-content” of a statement (ibid, 393). One key feature 
highlighted by Popper is that truthlikeness is scalar and continuous. The 
truthlikeness/verisimilitude of statement 𝑎, 𝑉𝑠(𝑎), might assume any real number 
between −1, the truthlikeness of a contradiction, and +1, the truthlikeness of the 
truth (ibid, 391-7). That is, −1 ≤ 𝑉𝑠 𝑎 ≤ +1. While we need not commit to the 
details of Popper’s account54 to utilize truthlikeness in this manner, this is the basic 
idea of truthlikeness I will use going forward, a scalar measure of verisimilitude.  
Since truthlikeness is scalar, like justification, we might say that certain beliefs 
are more truthlike than others. Thus, for in order for the concept of truthlikeness to 
work as a condition of knowledge, we must set a specific threshold of truthlikeness 
necessary for knowledge. The result is the truthlikeness condition of knowledge. 
 
TRUTHLIKENESS CONDITION FOR KNOWLEDGE: S knows that p only if p is 
sufficiently truthlike. 
 
In order for this to be a plausible replacement for factivity, the threshold for 
sufficient truthlikeness needs to be very high. Otherwise, any analysis of knowledge 
built on such a condition will encounter intractable problems with over-attributing. 
While we might simply leave it at that, I think there is an obvious standard for 
truthlikeness we might posit, the truthlikeness of successful cognitive function in 
																																																								
53 More recently, Elgin has argued for the “epistemic acceptability” of false propositions that are “true 
enough” (2017, 9; see also 2004). While Elgin doesn’t think that “true enough” propositions might be 
known, the concept of “true enough” is notably similar to that of truthlikeness. 




ordinary conditions. As we will see below (§1.3), the truthlikeness displayed by 
perceptual beliefs that guide successful motor action appears to be a viable 
standard for a necessary condition on knowledge. Finally, we might note that in 
replacing factivity with truthlikeness, we retain the intuition that there is a close 
relationship between knowledge and truth. In adopting a non-factive analysis of 
knowledge, we need not abandon the idea that there is a, as put by Buckwalter, 
“powerful and important relationship between knowledge and truth” (2014a, 407). 
 
1.2 Under-attribution  
 
Given that truthlikeness is a weaker condition than factivity, it doesn’t appear JTlB 
will pick up any problems with under-attributing knowledge as the result of 
truthlikeness itself. If a belief is true, then it will be sufficiently truthlike. Therefore all 




JTB is especially famous for problems with over-attributing knowledge in Gettier 
cases (1963), and it also appears to over-attribute in cases of probabilistic evidence 
(Hawthorne 2004; Friedman and Turri 2015). While JTlB will inherit these 
shortcomings, here I am only interested in novel over-attribution, cases in which the 
truthlikeness condition itself is responsible for JTlB over-attributing knowledge.  
In the previous chapter, we observed that our intuitive judgements seem to 
differ for different cases of almost-true, fine-grained belief content. While we judge 
that ordinary perceptual beliefs are known, even if their content is partially 
determined by noisy, reflectively inaccessible motor representations, the same 
doesn’t hold for approximately true beliefs that might emerge in the use of some 
high-precision measurement device, resulting in reflectively accessible but slightly 
inaccurate belief content. If this is correct, it appears to allow us to imagine cases in 
which justified reflectively accessible false belief A is more truthlike than justified, 
reflectively inaccessible false belief B, but A is unknown while B is known. If belief B 
is something like the ordinary perceptual beliefs that guide motor action, it seems 
belief A would then count as knowledge under JTlB. In this manner, we could 
construct novel over-attribution cases for the truthlikeness condition. However, as I 
will argue here, there is a problem if we try to actually find these beliefs. Given the 
requirements of constructing truthlike beliefs that we judge to be clearly unknown, 
these beliefs will never be sufficiently justified to qualify as knowledge.  
In order to argue this point, this subsection will proceed in the following 
way: First, I will work through a couple examples until we get to beliefs with 
reflectively accessible content that are more truthlike than that of the perceptual 
beliefs that guide successful motor action, which we clearly judge to be unknown, 
taking care to note the parameters required for such beliefs. Most significantly, it 
only appears we might form such beliefs on the basis of measurement. After this, I 
will present two arguments why these sorts of beliefs will never count as 
knowledge. First, it seems we might describe them as inferential beliefs that rely on 
a false premise. Second, and more generally, it doesn’t appear it is ever 




never be justified. Accordingly, we can account for our judgements without having 
to posit some weird, likely multipartite condition that covaries with reflective 
access. We judge these beliefs to be unknown because one can never be justified 
in believing them. Thus, there is no over-attribution problem for the truthlikeness 
condition.  
In order to understand what sort of cases might prove difficult for JTlB, let’s 
begin with an example of a belief like those detailed in the previous chapter, which 
we judge to be known despite being only approximately true: 
 
Randy reaches to grasp the coffee mug in front of him. Accordingly, 
we attribute a perceptual belief to Randy regarding the mug’s 
location, a belief that guides his motor action: Randy believes that the 
mug is there. The content of this belief is partially determined by a 
reflectively inaccessible motor representation of the mug’s location. 
While this representation is more than sufficiently truthlike to 
successfully guide Randy’s motor action, it is slightly noisy. 
Accordingly, it represents the mug as being at a location it is not. 
Nevertheless, our intuitive judgement is that when he initiates his 
movement, Randy knows that the mug is there. 
 
If we wish to consider a belief that approximates truth in this way, but is reflectively 
accessible, the first thing we might try is simply imagining we make our motor 
representations reflectively accessible. Consider we continue Randy’s story in this 
vein: 
 
. . . Unbeknownst to Randy, an evil scientist has spiked Randy’s coffee 
with a drug that induces new neural pathways in the brain, providing 
the taker reflective access to all previously inaccessible dorsal-stream 
and low-level representations. This access is similar to memory 
retrieval. While not present in a constant stream like visual 
experience, if Randy reflects on this information he might access it. 
Upon reaching for his coffee mug a second time, he does just that. 
Now for Randy’s belief that the mug is there, Randy can report the 
content of “there” in terms of three-dimensional egocentric 
coordinates. Again, planning noise results in this belief not being 
perfectly accurate. However, one side effect of this drug is that the 
accuracy of motor representations is drastically increased. This 
reflectively accessible content is much more accurate than the 
previous, inaccessible content, resulting in a more accurate belief. 
 
This I think is an odd case, and I can’t say that I have a strong intuition one way or 
the other. I’m tempted to say that Randy still has knowledge, but it’s not clear 
whether this is an intuitive judgement anymore or simply the product of my 
theoretical commitments. However, as it seems likely that the murkiness emerges 
from the strange mental content, we might remove this to construct a case in which 
we judge highly truthlike but false beliefs to be unknown. As the content in 




being perfectly accurate, the only obvious source of such beliefs seems to be 
quantitative measurement. If the content isn’t quantitative, it’s unclear how it might 
fulfil the accuracy requirements. Similarly, without relying on measurement, it’s also 
unclear how we might achieve sufficient accuracy while maintaining reflective 
access and some ostensible source of justification.55 Accordingly, we might imagine 
something like the following: 
 
Jan, a benevolent scientist, invents an extraordinary device that can 
determine and display the exact location of any object, down to the 
Planck length (ℓ!), in any conceivable reference frame. After getting 
Randy’s neural pathways and perceptual capacities back to normal, 
she uses this device to measure the location of the coffee mug in the 
same egocentric coordinates as the inaccessible motor 
representations that guide Randy’s motor actions on the mug. 
However, immediately after doing so, a freak, imperceptible 
earthquake shifts the mug 1ℓ!  radially towards Randy. Thus, when 
Jan looks at the display screen and forms the belief that the mug is 
exactly at (𝑟, 𝜃,𝜑), with the content of this belief being determined by 
her reflectively accessible representation per her measurement, her 
belief content is far more accurate than Randy’s. However, it is still 
not true, only truthlike. 
 
Despite Jan’s belief being far more accurate than Randy’s, it seems we intuitively 
judge that she doesn’t know that the mug is at (𝑟, 𝜃,𝜑), whereas Randy does know 
where the mug is when he acts on it. Given that Jan’s belief appears truthlike, and 
at least initially appears to be justified, this poses a challenge for the truthlikeness 
condition and JTlB. It seems this might be a case of novel over-attribution on the 
part of JTlB. Here I will describe two responses we might give to this sort of 
problem: We might (1) maintain that knowledge cannot be inferred from a 
falsehood, or (2) note that it seems inappropriate to ever form an exact belief on 
the basis of measurement. 
One might at first be tempted to abandon truthlikeness, or any unitary 
condition that captures accuracy, and instead maintain that there are different 
standards of knowledge depending on whether certain content is reflectively 
accessible. However, this would certainly result in an undesirably two-tiered 
replacement condition for factivity and strikes me as unsatisfyingly ad hoc. 
Furthermore, I think we have good reason to suspect that reflective accessibility 
isn’t the relevant feature here. Besides the matter of reflective accessibility, there 
are other distinctions we might draw between Jan and Randy’s respective beliefs. 
One critical difference between Jan’s and Randy’s respective beliefs about 
the location of the mug is the source of their respective belief content. Randy’s 
belief content is entirely perceptual, in this case the direct result of his visual 
capacities. However, Jan’s belief content, as it is determined by a measurement, is 
not entirely perceptual. Rather, it results from an inference she makes from her 
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illustrated in the second vignette (above), this seems to come at the expense of the clarity of our 




perception of that displayed measurement, along with a facilitating implicit 
assumption: 
 
(P1) The measuring device displays the position of the mug as being 
(𝑟, 𝜃,𝜑). [perception] 
 
(P2) If in its current configuration the measuring device displays the 
position of the mug as being (𝑟, 𝜃,𝜑), then the mug is exactly at 
position (𝑟, 𝜃,𝜑). [implicit assumption] 
 
(C) The mug is exactly at position (𝑟, 𝜃,𝜑). 
 
In this manner, we can understand that to the extent to which it is determined by 
the measuring device, Jan’s belief that the mug is there will be inferential. 
However, the problem with this inference is that it is based on a false premise. 
When Jan forms her belief, P2 is false. It is not the case that the machine displaying 
position (𝑟, 𝜃,𝜑) entails that the mug is at position (𝑟, 𝜃,𝜑). If we posit “no false 
premises” as a necessary condition for knowledge, one might appeal to this to 
explain why she lacks knowledge, without needing to posit separate 
epistemological standards for knowledge depending on reflective access. 
While I think some might find this response attractive, this account is not 
without its limitations. First, it does still require we place an additional constraint on 
knowledge itself. Although it doesn’t seem as arbitrary as positing separate 
constraints on knowledge for accessible and inaccessible content, I still think this 
leaves something to be desired. Next, while I won’t discuss it here, I should at least 
note that a number of authors have recently argued that we can indeed infer 
knowledge from false belief (Warfield 2005; Fitelston 2010; Luzzi 2010; for a recent 
response see Schnee 2015). Finally, this still does seem to set up multiple standards 
for knowledge, a factive standard for inferential knowledge and a non-factive 
standard for perceptual knowledge. Again, while this divide looks less arbitrary than 
positing a non-factive standard for knowledge involving noisy, reflectively 
inaccessible content, and a factive standard for (tentatively) everything else, it still 
strikes me as a unsatisfying. I think we can do better. 
There is a more intractable problem with cases like Jan’s belief (quantitative, 
fine-grained, extremely but not perfectly accurate, reflectively accessible content 
formed on the basis of a measurement) than the potential for unreliable 
judgements or being based on a false premise. In order to understand this 
problem, we first need to note two necessary features of these cases so that they 
might compare to noisy perceptual content: They must be based on measurement, 
and their content must be exact. They must be based on measurement because 
there appears no alternative means by which we might rationally acquire beliefs 
with fine-grained error comparable to that caused by noise in human perception. 
Of course one might base such beliefs on nothing at all, but these won’t pose a 
challenge for JTlB because they won’t be justified. Furthermore, the content of 
these beliefs must be exact because if it is not, we judge them to be known and 
there is no longer any complication for a non-factive account. Consider if instead of 




her reflectively accessible representation is that the mug is somewhere close to 
(𝑟, 𝜃,𝜑), and this is what determines the content of her belief that the mug is at 
(𝑟, 𝜃,𝜑), we simply judge this belief to be known. 
However, the problem that emerges for cases with both these properties is 
that it never seems appropriate to form an exact quantitative belief on the basis of 
measurement. 56  At an intuitive level, it seems we judge a speaker is doing 
something wrong if they report an exact belief on the basis of a measurement. 
Imagine someone uses digital callipers, precise to the nearest one tenth of a 
millimetre, to measure the diameter of a cylinder. Upon doing so, they report the 
diameter to be exactly 5.17 cm. When pressed, they don’t concede that this report 
wasn’t meant to be exact, and perhaps the diameter isn’t exactly 5.17 cm, but just 
some value close to it. They insist on the basis of their measurement that the 
diameter of the cylinder is exactly 5.17 cm. Even before we fill in the details, there 
seems to be something wrong with this belief. Furthermore, even if we specify that 
this person used the callipers competently, and that the object happens to be 
exactly 5.17 cm, it seems their belief is profoundly mistaken. In fact, it seems that 
even granting that the belief is true, we don’t judge it to be known.57 At the very 
least, this will hold for any actual case involving exact belief and measurement. This 
I think is what our intuitive judgements are responding to when we judge that Jan’s 
belief is unknown. It is simply in the nature measurement that it does not provide 
an adequate basis for beliefs with exact quantitative content. Or, put another way, 
these beliefs are not justified.  
This observation that it seems we are never justified in forming exact beliefs 
on the basis of measurement corresponds well with standard metrological58 theory 
and what has been called the “epistemology of measurement” (Mari 2003)59. It is 
widely recognized that any actual measurement will be subject to inevitable 
uncertainty from multiple sources, including environmental factors and limitations 
on the instrumentation (ISO 1993). Additionally, uncertainty is now generally 
considered to be fundamental to the nature of measurement itself, the product of 
the modelling required of measurement:  
 
Against the tradition, which has considered measurement able to produce 
pure data on physical systems, the unavoidable role played by the modeling 
activity in measurement is increasingly acknowledged, particularly with 
respect to the evaluation of measurement uncertainty. (Giordani and Mari 
2012, 2144). 
 
More generally, as put by Mari (2003, 24) this metrological stance on uncertainty 
reflects the “need to make any empirical process of information acquisition 
																																																								
56  To be clear, here I’m talking about exact beliefs in the quantities being measured, not the 
measurements itself. Of course on the basis of measurement we might believe that the measuring 
device displays exactly (𝑟, 𝜃,𝜑), etc., but this is something different. 
57 This might be explained by noting that these sorts of beliefs aren’t sensitive to the fact of whether 
the quantity in question is exactly X. Consider the closest possible worlds in which diameter was 
actually exactly 5.17000000000000001 cm. The callipers would still display “5.17,” still resulting in 
beliefs that the diameter was exactly 5.17 cm. 
58 Metrology is the academic study of measurement.  




approximate.” Exactly true values are viewed as simply unattainable via 
measurement60 (ibid, 24). This serves to corroborate our initial suspicion that exact 
beliefs formed on the basis of measurement will never be justified. Accordingly, 
they will not be considered known on JTlB, which means that there is no threat of 
over-attribution.  
I would suspect that our initial tendency to not question that these beliefs 
are justified arises from the fact that ordinarily measurement is uncontroversially a 
source of justification. In ordinary practice, given competent measuring procedure, 
the beliefs we form on the basis of measurement tend to be justified. However, 
ordinarily we don’t form beliefs that the world is exactly as the measurement 
reports, and upon consideration it appears to be a violation of competent 
measuring practice to do so.  
The most obvious way one might object to this picture is to maintain that 
measurement is not the only plausible route to over-attribution for JTlB. The best 
way I can imagine one doing so is with a case like the following: 
 
 Martha, a physics student, reads in her text book, “The fine structure 
constant 𝛼 is !
!"#
.” On this basis, she comes to believe that the value 
of the fine structure constant is exactly 1/137. However, the fine 
structure constant is not actually exactly 1/137, but only 
approximately 1/137 (1/137 - 𝛼 ≈ 0.000002). Somehow in the editing 
of the textbook, the “approximately” was erroneously removed from 
the text.  
 
Here we might note that while false, Martha’s belief is highly truthlike, and it seems 
she’s justified in believing it. However, we certainly don’t judge that Martha knows 
that the fine structure constant is 1/137. In this manner, it appears that in cases like 
these JTlB over-attributes knowledge. While this might be correct, I don’t think that 
such cases are novel instances of over-attribution. It is a matter of luck that the typo 
in the textbook resulted in a truthlike sentence, and therefore it is a matter of luck 
that Martha’s belief is truthlike. As JTB famously struggles with this sort of 
knowledge-undermining luck, I don’t think there’s anything novel about JTlB over-
attributing here. 
In conclusion, there doesn’t appear to be any novel risk of JTlB over-
attributing knowledge. The only potentially justified beliefs that are accurate 
enough to count as known under the truthlikeness condition, but still false, will 
involve beliefs in the exact values of measurement. However, upon closer 
inspection it doesn’t appear that such a belief might ever be justified. This both 
explains why we judge them to be unknown and eliminates the initial problem that 





60 There is a very interesting parallel here between this view of measurement and the picture of vision-
for-action detailed in the previous two chapters. Mari even hints that “sense data obtained by direct 






In this section, I hope to have demonstrated the basic viability of a factivoid 
analysis of knowledge. Taking JTB as a starting point, we might replace the truth 
condition with a truthlikeness condition without encountering any novel under-
attribution or over-attribution of knowledge, provided that our standard for 
truthlikeness is set at the accuracy of ordinary perception. However, one limitation 
of simply positing the truthlikeness condition is that it is unable to account for why 
perceptual accuracy should determine standard of truthlikeness. While doing so 
enables a viable factivoid analysis of knowledge, it remains a bit of a mystery why 
this actually works. In the next section, I will introduce a more sophisticated 
factivoid account, which not is not only viable but is able to explain why setting the 
standard of truthlikeness to that of ordinary perception proves successful. 
 
 
2. Factivoid Robust Virtue Epistemology 
 
In this section, I will discuss the second of three candidate non-factive analyses of 
knowledge, a factivoid version of robust virtue epistemology (RVE). I intend to show 
that not only is the structure of RVE is especially amenable to the shift away from 
factivity, but that it might explain why the standard of truthlikeness for knowledge 
should be determined by the accuracy of ordinary perception. As with the previous 
section, this one will be structured in the following way: First, I will introduce a 
factivoid version of RVE, after which I will consider possible problems each might 
have with the novel under and over -attribution of knowledge.  
 
2.1 Factivoid RVE 
 
The purpose of this subsection is to introduce a factivoid version of robust virtue 
epistemology. In doing so, I will first briefly outline the standard view, followed by a 
transition from standard to factivoid RVE.  
Coined by Pritchard (2010), “robust virtue epistemology” refers to the claim 
that “knowledge is type-identical with a particular species of cognitive 
achievement” (Carter, Jarvis, & Rubin 2015, 1603). As achievement here is simply 
success attributable to ability, we might understand RVE as the claim that 
knowledge is cognitive success attributable to cognitive ability. The distinguishing 
feature of robust virtue epistemology, as opposed to virtue epistemology 
generally, is that “it attempts to exclusively analyse knowledge in terms of” a 
cognitive success that is attributable to a cognitive ability (Pritchard 2010, 25; 
emphasis mine). Of course, this alone is more a template for an analysis of 
knowledge than it is an analysis itself, as such a claim is at this point ambiguous in 
multiple respects. One such ambiguity involves what it means for a success to be 
“attributable” to an ability, but this won’t be discussed here. 61  This is simply 
because factivoid RVE doesn’t need to favour any particular take on attribution. 
Next, we might inquire about the specific nature of a cognitive ability. On the 
																																																								




standard account, “a cognitive ability is a knowledge-conducive belief-forming 
process” (Pritchard 2012, 261), and I won’t diverge from this here. Rather, here I 
will disambiguate one key question: What constitutes a cognitive success? By 
answering this in a non-standard way, specifically a non-factive way, we might 
construct a viable factivoid RVE. First, however, we should begin with the standard 
epistemological account of cognitive success. 
On the standard picture, true belief is cognitive success and false belief is 
cognitive failure. If a belief is true, it constitutes a cognitive success; if a belief is 
false, it constitutes a cognitive failure. To avoid confusion, we should note that the 
sense in which “cognitive” is used here is not the sense used elsewhere in this 
project. It is not the sense in which we talk about cognitive systems or cognitive 
neuroscience, which encompass far more than the formation of belief. Rather, this is 
a sense of “cognitive” is restricted to the domain of belief, and might be 
interchanged with “doxastic” (Sosa 2009, 10), “epistemic,” (Turri et al. 2017) or 
“intellectual” (ibid). While in section three we will revisit this restriction, here I will 
only talk of cognitive success insofar as it is doxastic success.  
At this point, we might question why we should consider true belief to be a 
success and false belief a failure. The standard answer to this question is that the 
aim of belief is truth: 
 
The aim of belief is said to be truth. When you sincerely pose a question to 
yourself, for example, you want a correct answer. When you reach an answer 
to your question through adopting a certain belief, the aim of your belief is 
the truth of the matter. (Sosa, 2009, 6) 
 
This view that the aim of belief is truth has been challenged along the lines that it 
doesn’t actually explain why “correct beliefs are true beliefs” (Owens 2003, 283; 
see also Whiting 2014; for a response see Steglich-Petersen 2009, 2017). However, 
this idea that belief aims at truth faces another problem in that it doesn’t seem to 
reflect the actual properties of belief-forming processes. This problem might first 
be observed as an intuitive matter. When we consider beliefs like those that guide 
motor action, it doesn’t appear that they are aiming at truth at all. Upon close 
inspection, it seems more appropriate to say that these beliefs aim at a certain level 
of truthlikeness. This is especially clear when we note that certain belief-forming 
processes, like those for action guidance, lack the capacity to hit truth. While in 
ordinary circumstances this process produces truthlike beliefs, the inevitability of 
visuomotor noise makes it extremely unlikely that any such belief will ever be 
strictly true. Accordingly, it seems mistaken to think of these beliefs as aiming at 
the truth. Any appearance of aiming at truth here is only due to the proximity of the 
actual aim, truthlikeness, to truth. Given that at least some of the time belief aims 
not at truth but only truthlikeness, we can understand that it is mistaken to take 
only true belief to constitute cognitive success. 
This idea, that often beliefs aim not at truth but a standard of truthlikeness, 
and thus might be successful without reaching truth, gains further support if we turn 
our attention to the output requirements of belief-forming processes. Recall that in 
chapter three we briefly encountered the concept of the output requirement of a 




conscious-perception) and dorsal (vision-for-action) streams are required to output 
different types of representations. Roughly, the ventral stream is required to output 
more qualitative representations (colour, texture, etc.) while the dorsal stream is 
required to output more quantitative spatial information (location, size, etc.). 
Additionally, while the output of conscious perception is required to be conducive 
to long-term storage in memory, the opposite holds for vision-for-action (see 
especially Milner and Goodale 1995, §2.4). All this raises an obvious question, 
“Required for what?” While Milner and Goodale don’t state explicitly, the answer 
seems to be something along these lines: For the ventral stream, these are the 
required outputs for successful conscious perception. For the dorsal stream, these 
are the required outputs for successful motor action. Thus we might say, as a 
general matter, the output requirements of a cognitive process are those required 
outputs for cognitive success. 
Here, the type of output representations required for success isn’t directly 
relevant. However, I think we might extend the concept to the output requirement 
to the accuracy of beliefs as well: There is a certain degree of accuracy, a standard 
of truthlikeness, required of the output of belief-forming processes in order for 
them to successfully constitute conscious perception, guide action, etc. Therefore, 
we might understand the success of any given cognitive process as determined by 
the output requirements of that process. Put simply, cognitive success is 
determined by output requirements. 
This idea, that what it means for a belief to be successful is determined by 
the output requirements of the processes on which that belief forms, provides us 
with a foundation for a factivoid RVE. Upon noting that often truth is not an output 
requirement of belief-forming processes, we might understand cognitive success in 
the non-factive sense required. Cognitive success is not truth, but the standard of 
truthlikeness determined by the output requirements of a given belief-forming 
process. This leaves us with a theory of knowledge on which knowledge is still 
cognitive achievement, with the following conceptions of success and ability: 
Cognitive abilities are still taken to be knowledge-conducive belief-forming 
processes. However, for certain knowledge-conducive belief-forming processes, 
such as vision-for-action, cognitive success is not truth but rather a sufficient degree 
of truthlikeness. In this way, we might describe a factivoid RVE. 
Before continuing to the potential for novel misattribution for factivoid RVE, 
there are two things I would like to note. First, we might observe that on this 
account cognitive ability determines cognitive success. That is, what it means for a 
belief to be successful is not fixed independently of the process by which it forms, 
but is determined by the output requirements of that process. As cognitive abilities 
are simply those belief-forming processes that are knowledge-conducive, we might 
understand that what it means for a belief to be successful is determined by the 
ability by which it forms. While I am hesitant to make any definitive conclusions, this 
at least opens the possibility of cognitive success being constituted by different 
standards of truthlikeness for different cognitive abilities. For example, it might be 
that for certain cognitive abilities, perhaps those processes associated with 
inferential knowledge, the output requirement is still truth. This of course in an 




The second observation we might make is that, unlike an analysis like JTlB, 
which simply posits a truthlikeness condition, factivoid RVE provides an explanation 
for why the standard of truthlikeness corresponds with the truthlikeness of ordinary 
perception. This is the minimum accuracy output requirement we might observe for 
knowledge-conducive belief-forming processes. Achieving that standard of 
truthlikeness because of the operation of a knowledge-conducive belief-forming 
process is simply achieving cognitive success because of cognitive ability, which is 




One of the major challenges posed to RVE is that it under-attributes in cases of 
knowledge from testimony (Lackey 2007, 2009). To the extent that this is a problem 
for standard RVE, it will also be a problem for factivoid RVE. However, as with 
Gettier problems for JTB, here we must set these concerns aside in the interest of 
isolating novel under-attribution. 
As with the move to a truthlikeness condition presented in the previous 
section, there doesn’t appear to be any risk of novel under-attribution for factivoid 
RVE. The reason for this is similar in both cases. Just as all true propositions will be 
truthlike, all cognitive success on standard RVE (true belief) will count as cognitive 
success on factivoid RVE (true or truthlike belief, determined by the specific output 
requirements of individual belief-forming cognitive processes). Since cognitive 
success on factivoid RVE is a weaker concept than cognitive success on standard 
RVE, all cognitively successful beliefs on the latter will also be successful on the 




RVE appears to struggle with over-attributing knowledge in certain cases involving 
knowledge-undermining luck (see Pritchard 2012, 15-17). However, again, in the 
interest of identifying over-attribution associated with the move to a factivoid 
account, I’ll set this aside. 
Despite my best efforts, unlike JTlB, there doesn’t appear to be any obvious 
candidate for novel over-attribution on factivoid RVE. Cases involving truthlike 
measurement don’t pose any problem, as there is no cognitive ability by which we 
might form exact beliefs on the basis of measurement. As discussed in the last 
section, it appears to violate competent measuring practice to believe physical 
quantities are exactly what one measures. Therefore, the belief-forming process by 
which one does so clearly does not constitute a cognitive ability. Also like JTlB, it 
may be that factivoid RVE struggles with certain beliefs that are truthlike as a matter 
of luck. However, if this were indeed the case, it would of course not be novel over-
attribution.62 
																																																								
62 There might be a worry that that because the candidate factivoid analyses I discuss all have been 
challenged by cases involving epistemic luck, that perhaps there is something inherent to factivoid 
analyses that they cannot handle luck. However, this worry might be easily addressed by noting that 
we might easily construct a factivoid anti-luck condition, factivoid safety: If S knows that p then S’s 







Not only does factivoid RVE again demonstrate the viability of the factivoid analysis 
of knowledge, but it also provides valuable insight into why the standard of 
truthlikeness for knowledge appears to be set at the level of ordinary perceptual 
accuracy. Of course, factivoid RVE will inherit all the shortcomings of standard RVE, 
but this doesn’t pose any problem for the factivoid analysis of knowledge itself. 
 
 
3. Radical Factivoid RVE 
 
In the previous section, I presented a factivoid version of robust virtue 
epistemology. On this account, knowledge is still cognitive success because of 
cognitive ability, but cognitive success is understood in such a way that certain false 
beliefs might still constitute a cognitive success. The key idea there was that it is 
the output requirements of belief-forming processes that determine what it means 
for a belief to be successful. In this section, I will take the brakes off this analysis 
and utilize the RVE framework to a more radical effect. The proposed account of 
knowledge will still be cognitive achievement, but I will no longer restrict the 
domain of cognitive success to belief formation. Bringing the structure of RVE in 
line with a more standard use of “cognitive,” cognitive achievement need not 
involve belief formation at all. This is the least conservative of the three accounts 
discussed in this chapter, and it brings with it the consequences we might expect 
from this. However, dropping the doxastic restriction from RVE also affords 
significant advantages. Most notably, it allows for the unification of the 
epistemological and psycho-cognitive usage of “knowledge.” 
In the familiar structure, this section will first introduce radical, factivoid RVE, 
followed by a discussion of the motivation behind such a move. After this, I will 
consider potential concerns of either under-attributing or over-attributing 
knowledge. Finally, I will look at the necessity of dropping factivity and the ability 
to do the same for belief. Again, in reading this section, it is important to keep in 
mind that this proposal is especially speculative, and in places will push at certain 
assumptions of this project. 
 
3.1 Domain Unrestricted Cognitive Achievement 
 
As with the initial version of factivoid RVE discussed in section two, let’s once again 
choose as a starting point the idea that knowledge is cognitive achievement, 
cognitive success because of cognitive ability. This time, however, rather than 
restricting “cognitive” to be synonymous with “doxastic,” let’s instead recognize 
that many of what we would otherwise call “cognitive processes” or “cognitive 
systems” do not reduce to belief formation. On radical factivoid RVE, cognitive 
success might be constituted by any cognitive process, not just belief-forming 
																																																																																																																																																													
factivoid analysis of knowledge to account for cases like the fine structure constant example (§1.3). 
Her belief was formed on the basis of a typo, and a typo could have just as easily resulted in a belief 




ones. Again, the question of what constitutes success is an empirical one, 
determined by the output requirements of individual systems.  
Immediately, this proposal seems unnecessarily broad in at least two 
respects. First, on this analysis belief is no longer a necessary condition for 
knowledge. For the moment I will set this concern aside. Later in this section I will 
argue that this might be considered advantage of the theory, although of course it 
brings with it certain costs. Second is the even broader concern that I’m no longer 
just talking about propositional knowledge. Given that many cognitive processes 
might be successful without generating propositional knowledge, the initial risk of 
over-attribution seems extremely high. This is of course correct. However, the fact 
that such a proposal includes more than just propositional knowledge doesn’t 
mean it is a bad account of knowledge. Rather, I think it offers the opportunity to 
unify multiple senses of “knowledge” under a single concept. The core of the 
proposal is this: Knowledge is a unitary concept we might analyse as cognitive 
achievement, and different senses of “knowledge” correspond with specific 
restrictions on what can constitute a cognitive success. 
In order to illustrate this, here I will identify three robust senses of 
knowledge: propositional knowledge (knowledge-that), practical knowledge 
(knowledge-how), and the more empirically oriented concept we might see in 
cognitive science and psychology, “psycho-cognitive” knowledge. In each case, we 
might understand the specific sense of knowledge as a restriction on the domain of 
cognitive success. Depending on what we take to constitute a cognitive success, 
we will get different senses of knowledge.  
 
PROPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE:  As a starting point, we might say that propositional 
knowledge is knowledge for which the domain of cognitive success is limited to 
propositional content. For propositional knowledge, cognitive success is successful 
formation of propositional content, and cognitive failure is failure in the formation 
of propositional content. Of course, this framework is ambiguous both in terms of 
what constitutes propositional content and what constitutes the successful 
formation of propositional content. The first ambiguity we might ignore here, as it 
is no more ambiguous than for any other epistemological account of propositional 
knowledge, so it’s not clear that the disambiguation of “propositional content” is of 
immediate relevance. As long as we understand propositional content as in some 
vague sense representing the world to be a certain way, this will suffice for the 
sketch of this account. The second ambiguity we might fill in. Just as for the more 
constrained factivoid RVE proposed in section two, cognitive success is determined 
by the output requirements of the relevant cognitive abilities. If a specific cognitive 
process requires a high degree of truthlikeness, then cognitive success for 
propositional content produced by that process is that high degree of truthlikeness, 
etc. Again, what constitutes cognitive success is in this sense an empirical matter, 
and there is at least a possibility that this will vary for different cognitive processes. 
While I will reserve the following sections for discussions of the potential for 
this conception to under and over -attribute propositional knowledge, there are 
two sub-categories of propositional knowledge I wish to introduce here, which 




knowledge” and “theoretical knowledge63 .” At the most basic level, doxastic 
knowledge is simply knowledge that is associated with a belief attribution. Given 
that belief is a propositional attitude, we can understand this to be a sub-set of 
propositional knowledge. Accordingly, if for some attribution of knowledge that p 
we can identify a corresponding belief that p, that propositional knowledge is 
doxastic knowledge. If we wish to consider belief to be a real mental type, then we 
might take this a step further and say that doxastic knowledge is a knowledge for 
which the domain of cognitive success is limited to belief formation. Next, 
theoretical knowledge is knowledge with reflectively accessible content. Given 
the robust empirical distinction between accessible and inaccessible mental 
content, we might formulate theoretical knowledge as knowledge for which the 
domain of cognitive success is limited reflectively accessible propositional content. 
Theoretical knowledge is the knowledge we might report on, use in our reasoning, 
and so forth.64 
Before continuing, there are a few observations I’d like to make regarding 
the relationship between propositional, doxastic, and theoretical knowledge. First, 
while there is certainly a good deal of overlap, doxastic and theoretical knowledge 
are distinct categories. As illustrated by the mental content that guides motor 
action, knowledge might be associated with a belief attribution without retaining 
accessibility. Thus, not all doxastic knowledge is theoretical knowledge. Next, at 
least initially, it seems we want to say that all theoretical knowledge is doxastic. This 
keeps us in line with standard epistemological practice, which is desirable since 
there is no obvious reason to break with it. Finally, while we might observe that all 
doxastic and theoretical knowledge will be propositional, as will become clear 
shortly, there may be some propositional knowledge that is neither doxastic nor 
theoretical. 
 
PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE: First, let me clarify that here I will use “practical 
knowledge 65 ” to denote what is often called “knowledge-how.” Examples of 
practical knowledge range from simple motor (“S knows how to grasp a coffee 
mug.”) and perceptual skills (“S knows how to discriminate between red and 
green.”) to more complex skills, which might range from the very broad (“S knows 
how to play football.”) to the very specific (“S knows how to run a post route 
against single coverage.”). The reason that I am not simply using “knowledge-how” 
is that sometimes we use “knows how” to attribute propositional knowledge, 
unrelated to knowledge of some skill or ability. For example, we might say, “Jukka 
knows how the 2010 MSU-Notre Dame game ended” to denote clearly 
propositional knowledge: Jukka knows that the 2010 MSU-Notre Dame game 
ended with MSU faking a field goal to score a game-winning touchdown.” To filter 
out this sort of propositional knowledge, it’s easier to just go with “practical 
knowledge.” 
																																																								
63 After a similar notion from Glick (2011, 412) 
64 As discussed in the previous chapter, in some cases the contents of beliefs might be determined by 
both accessible and inaccessible content. Accordingly, it is best to think of theoretical knowledge 
admitting of degrees: Some instances of knowledge are more theoretical than others, being more 
reportable, integrable into reasoning, and so forth. 




While some, most famously Stanley and Williamson (2001), have argued that 
practical knowledge is simply a form of propositional knowledge, there is 
compelling empirical evidence that propositional and practical knowledge are 
distinct. First noted by Cohen and Squire (1980), neuropsychological evidence 
suggests that practical knowledge dissociates from propositional knowledge in the 
following way: Amnesiac patients can acquire a new skill (on the basis of which we 
would attribute practical knowledge) and retain that knowledge even after they 
forget all propositional knowledge associated with the acquisition of that skill. The 
example they use involves the skill of reading words printed as if viewed in a mirror 
(“mirror reading”). They found that not only might individuals with amnesia might 
be taught how to mirror read, but also that they retain this knowledge even after 
losing all propositional knowledge associated with it.  
These results led Cohen and Squire to posit a distinction between the 
representation of “declarative” and “procedural” information (ibid, 209), a 
distinction that serves as the foundation for the contemporary empirical argument 
in epistemology for the independence of propositional and practical knowledge 
(Wallis 2008; Adams 2009; Brown 2013). At its core, this distinction is between two 
independent memory systems, a procedural memory system for “mediating the 
acquisition of cognitive skills” and a declarative memory system for “mediating 
learning of new facts or other data-based knowledge” (Cohen et al. 1985, 69). 
When we gain new skills, the corresponding representations are stored in 
procedural memory, fundamentally distinct from the propositional knowledge 
stored in declarative memory: 
 
Procedural representations are those that guide cognitive operations and 
overt actions by specifying what is to do under which circumstances (where 
circumstances are given through declarative representations). Procedural 
representations can be explicated as condition-action rules, with the 
condition describing the circumstances to which the procedure applies, and 
the action component describing what is to be done (i.e., the cognitive 
operation or the physical action to be carried out). Although communicating 
procedural representations (e.g., when instructing people) requires 
translating them into a declarative format, such as a verbal rule or a graph, 
they are not themselves declarative: A core assumption of theories 
distinguishing declarative and procedural representations is that cognition 
and action is controlled by procedural representations, and declarative 
representations such as instructions must first be interpreted by procedures 
that take them as input and generate (cognitive) actions as output. 
(Oberauer 2010, 279) 
 
This distinction between declarative and procedural representations allows us to 
identify, at least preliminarily, the domain restriction for practical knowledge: 
Practical knowledge is cognitive achievement for which the domain of cognitive 




produces a representation that meets its output requirements, it achieves practical 
knowledge.66 
 
PSYCHO-COGNITIVE KNOWLEDGE: Even when framed in terms of domain restrictions 
for cognitive success, the categories of propositional and practical knowledge are 
both epistemologically familiar. However, in addition to these categories, there is a 
third sense of knowledge that appears to be just as robust. This is the sense of 
knowledge we might find associated with empirical research into human cognition. 
Here I will rely primarily on examples from cognitive neuroscience, especially 
cognitive neuropsychology, but I don’t mean to claim this is a uniquely cognitive-
neuroscientific usage. This usage corresponds with what we might call “psycho-
cognitive” knowledge. While here I won’t endeavour to make any definitive 
conclusions on the boundaries of this concept, upon initial inspection it appears to 
correspond with the general analysis of knowledge I’m presenting here, domain-
unrestricted cognitive achievement. 
As a disclaimer, I should first note that the term “knowledge” is not used as 
consistently as I may make it seem below. Some researchers use it liberally, while 
others not at all. It is not uncommon to see a paper that outlines a claim about 
“knowledge,” referencing a paper that instead uses a word like “representation” 
instead of “knowledge” in establish that claim (eg. see Gade et al. 2004, 174; 
referencing Squire 2004). Moreover, there is significant variability between research 
literatures with respect to the frequency of the usage of “knowledge,” clustering in 
specific patterns for reasons that aren’t entirely transparent. We might compare the 
proliferation of “procedural knowledge” (discussed below) and “prior 
knowledge67” (Faisal et al. 2008, 298) with the conspicuous lack of “knowledge” in 
the Milner and Goodale program (chapter 2, section 3). While this might suggest a 
need for additional research, I don’t think it detracts from the observations about 
the psycho-cognitive usage of “knowledge” I discuss below. 
When we first examine the way in which the word “knowledge” is used in 
psycho-cognitive research, we find that it often corresponds with familiar 
theoretical knowledge. Knowledge corresponds with propositional content, facts 
about the world that the knower might access upon reflection. Belief reports 
evidence what an agent does and does not know. For example, the fact that a 
lesion patient “knew that a kangaroo is Australian and an elephant is not, despite 
his inability to report how many legs each has” is taken to evidence that there are 
separate systems for knowledge of perceptual properties and knowledge of non-
perceptual properties (Rapp 2001, 6). Similarly, “knowledge” is used to refer to a 
known neuropsychological finding, such as “knowledge of the neural bases of 
bilingualism” (ibid, 322). In both cases, knowledge is used in the familiar sense of 
theoretical knowledge. 
																																																								
66 I say that this is only a preliminary proposal because it is likely there are multiple cognitive systems 
that produce practical knowledge, with the perceptual learning associate with discrimination skills 
being distinct from procedural memory/content (see Squire 2004).  
67 Used in the context of neural strategies to minimize the impact of noise, “prior knowledge” refers to 
the brain’s representation of expect levels and distribution of noise across perceptual channels (Faisal 





The interesting features of psycho-cognitive knowledge arise from the fact 
that “knowledge” is also used in a way that is markedly non-theoretical. First, 
psycho-cognitive knowledge need not be reflectively accessible, as in “knowledge 
without awareness” or “unconscious knowledge” (ibid, 89). In short: 
 
Contemporary psychology speaks of unconscious knowledge to refer to 
cases in which subjects display available knowledge to which they lack 
conscious access. While this is not controversy-free in psychology, a 
significant part of the psychological community attributes to this claim a 
scientific status. (Augusto 2011, 116) 
 
Unconscious knowledge is attributed when “subjects exhibit behaviours that 
indicate that they possess knowledge but seem both unaware of that possession 
and unable to verbalize it” (ibid, 117). Perhaps the best examples of this come from 
unconscious perception, as discussed in chapter 3. In the case that S unconsciously 
perceives, say, the orientation of a grating, S can know the orientation of that 
grating without having access. Given that we wouldn’t on the basis of S’s 
unconscious perception attribute a belief to S, we might also understand that 
psycho-cognitive knowledge can be non-doxastic. 
More generally, cognitive knowledge seem to include all cognitive success in 
the representation of information, regardless of the level of processing or degree of 
accessibility: 
 
In psycho-cognitive terms, knowledge can be defined as information or data 
about the environment (roughly: sensory input) that can be acquired, stored, 
and retrieved by living organisms with a more or less complex nervous 
system, with a view to securing their wellbeing. Cognition can be defined as 
the actual process of acquisition, storage, and retrieval of knowledge. (ibid, 
117)  
 
While such a definition serves to illustrate the breadth of psycho-cognitive 
knowledge, it of course is remarkably crude. Beyond obvious epistemological 
problems, one of which I discuss in §3.2, this still doesn’t capture the full scope of 
the concept. Already in the examples above, we can see psycho-cognitive 
knowledge includes information that is neither about an agent’s environment nor in 
any way related to her wellbeing, such as the lesion patient’s knowledge that 
kangaroos are Australian. Beyond this, we might note that the representations 
associated with the procedural memory system also fall under psycho-cognitive 
knowledge as “procedural knowledge.” The following are examples from, in order, 
sports psychology, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience (emphases 
mine): 
 
It is widely believed that highly practiced, overlearned performances 
are automated—meaning they are controlled in real time by procedural 
knowledge that requires little attention, operates largely outside of working 






The ability to acquire declarative and procedural knowledge has been 
mapped to different neural substrates. (Gade et al. 2014, 174) 
 
Altogether, perceptual and motor skill learning paradigms indicate that a 
high degree of plasticity has been preserved in the adult human cortex and 
that a limited repertoire of neuronal mechanisms of plasticity mediate 
memory functions throughout the mammalian cortex. This plasticity may 
underlie the acquisition and the long-term retention of procedural 
knowledge. (Karni 1996, 47) 
 
In short, psycho-cognitive knowledge includes practical knowledge (“procedural 
knowledge”) as well as both theoretical and non-theoretical, doxastic and non-
doxastic, propositional knowledge. Accordingly, it appears that this empirical 
concept of knowledge is simply knowledge as unrestricted cognitive achievement. 
Analysing knowledge along these lines allows us to not only to account for both the 
psycho-cognitive and epistemological uses of “knowledge,” but also to unify them 
under a single concept that explains the relation between them. While in the form 
presented this is simply the sketch of a theory, I think it offers a promising route for 
further development. In the following two subsections, I’ll explore some of the 




As noted above (§2.2), RVE struggles with under-attribution in the case of 
knowledge from testimony, famously noted by Lackey (2007, 2009). In the interest 
of only discussing the potential for novel under-attribution, this concern will be set 
aside. 
At a first glance, it doesn’t appear that radical factivoid RVE runs much risk of 
under-attributing knowledge in a way that standard RVE does not. After all, the 
former is a much broader conception of knowledge, which counts under it far more 
than the latter. This instinct, that the risk for under-attribution seems low when 
moving to a much more attribution-happy theory of knowledge, seems largely 
correct. However, there is in interesting sort of under-attribution this account 
appears to be guilty of, which I want to discuss here. Put briefly, there seems to be 
psycho-cognitive knowledge that does not constitute cognitive achievement.  
Beyond the other issues with defining psycho-cognitive knowledge as 
information about an environment (discussed in §3.1), we might note that this 
definition leaves no room for a distinction analogous to that of true belief vs. 
knowledge. So defined, psycho-cognitive knowledge includes all environmental 
information, even that which is truthlike as a matter of epistemic luck. There are of 
course many ways in which one might gain information as a matter of luck, and we 
might even note that Gettier’s original “Case I” (1963, 122) is an example of luck in 
the acquisition of environmental information.  
While it is tempting to simply chalk this space for luck up to the non-analytic 
nature of such definitions, in this case I think this would be a mistake. In the case of 
non-environmental or non-beneficial knowledge, we might easily observe that 
psycho-cognitive usage does not actually ignore these categories. However, this 




have I been unable to find anything to indicate that psycho-cognitive knowledge 
ever excludes information acquired as a matter of luck, but we might also observe 
that the way in which the concept is employed is often necessarily insensitive to 
sources of information. Let’s consider an example of how “knowledge” is used in 
the neuropsychological studies of the patient known as “AC”. While AC could 
report certain properties of objects, like whether an animal is Australian he 
struggled to report other properties, like which animals have legs (Sartori and Job 
1988). Summarized one way: 
 
What happened to AC is that he lost all information about the visual 
properties of objects, while still retaining knowledge about their non-
perceptual properties, and also knowledge about perceptual properties 
which are not visual. What does this tell us about how knowledge of objects 
is represented mentally? . . . [There] is a system of knowledge about what 
objects look like which is quite separate from other stores of knowledge 
about other kinds of properties of objects. (Coltheart 2001, 6) 
 
What I want to highlight here is that even if we assume that AC’s beliefs about the 
non-visual properties of objects are all truthlike as a matter of luck, it is clear these 
count as knowledge under this psycho-cognitive usage. Conversely, if we stipulate 
a conception of psycho-cognitive knowledge with an explicit anti-luck condition, it 
undesirably narrows the scope of this claim. The researchers here want to draw a 
conclusion about how visual information is processed, regardless of why that 
information happens to be accurate. 
In short, when psycho-cognitive knowledge is conflated with information in 
the nervous system, independent of whether that information is truthlike as a 
matter of luck, we should take it at face value. This usage of “knowledge” makes 
no distinctions for how information is acquired, the psycho-cognitive equivalent to 
conflating knowledge with true belief. Therefore, we might understand an analysis 
of psycho-cognitive knowledge as cognitive achievement as under-attributing 
psycho-cognitive knowledge, leaving out representations that are luckily truthlike, 
which do not constitute cognitive achievements. 
There are two ways we might respond to this. First, we might go with a 
revisionary response and accept this under-attribution as a positive refinement on 
the psycho-cognitive usage of “knowledge.” This would allow “information” to 
continue corresponding with cognitive success, with “knowledge” being reserved 
only for instances of cognitive achievement. We might also note that this isn’t that 
disruptive a revision, given that in the psycho-cognitive realm there is very little 
cognitive success that isn’t also cognitive achievement. In contrast with 
epistemology, the focus on actual and/or ordinary cases means that psycho-
cognitive knowledge isn’t usually applied in cases involving knowledge-
undermining luck. Nevertheless, I think it is best to avoid philosophical revisions of 
scientific usage if it might be helped. The better option appears to the non-
revisionary route. 
The second response we might provide to this apparent under-attribution is 
simply to say that as a concept psycho-cognitive knowledge is not type-identical 
with an epistemologically interesting concept of knowledge. Rather that domain-




unrestricted cognitive success. While ordinarily tokens of psycho-cognitive 
knowledge will be cognitive achievements, we might note that this will not always 
be the case. This allows us to unify epistemologically interesting knowledge and 
psycho-cognitive knowledge under a single concept, while still respecting the 
autonomy of the latter. 
In conclusion, the potential for radical factivoid RVE to under-attribute 
psycho-cognitive knowledge involving lucky truthlikeness results in a critical 
refinement to the analysis: Psycho-cognitive knowledge is best understood in terms 




The question of over-attribution for radical factivoid RVE is a complex one, and I 
will not fully address it here. Initially there appears to be a significant potential for 
over-attribution arising from low-level, non-doxastic, unconscious representations 
(e.g. the retinotopic representations discussed in chapter two (§2). However, upon 
closer inspection this isn’t as obvious as it might seem. Not only might we question 
whether these intermediary representations actually constitute cognitive successes, 
but it also doesn’t appear that these cases are considered psycho-cognitive 
knowledge. For example, in one study involving consciously unresolvable but 
unconsciously perceived orientation gratings, researches remark that the 
participants “had no knowledge” of the unresolvable stimuli (He and MacLeod 
2001, 475). All this is to say that fear of over-attributing knowledge in the case of 
inaccessible content that we don’t associate with belief attributions or skill 
execution might be premature. Nevertheless, to be safe, we should assume that 
there will be at least some over-attribution in cases like unconscious perception, so 
that we might see why we shouldn’t consider this type of over-attribution to be a 
problem. 
Let’s begin with an example of the sort of cases in which we might 
anticipate radical factivoid RVE to over-attribute: In a study investigating the 
representation of orientation in the visual cortex, Haynes and Rees observed that 
simply on the basis of fMRI of subjects, “we could then successfully predict which 
one of two oriented stimuli a participant was viewing, even when masking rendered 
that stimulus invisible” (2004, 686). This indicates that the orientations of the stimuli 
were represented in the visual cortex, despite being masked from conscious 
perception. Assuming that this constitutes an achievement of the relevant cognitive 
system, this would seem to be an over-attribution by radical factivoid RVE. There is 
no relevant motor action, belief report, skill execution, etc., and it unclear that such 
representation might be capable of guiding any behaviour that we associate with 
knowledge. Accordingly, we don’t judge that the subject knows what the 
orientations of the stimuli are. More generally, we might observe that it doesn’t 
appear we ever attribute knowledge on the basis of fMRI alone in passive viewing 
studies. 
My thought here is that if the analysis misattributes knowledge in this way, 
we might reasonably accept this as a cost of an analysis that can accommodate 
psycho-cognitive knowledge. After all, it is difficult to imagine such a project 




mental states and behaviours that are invisible in ordinary life. We shouldn’t expect 
our intuitive-judgement-forming capacities, which are tuned to more conspicuous 
behaviours and mental states, to be all that well equipped at handling cases so 
outside ordinary conditions. Accordingly, it seems simply accepting the limitations 
of our intuitive judgements in these cases is not all that unreasonable, and seems in 




To conclude my discussion of radical factivoid RVE, I want to observe that this 
unification of epistemological and psycho-cognitive knowledge is only achievable 
under a factivoid framework. Given the argument presented in previous chapters, it 
shouldn’t be surprising that psycho-cognitive knowledge is non-factive. Many of the 
cognitive systems described by psycho-cognitive research might be successful 
without generating true representations of the world. Furthermore, we might 
observe this directly in explicitly non-factive uses of “knowledge” and “know” in 
psycho-cognitive research, on which the knowledge might not be perfectly 
accurate (emphases mine): 
 
Knowledge of our hands’ positions in space is vital for everyday 
tasks, yet in the absence of visual feedback we systematically 
misjudge their position and size . . . The aim of Experiment 1 was to 
identify how accurately and precisely participants know the 
orientation of their left and right index fingers in the frontoparallel 
plane in the absence of visual information. (Fraser & Harris 2016, 
3565 & 3568) 
 
To advance understanding of mental health literacy on two prevalent 
neurocognitive disorders, this study aimed to develop and validate 
the Brain Injury and Schizophrenia Awareness Scale (BISAS) and 
compare accuracy of knowledge of the functional effects of 
schizophrenia and TBI. (McKendry et al. 2014, 225) 
 
People tend to be overconfident, that is, they exaggerate the extent 
to which what they know is correct. (Fischhoff et al. 1977, 552) 
 
This underscores the importance of a factivoid framework for any account that 
seeks to analyse psycho-cognitive knowledge. Regardless of whether such a project 
is pursued along the lines of RVE, a theory on which knowledge is factive simply 
cannot capture the psycho-cognitive usage of “knowledge.” This is a key 
advantage of factivoid analysis of knowledge, especially within a naturalistic 
context. 
There is still a good deal of work that needs to be done before radical 
factivoid RVE might be considered a complete theory of knowledge. Not only is a 
more precise description of its boundaries needed, as well as a more sophisticated 
account of psycho-cognitive knowledge, but we might also observe that at least 




protagonist projection. However, as mentioned at the outset, my intention with this 
preliminary attempt at radical factivoid RVE was not to produce a complete, 
challenge-free analysis of knowledge, but rather to illustrate how the factivoid RVE 
framework opens the door for a promising naturalistic analysis of knowledge with 
features we haven’t seen before. 
 
 
4. Factivity and Linguistic Intuition 
 
Until now, I have reduced the question of the viability of factivoid knowledge to the 
question of whether a factivoid account of knowledge might successfully account 
for our intuitive judgements regarding knowledge, without misattributing in any 
novel ways. This is based on the assumption that the theoretical work of factivity is 
limited to its ability to account for our epistemic intuitions. While this is broadly 
true, there is an additional explanatory role that factivity plays. As discussed in 
chapter one, factivity is widely cited as an explanation for specific linguistic 
intuitions of oddness or contradictoriness for utterances like “S knows that p, and 
not p.” 
Factivity easily explains why these utterances seem contradictory. If knowing 
that p entails p, then such utterances are simply self-contradicting. However, if 
knowledge only entails the truthlikeness of p, this type of explanation no longer 
works. This, then, might be cited as an objection to my broader argument: Here we 
have something factivity does that a non-factive condition can’t do. My response to 
such an objection is simple: It is not necessary that knowledge is factive in order to 
explain these linguistic intuitions, but only that factivity has a general intuitive 
appeal, that knowledge seems factive. While factivity certainly explains the fact that 
these utterances sound contradictory, it is far too hasty to think it might only do so 
if knowledge actually is factive. In order to illustrate this, let’s first consider another 
utterance that might sound odd or contradictory: 
 
“Väinö lives in Finland, but he doesn’t live in Scandinavia.” 
 
Although it is not guaranteed, I suspect that many will find this utterance to seem 
odd or contradictory in the same fashion as, “S knows that p, and not p.” However, 
in this case we might note that the explanation for this intuition is not, and 
moreover cannot, be that living in Finland entails living in Scandinavia. This is 
because, while often misidentified as such, Finland is not part of Scandinavia. In this 
case, it is obvious that this is explained by the fact that one thinks Finland is in 
Scandinavia, that it seems like Finland is in Scandinavia. Moreover, even if we 
substitute “a Nordic country” for Scandinavia, it would be clearly mistaken to infer 
from our intuition of contradictoriness that Finland is in fact a Nordic country. 
Rather, the appropriate inference would be that it intuitively seems that Finland is a 
Nordic country. 
In case one might be concerned about the dissimilarity between the 
utterances in question and the Finland example, we find something very similar 





“S knows that p, but might be wrong.” 
 
As with the previous utterances, this too seems contradictory. As put by Lewis: 
 
If you claim that S knows that P, and yet you grant that S cannot eliminate a 
certain possibility in which not-P, it certainly seems as if you have granted 
that S does not after all know that P. To speak of fallible knowledge, of 
knowledge despite uneliminated possibilities of error, just sounds 
contradictory. (1996, 549) 
 
While knowledge being infallible would certainly explain this intuition, we of course 
don’t need to posit that knowledge is infallible in order to explain it. Instead, we 
only need to note that knowledge seems infallible, that there is a general intuitive 
sense that knowledge is an infallible sort of thing. Crucially, we might reject 
infallibilism even while noting that utterances like “S knows that p, but might be 
wrong” sound contradictory. 
I think we might extend this same sort of explanation to “S knows that p, 
and not p.” These utterances sound contradictory not because knowledge is factive 
but simply because knowledge seems like a factive sort of thing. This, however, can 
be explained by knowledge being factivoid. If knowledge is factivoid, then 
knowledge appears factive. It is only close investigation that reveals that it isn’t. 
Moreover, as discussed in chapter one, general intuitions, like the intuition that 
knowledge is factive, might be overridden by both patterns of specific intuitive 
judgements and other theoretical factors (e.g. avoiding skepticism). As the case 
against factivity has both, we might understanding how we can explain the seeming 






















The argument against the factivity of knowledge presented in chapter three is, of 
course, a highly specialized one. It focuses specifically on knowledge associated 
with the visual guidance of motor action, which admittedly represents a very small 
subset of our total knowledge. Because of this, the purpose of this chapter is to 
make efforts directed towards the generalization of this argument. As we will find, 
the question of exactly how much my argument against factivity generalizes is a 
complex one, and here I won’t be able to answer it conclusively. However, we can 
say quite confidently that there is nothing anomalous about motor action. Empirical 
findings highlight that many of our knowledge attributions associated with 
perceptual judgement (§2) and proprioception (§3) also violate the principle of 
factivity. Most significantly, this evens seems to hold for much of our a priori 
knowledge of numerical magnitude (§4). These observations highlight the extent of 
the skeptical problem associated with retaining factivity. Not only does this 
strengthen the general case for a factivoid analysis of knowledge, but the specific 
argument advanced in chapter three, which relies in part on the claim that there is a 
major skeptical threat associated with denying knowledge in the case of the beliefs 
that guide motor action. While I’ll be unable to provide a complete account, and 
some key questions will remain unanswered, in this chapter the extent of the 
skepticism invited by factivity begins to come into focus. 
This chapter will assume a simple structure. After an introductory section 
outlining my “formula” for constructing arguments against factivity, I’ll (loosely) 
apply this formula to visual perception, proprioception, and magnitude 
representation. The last of these cases is by far the most interesting, and I’ll 
accordingly spend the most time discussing the representation of magnitude. 
Finally, I’ll say a bit on what appears to be the most significant question governing 
just how far the argument against factivity generalizes, whether we might make a 
similar argument for beliefs with more accessible content. 
 
 
1. How to argue against the factivity of knowledge in four easy steps! 
 
Before presenting any parallel arguments against the factivity of knowledge, I’d like 
to provide a generalized sort of “recipe” for the type of argument that I’ve made 
and will continue to make. Note that the primary value of this recipe is clarificatory, 
and I’m not trying to suggest that this is some robust philosophical method. 
Presenting a general formula for an argument in this way is merely a tool that helps 
highlight key components of that argument. Accordingly, in this chapter I’ll only 
follow the recipe loosely. Moreover, we might note that while the argument 
presented in chapter three also contains all the key components I’ll discuss here, its 




suggest that this is the only way one might go about arguing against factivity, 
although it’s presently unclear to me how one might go about it in a different way.  
The recipe I present in this section involves four steps, identifying in turn (1) 
appropriate mental content, (2) behaviour guided by that content, (3) associated 
belief attributions, and (4) associated knowledge attributions.  
 
Step 1: Identify appropriate mental content  
 
This first step is of course empirical, and for this project I’ve been relying primarily 
on findings from cognitive neuroscience. Starting with empirical research, the key is 
to identify the potential for fine-grained misrepresentation, mental content that 
might misrepresent the world, but only slightly. The idea here is that the 
misrepresentation needs to be so slight that it is not observable in ordinary 
settings, but only in laboratory environments. I’ve found success in cases that either 
involves some sort of cognitive bias or cognitive noise (or both). Evidence that 
suggests that this misrepresentation causes variation in behaviour is crucial, and 
thus behavioural evidence for noise and/or bias is especially valuable. Evidence 
from neuroimaging, neuropsychology, and neurophysiology can also be helpful, 
but only insofar as it can be linked to ordinary behaviour. We should be especially 
on the lookout for fine-grained misrepresentation that is unavoidable and/or does 
not preclude cognitive success, as this will be helpful in step 4. 
 
Step 2: Identify Behaviour 
 
Once promising mental content has been identified, we need to identify the 
behaviour that is guided by this mental content. This too relies on empirical 
findings, and is most easily accomplished if the previous step draws from 
behavioural studies. After all, if misrepresentation such as noise or bias is posited in 
order to explain a certain behaviour, that of course is compelling evidence that said 
behaviour is guided by noisy and/or biased representations. After specific 
behaviour guided by the promising mental content is identified, we can move on to 
step 3.  
 
Step 3: Identify Belief Attributions 
 
Here we identify what beliefs we might attribute on the basis of the behaviour 
identified in step 2. Of course, if the behaviour is too fine, such as slight delays in 
response time often observed in priming paradigms68, it may be that there aren’t 
any associated belief attributions at all. If this is the case, we should then return to 
step 2 to find new behaviour (or step 1 if there isn’t any). Once associated belief 
attributions are identified, we should check the truth-values of the beliefs. Ideally, it 
should be uncontroversial that they are false. However, as we see especially in §4.2, 
this can be a quite complicated matter and might require a good deal of work to 
establish. At any rate, once it can be established that the beliefs are in fact false, we 
can move on to step 4. 
																																																								





Step 4: Identify Knowledge Attributions 
 
The final step is to check to see if we attribute knowledge on the basis of the false 
beliefs identified in step 3. Of course, the best possible result here is that we simply 
judge these false beliefs to be known, even after becoming aware of their slightly 
misrepresentative content. However, even if this isn’t the case, we might also have 
some strong theoretical motivation to insist that these false beliefs are counted 
under knowledge. As I have argued in chapter three and will continue to argue 
below, denying that these beliefs are known invites a skeptical problem. If no such 
reason can be found, then we should return to step 3 and try again with different 
beliefs. However, if there is a compelling case to be made that we should consider 
these false beliefs to be known, congratulations! You’ve successfully argued against 
factive knowledge! 
Of course, the simplistic “recipe” presentation downplays the challenges 
faced by this sort of argument. Each step requires a serious amount of 
argumentation and might be subjected to any number of objections. Nevertheless, 
by outlining these steps, which I’ve found myself working through in the process of 
building this project, I hope to provide a bit of clarification on what seem to be the 
fundamental components of this type of argument. Moreover, where presented in 
this way, we can clearly observe the “multi-level” structure of my argument, first 
discussed in chapter one. 
 
 
2. Visual Perception Revisited 
 
The purpose of this section is to (slightly) expand the set of knowledge that we 
might observe causes a problem for factivity. It seeks to address the matter of 
knowledge of spatial properties associated not with motor action, but perceptual 
(especially visual) judgement. In doing so, I’ll give an overview of the knowledge 
attributions I have in mind, after which I’ll present empirical evidence that the 
corresponding mental content is both noisy and biased. In short, this mental 
content that guides perceptual judgements poses the same problem for factivity as 
the mental content that guide motor action. 
The argument against factivity presented in chapter three hinged on our 
readiness to attribute knowledge on the basis of success in ordinary motor action. If 
under ordinary conditions, guided by vision, S successfully reaches for and grasps 
an object, we will ordinarily grant that she knew where that object was, how large it 
was, and how it was oriented. In short, up to this point, the following is an 
exhaustive list of the knowledge attributions that I’ve argued challenge factivity: 
 
LOCATION: On the basis of her perception that object O is there, S 
knows that O is there. (S knows where O is.) 
 
SIZE: On the basis of her perception that object O is that large/small, 





ORIENTATION: On the basis of her perception that object O is oriented 
thus and so, S knows that O is oriented thus and so. (S knows what 
the orientation of O is). 
 
If you recall from chapter three (§3), I’ve argued that during motor action the 
content of these beliefs is determined by both ventral (vision-for-conscious-
perception) and dorsal (vision-for-action) -stream representations. The main benefit 
of this move is that it still allows for the same beliefs to explain both motor action 
and perceptual reports. As the dorsal-stream representations are noisy, this means 
that during motor action these beliefs will be false, although highly truthlike, and 
the epistemological leg of the argument takes over from there.  However, we might 
note that motor action is not necessary for us to attribute knowledge of this type, 
as we often will do so on the basis of S’s belief reports, or perhaps even her gaze 
orientation or fixation. In these cases belief content is not determined by dorsal-
stream representations, and thus there is no visuomotor-noise-based problem for 
factivity. Nevertheless, as I will argue in this section, empirical evidence also 
suggests that ventral-stream representations are both noisy and biased. 
Accordingly, it appears that whether we make the above types of knowledge 
attributions on the basis of successful motor action, perceptual judgement, or gaze, 
this knowledge can only be handled by a factivoid account. 
To begin with, we might note that the sources of noise are not unique to 
visuomotor processing. As mentioned in section three of chapter two, noise is the 
product of the basic properties of the physical processes that serve as the 
foundation for perception and cognition (see Faisal et al. 2008). Far from a quirk of 
motor action, noise is ubiquitous throughout the nervous system: 
 
Noise permeates every level of the nervous system, from the perception of 
sensory signals to the generation of motor responses, and poses a 
fundamental problem for information processing. (ibid, 292) 
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that there is also evidence that “the very different 
neural processes of [conscious] perception and action are limited by the same 
sources of noise” (Osborne et al. 2005, 412), and specifically for “shared noise 
sources in the [conscious] perception and action pathways arising from a common 
sensory estimate” (Mukherjee et al. 2015, 8515). On the basis of these observations 
alone, we might anticipate that ventral-stream representations of the spatial 
properties of objects are no more accurate than their dorsal-stream counterparts. 
This expectation matches the observation of noise-correlated inaccuracy in 
perceptual judgements, summarized as follows (emphasis mine): 
 
Perceptual decision making is one of the most important tasks performed by 
the brain . . . The brain must therefore have evolved a sophisticated and 
rapid mechanism for making decisions based on input from the external 
world. Physical stimuli have certain, well-defined properties when they arrive 
at the sensory organs, but they are then transduced and transmitted along 
pathways that have multiple synaptic way-stations where information can be 
delayed, distorted or influenced by descending, efferent activity. The 




or internal stimulus representations, are therefore imperfect 
representations of the physical stimulus, and physically identical stimuli 
can elicit variable percepts. The decision-making mechanism must act on 
the perceptual evidence available to achieve the organism’s goals . . . As 
the relative contribution of the internally-generated noise to the 
percept increases, decision-making becomes increasingly prone to 
errors. (Amitay et al. 2013, 1) 
 
There are a few key observations here I’d like to stress. The first is that the mental 
content that guides perceptual judgements is very much susceptible to noise, as is 
evidenced by the correlation between noise levels and error in perceptual 
judgement (ibid; Arazi et al. 2017). Moreover, this noise is ubiquitous in the mental 
content that guides perceptual judgements (Neri 2010; Dinstein 2015; Ratcliff et al. 
2018). As with the visuomotor noise discussed in chapter three, this means that this 
mental content will always at least slightly misrepresent the world, and we might 
provide a similar reply to the objection that noise should be understood in terms of 
increased indeterminacy: If we assume that this content is so indeterminate that it is 
no longer misrepresentative, it can no longer explain observed variation in 
behaviour. In short, it is clear that the mental content that guides perceptual 
judgement is inaccurate in the same sort of way as the mental content that guides 
motor action. 
Beyond the general inaccuracy caused by noise, there is a more specific 
inaccuracy we might observe for ventral-stream representations of object location. 
Put simply, the representations of object location used in perceptual judgement are 
systematically biased towards gaze direction: 
 
People are biased toward localizing visual targets where they are looking. 
For static objects this bias is too weak to introduce noticeable errors, but for 
moving targets the temporal uncertainty can be large enough for the bias to 
no longer be negligible. (Brenner et al. 2006, 822) 
 
Dubbed “foveal69 bias” by Sheth and Shimojo (2001, 331)70, the evidence for this 
bias comes from behavioural studies involving direct reports of perceived object 
location. As the bias is far more pronounced for objects in motion than it is for 
static objects, it’s most easily observed in perceptual reports of objects in motion. 
For example, one such study by Brenner et al. (2008) used a visual array of five 
concentric circles, for which participants fixated their gaze at a small black dot in 
the centre of the array. The target was a green dot that jumped around the array, 
changing locations four times a second, and participants were asked to report on 
the location of the dot (which ring it was on) at a specific time, indicated either by a 
visual (flashing light) or auditory (tone) cue (ibid). In simply comparing actual target 
location to reported target location, this study “found a clear bias towards selecting 
target positions near fixation” (ibid, 8). Similar results have been observed in other 
numerous other studies, involving objects in motion (Kerzel 2002; Brenner et al. 
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2006) as well as the remembered location of static objects (Sheth & Shimojo 2001; 
Fiehler et al. 2010; Bocianski et al. 2010; Fortenbaugh and Robertson 2011). In 
short, there is strong evidence for the foveal bias (for an overview see Odegaard et 
al. 2015). 
The misrepresentation attributable to this foveal bias is certainly not the only 
sense in which accuracy for the conscious perception of moving objects appears to 
be significantly limited.71 However, as already alluded to, this bias is of particular 
interest because it not caused by motion: 
 
In this case the origin of the bias is not to be found in the statistics of the 
scenes that we encounter in daily life. Its origin lies in the way in which visual 
information is processed within the eye and brain, with most neuronal 
resources being devoted to a small area on the retina, and eye movements 
directing this part of the retina (the fovea) towards selected parts of the 
scene. (Brenner et al. 2008, 2) 
 
This means that the bias is shared by representations of the location of static and 
moving objects alike. Finally, and more critically for our purposes, under most 
circumstances this is bias is weak to the point of unnoticeability: 
 
Since we do not expect a strong bias towards small retinal eccentricities72, 
we can only expect such a bias to become apparent when there is 
considerable uncertainty about targets’ positions. (Brenner et al. 2008, 2) 
 
This combination of ubiquitous and scarcely noticeable misrepresentation lends 
itself to a similar result to that found with noise. It also helps to demonstrate how 
error in otherwise reflectively accessible mental content might still not easily be 
accessed upon reflection. To close out this section, I’ll show how both cases allows 
us to construct an argument roughly following the recipe outlined in the previous 
section, thereby broadening the case against factivity and for the factivoid analysis 
of knowledge. 
Let’s begin with the sorts of beliefs we might attribute to S on the basis of 
her perceptual judgements. It should be uncontroversial that, in ordinary 
conditions, if S makes a perceptual judgement about the location/size/orientation 
of an object, we readily grant that S believes that the object is there/ that size/ that 
orientation. Next, we might note that the content of these beliefs is determined by 
noisy representations of location/size/orientation, which means that these beliefs 
will be false. Additionally, representations of location will also be biased towards 
the centre of gaze, resulting in an additional layer of misrepresentation. Given that 
perceptual judgements both covary with noise and directly display foveal bias, we 
might preëmpt any objection that belief content isn’t actually determined by 
noisy/biased representations. Thus, we might reasonably conclude here that all our 
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moving object, “perceptual localization is influenced by motion signals collected over 80 ms after a 
query is triggered” (Eagleman et al. 2007).  
72 Retinal eccentricity is the angle of an image on the retina from the centre of gaze (fovea). Thus, “a 
bias towards localising targets near where one is looking is equivalent to a bias towards small 




beliefs about these spatial properties of objects will be false. However, ordinarily 
these beliefs are of course still highly truthlike. After all, we generally assume them 
to be true, and it is only through close observation in an experimental setting that 
their (slight) falsity might be observed. As is the case when the content of these 
beliefs is determined by noisy motor representations, they are false in just the right 
way to be problematic for the factivity of knowledge. 
At this point, we might return to the cases of knowledge attribution listed at 
the beginning of this section. Ordinarily, on the basis of any number of apparently 
correct73 perceptual judgements or reports, or even gaze orientation, we might 
readily attribute this sort of knowledge. However, as the corresponding beliefs will 
always be false, these knowledge attributions can only be accommodated under a 
factivoid account of knowledge. We can further emphasize the need for such an 
account by making the same two observations as we did for visuomotor noise. First, 
I think that even when we note that these beliefs are noisy, we still judge that these 
beliefs are known. Even if S’s representation of an object O’s location is slightly 
inaccurate, S still knows where O is. Second, even if this judgement proves 
contentious, we need to grant knowledge in these cases to avoid the threat of 
skepticism. This skeptical problem becomes clearer over the course of this chapter, 
as we begin to unravel the full extent of noisy belief content. 
In short, we might see that from the mental content that guides perceptual 
judgement, we might construct a very parallel argument against factivity to that 
presented in chapter three. The key difference here is that we cannot appeal to the 
totally inaccessibility of this content to bolster the argument’s plausibility. 
Nevertheless, it seems we might still say that the error is itself inaccessible even if 
the content generally is. This means that we never have true beliefs about the 
spatial properties of the objects in our environment, whether we are acting on them 
or making perceptual judgements about them. Therefore, all the knowledge 
attributions associated with this perceptual judgement and motor action can only 





Even in the absence of visual feedback, we ordinarily think that we have knowledge 
of the location and orientation of our limbs. We readily attribute knowledge to S of 
where here limbs are, that they are oriented thus-and-so, etc., even when they are 
outside of S’s visual field. While we might do so on the basis of S’s action or verbal 
reports, upon closer inspection it seems we are willing to attribute such knowledge 
even in the absence of any explicit behavioural cues. This might be explained by 
the fact that we always have a sense of limb location and orientation, referred to as 
“proprioception,” which is independent from other sensory input (for a primer see 
Tuthill & Azim 2018). However, as I will discuss here, proprioception is not perfectly 
accurate. The representations of limb location and orientation it produces are not 
perfectly accurate, and in fact systematically biased. This means that if we gain 
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ordinary language, and even conscious awareness itself, is too coarse-grained to capture the 




knowledge of limb location and orientation on the basis of proprioception, then 
this knowledge cannot be explained by a factive account of knowledge. Here, 
however, we need to be careful, as proprioception is famously rudimentary and 
significantly less accurate than visual perception. This opens the door for a very 
plausible skepticism of putative proprioceptual knowledge, a possibility I’ll leave 
open here. Thus, in contrast with the other cases I’ve discussed, for proprioception 
I’ll limit myself to a weaker, conditional claim: If we acquire knowledge of limb 
location and orientation on the basis of proprioception, then this knowledge 
violates factivity. In arguing for this claim, I’ll first provide a brief background on 
proprioception, before discussing the associated belief and knowledge attributions. 
There are multiple ways in which of our cognitive systems might acquire 
information about the location and orientation of our limbs. One of these sources is 
of course vision, and it has also been argued that forward modelling, a predictive 
capacity for objects in motion, plays a key role in the representation of one’s own 
limbs while they are in motion (Yavari et al. 2015). However, even when our limbs 
are neither within our visual field nor in motion, we are still able to sense where 
they are and how they are oriented. This ability is known as “proprioception.” 
While there is some philosophical disagreement whether this constitutes a 
perceptual capacity (see Gallagher 2003 for an argument that it is not, and Fridland 
2011 for a response), on the empirical side it is certainly treated as such. For 
example, consider the following (emphasis all mine): 
 
Our ability to properly move and react in different situations is largely 
dependent on our perception  of our limbs' position. At least three sources 
— vision, proprioception, and internal forward models (FMs) — seem to 
contribute to this perception . (Yavari et al. 2015, 403) 
 
In “Experiment 2”, we examined the relationship between actual hand 
position and the conscious perception  of hand position by subjects during 
tracking. It was expected that withdrawal of visual inputs would increase the 
variability of the perception  of dynamic hand positions, and that this may, 
in turn, account for poorer unseen target position judgements. (Tanaka et al. 
2009, 376) 
 
In the absence of visual feedback, the perceived  position of the hands is 
systematically biased towards the plausible manual task space. (Fraser and 
Harris 2016, 3565) 
 
The key here is that the representations produced by proprioception play similar 
roles to those produced by visual perception. Just as unconscious vision represents 
the location of objects being acted on, unconscious proprioception represents the 
position of hands during motor action (Vindras et al. 1998; Jones et al. 2010; 
Veilleux & Proteau 2011). Similarly, just as conscious vision represents object 
location and orientation in a way that might guide perceptual judgements, we 
might also make judgements about limb position on the basis of proprioception 
alone (Vindras et al. 1998; Plooy et al. 1998). In short, structurally proprioception is 




content and content for motor action. Accordingly, here I will discuss 
proprioception simply as a mode of perception.  
Like the perceptual representations discussed previously, those produced by 
proprioception are not perfectly accurate. Behavioural evidence suggests that 
proprioceptive representations of hand position are systematically biased. As an 
example, let’s look at the widely cited study conducted by Vindras et al., which 
notes that the bias displayed for reaching in certain conditions suggests that 
proprioception produces biased representations of hand position (1998). During 
reaching tasks under suppressed visual feedback, our reaches tend to display a 
constant error, a “parallel shift” between target endpoint and reaching endpoint 
(1998, 3290). As discussed in chapter two, specific patterns of error are indicative of 
specific sources. In brief, here, as the endpoint bias is (i) present in both perceptual 
judgement and motor action and (ii) eliminated by visual feedback, this suggests 
that the bias is in the proprioceptive representation itself.74 They conclude: 
 
1) Kinesthetic estimation of hand position may be consistently biased. Some 
of the mechanisms responsible for these biases are always active, 
irrespective of whether position is estimated overtly (e.g., with a matching 
paradigm), or covertly as part of the motor planning for aimed movements. 
2) Pointing errors reflect to a significant extent the erroneous estimation of 
initial hand position. (ibid, 3290) 
 
Similar results have been reported by many other studies (Desmurget et al. 2000; 
Farrer et al. 2003; Cressman & Henriques 2010; Saidi et al. 2012; Darainy et al. 
2013). Yarvari et al. nicely characterize these sorts of findings, observing after one 
experiment that when only able to access proprioception, “subjects felt their 
hand's position on the right and bottom of its actual position” (2015, 415). Beyond 
hand localization, although the subject of less research interest, there is also 
evidence for bias in the proprioceptive representation of hand orientation (Fraser 
and Harris 2016/ 2017).  
All this means that any beliefs of limb position or orientation whose content 
is determined by proprioceptive representations will be false. Accordingly, on a 
factive account of knowledge, we cannot on the basis of proprioception know 
where our limbs are or how they are orientated. Again, I think we need to leave 
open the possibility that proprioception is simply not accurate to actually produce 
knowledge. However, it is clear that if we want to say that we have this knowledge 







74 As I understand it, the rationale here goes something like this: (i) rules out the possibility it’s 
execution noise, since the bias is in perceptual judgements too. (i) also rules out the possibility that it’s 
something specific to motor control or conscious perception. (ii) rules out coordinate transformations 
or some higher-level source for the bias, since this would persist for vision. Thus, given all the this, the 




4. Analogue Magnitude Representation 
 
Analogue magnitude representation (AMR) is a specific representational kind, 
which, as I will argue, is especially problematic for factive accounts of knowledge. In 
this section, I will first introduce the concept of AMR, after which I will discuss two 
specific instances, analogue numerical magnitude representation and analogue 
temporal magnitude representation. Both cases present a clear argument against 
the factivity of knowledge. Ultimately, if we wish to retain our ordinary knowledge 
attributions involving numerical and temporal magnitude, we need to adopt a 
factivoid framework. 
 
4.1 Introduction to AMR 
 
Much of the information our cognitive systems process assumes the form of 
magnitudes. Ordinary tasks will often involve such information as the quantity of a 
given entity (numerical magnitude), the size of an object (spatial magnitude75), or 
elapsed time (temporal magnitude). Accordingly, the successful completion of 
ordinary tasks will often require accurate representations of magnitudes, 
representations that are often closely associated with judgement and belief. For 
example, the judgement that one group of objects contains more members than 
another group requires the accurate representation of the numerical magnitude of 
membership of each group. Moreover, on the basis of S’s judgement that group A 
contains more members than group B, it is ordinary practice to attribute to S beliefs 
about the magnitudes in involved in the judgements. Finally, under ordinary 
conditions, we attribute knowledge to S if indeed group A contains more members 
than group B, such as knowledge of the magnitude of membership of each group. 
This of course is not unique to numerical magnitude, and we might say something 
similar for judgements and beliefs involving temporal magnitude. 
The importance of magnitude representation in the guidance of behaviour 
raises the question of how magnitude is represented internally. Put simply, there is 
widespread agreement that magnitude representation is analogue. Not only is 
this the case in the vast empirical literature (for overviews see Ansari Vogel 2013; 
Piazza & Eger 2016) but also in what minor attention it has received on the 
philosophical side (Beck 2015; Gemel & Quinon 2015). Before surveying the 
evidence for general analogue magnitude representation, however, I should first 
say a bit on what it means for a representation to be analogue. 
At the most basic level, an analogue representation is exactly what its name 
might suggest: A representation is a direct analogue for the information being 
represented. This idea is best conveyed via example, likely the most familiar of 
which is not neural, but rather that of analogue audio signals. In the case of an 
analogue audio signal, voltage as a function of time directly represents sound 
pressure as a function of time. Higher sound pressure is represented by higher 
signal voltage, and lower pressure by lower voltage, via a continuous function. In 
this way, we might understand voltage to represent sound pressure as its direct 
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representational analogue. We might contrast this with digital audio signals, on 
which voltage is not a direct analogue for sound pressure, but rather corresponds 
with a binary code, which in turn corresponds with a certain level of sound pressure. 
The key here is that for digital representation, there is no direct analogue for sound 
pressure, nothing that represents increasing sound pressure by simply increasing, 
and so forth. 
Just as voltage is a direct analogue for sound pressure in analogue audio 
representation, magnitude is represented by an analogue in the brain, “some 
neural entity that is a direct analogue of the magnitude it represents” (Beck 2015, 
835). In order to illustrate what this might look like, let’s consider the example of 
the “mental number line.” While I’ll discuss the details more in the following 
subsection (see Ansari Vogel 2013 for an overview), the basic idea is that numerical 
magnitude is represented by a neural structure that functions like a sort of “number 
line,” with any given numerical magnitude represented as a specific location along 
this number line.  
The general evidence that neural magnitude representation is analogue is 
both behavioural and neurological. While in the following subsections I’ll highlight 
specific evidence pertaining to numerical and temporal magnitude, here I want to 
briefly highlight the thrust of the behavioural evidence for AMR, which involves two 
key observations: (1) Magnitude representation occurs independently from 
semantic representation, and (2) magnitude representation corresponds with 
Weber’s law. I’ll discuss each in turn. 
There is a wealth of behavioural evidence that highlights that magnitude 
representation is not contingent upon the capacity to process written language. 
First, we might observe that pre-linguistic infants demonstrate the capacity to 
accurately represent magnitudes. For example, a study by vanMarle and Wynn 
reported that “by the age of 6 months, infants have a means of representing 
duration, and they can discriminate durations of audiovisual events” (2006, F44). 
This conclusion is based on the observation of infants fixating much longer on 
visual targets (in this case a puppet) when it emits a tone of a duration 
discriminable from the previous tone emitted; in this case the discrimination 
threshold was 2:1 (ibid). Similar magnitude representation in infants has been 
reported in a multitude of other studies, including for numerical magnitude (Xu & 
Spelke 2000; Lipton & Spelke 2003; Xu et al. 2005; vanMarle & Wynn 2009), spatial 
magnitude (Brannon et al. 2006), and velocity (Daum et al. 2016; Möhring et al. 
2017) in addition to temporal magnitude (Brannon et al. 2007; Hevia et al. 2017).76 
Beyond this, there is also evidence of magnitude representation in non-human 
primates (Beran et al. 1998; Cantlon et al. 2007; Tomonaga 2008; Jordan et al. 
2008; Gazes et al. 2017) and even birds (Pepperberg & Carey 2012; Rugani et al. 
2015a/b).77 All this is important because, although it doesn’t definitively answer 
how magnitude is represented in adult humans, it suggests that magnitude need 
not be represented symbolically (see Dehaene et al. 1999). That is, it suggests, for 
example, we might represent the magnitude of 12 independently from the 
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questions as whether they exclusively use AMR (Mou & Vannarle 2014) and whether magnitude is 
represented in a single system (Lourenco & Longo 2010). 




“semantic representation of numerical symbols” (Piazza & Eger 2016, 264) like 
“12.” Crucially, this suggests that our behaviour in judgements of comparison 
might be explained not by any semantic representations, but by non-semantic 
representations of magnitude, which we have both general and specific reason to 
assume are analogue. 
The most compelling behavioural evidence that magnitude representation 
is analogue emerges from the fact that magnitude representations follow a pattern 
referred to as “Weber’s law,” on which “the ability to discriminate two magnitudes 
is determined by their ratio” (Beck 2015, 833). For example, in a number 
discrimination task, we might note that we are faster to judge that 2 is larger than 1 
than we are that 9 is larger than 8 (Ansari and Vogel 2013). Despite the fact that 
there is a difference of one in both cases, 2:1 is larger than 9:8. Weber’s law is 
simply this correlation of discrimination of magnitude with the ratio of the 
magnitudes being discriminated. This basic pattern holds for the above cases of 
infants and non-human animals, as well as adult humans, as I’ll discuss in detail in 
the following subsections. For example, in the vanMarle and Wynn study discussed 
above, infants were able to discriminate between temporal magnitudes for a 2:1 
ratio, but not a 3:2 ratio (2006). 
The reason this constitutes evidence that magnitude representation is 
analogue reduces to one key observation: On an analogue representational format, 
as magnitudes get larger their representational forms become more similar. This 
means that the representations of two large magnitudes of difference X are more 
similar than the representations of smaller magnitudes of difference X, and thus 
require additional cognitive resources to discriminate. An excellent way to 
understand this is with Carey’s illustration (2009, 118), which I’ll recapitulate as the 
following: Say instead of representing numerical magnitude with numerals, we 
represent magnitude in an analogue format, for which one “-” corresponds with a 
single numerical unit. That is “-” represents the magnitude of 1, “--” the magnitude 
of 2, and so on. Here we note that as magnitude increases these representations 
become more similar, in that they have more in common. 9 and 8 (--------- and -------
-) are far more similar in representational form than 2 and 1 (-- and -), despite 
sharing the same difference. Thus, we might note it is much more difficult to 
visually discriminate 9 and 8. Conversely, 8 and 4 (-------- and ----) are just as 
discriminable and 2 and 1 (-- and -), as they have the same ratio. As I’ll discuss with 
numerical magnitude specifically, there is additional neurological evidence for 
analogue magnitude representation. However, here we might conclude that the 
fact that magnitude representation follows Weber’s law is easily explained if 
magnitude representation is analogue, a fact which has led to the widespread 
acceptance of the claim that magnitude representation is analogue (Brannon 2006; 
Spelke & Kinzler 2007; Carey 2009; Beran et al. 2011; Beck 2015). 
While I’ll discuss specifics in the following subsections, as they pertain to 
numerical and temporal magnitude respectively, here we might note the general 
concern that AMR raises for the factivity of knowledge. Put simply, analogue 
representations tend to be noisy. Even before focusing attention on neural 
analogue representation, analogue audio signals foreshadow this problem. The 
familiar ubiquity of noise in analogue audio signals is not a quirk of audio 




perhaps obscured by the above toy example, on which the analogue of numerical 
magnitude was a set of discrete dashes, actual analogues tend to be continuous, 
such as voltage distributions for analogue audio signals. Thus, slight different 
voltages, for example, result in the representation of slightly different audio 
pressures. This means that any fluctuation in the signal (i.e. noise) changes what is 
represented. In this way, input noise is transmitted through to the output. Since 
input noise is unavoidable, so is output noise. As we will see in §4.2 and §4.3, the 
continuous neural distributions used as analogues for the representation of 
numerical and temporal magnitude both succumb to this problem.  
This poses the same challenge for factivity as the other cases of noise 
discussed previously. If our representations of magnitude are noisy, then this means 
that they don’t represent the world as it is and, more crucially, that they slightly 
misrepresent the world. We might make a similar argument that these 
representations determine belief content, on the basis that they explain the 
behaviour on which we form certain belief attributions, and note that, given the 
belief still meets its output requirements, we still judge this belief to be known. 
However, as the content of these beliefs misrepresents the world, they are false. 
Therefore, we need a factivoid account to handle them. Again, note that this is only 
a sketch of the general argument, and I’ll fill in specifics for each type of magnitude 
representation discussed below. 
The final thing I want to note before moving on to the specifics of numerical 
and temporal magnitude is that while it is widely agreed adult humans have a 
cognitive system that represents magnitude via a neural analogue, it is not widely 
agreed that this is the exclusive means by which we might represent magnitude. 
For example, it has been proposed that numerical magnitudes between one and 
four might be represented by a separate “object tracking system” (Mou & 
VanMarle 2014; see also Feigenson et al. 2004; Revkin et al. 2008; Trick 2008).78 
This underscores the importance of establishing that the belief content I’ll discuss in 
the following subsections is in fact determined by AMR, which is a matter of 
demonstrating that the behaviour on the basis of which we attribute relevant beliefs 
is clearly guided by the analogue representation of numerical (or temporal) 
magnitude. 
 
4.2 Numerical Magnitude 
 
In this subsection, I’ll argue along the following lines that much of our knowledge 
involving numerical magnitude will violate factivity: Due to the analogue way in 
which the brain represents numerical magnitude, it appears that many of our beliefs 
involving numerical magnitude will in fact be false. In certain cases we might judge 
that these beliefs are simply unknown, especially when involving large numbers. 
However, in more everyday cases, as with the false beliefs that guide motor action, 
we still judge that these beliefs are known. Beyond this, in order to avoid 
skepticism for some knowledge involving numerical magnitude we must grant that 
these false beliefs are often still known. As such beliefs are still highly truthlike, 
meet the output requirements of the cognitive processes according to which they 
																																																								




form, still play the same functional role as true belief, etc., they fit perfectly into the 
factivoid framework outlined in the previous chapter. In order to present this 
argument, this subsection will be structured in the following way. First, I’ll provide 
an overview of the empirical evidence that numerical magnitude specifically is 
represented via a neural analogue, a sort of mental number line. Here I’ll focus on 
evidence form behaviour and neuroimaging.79 From this, I will argue that much of 
our knowledge involving numerical magnitude is factivity-violating. We see this 
especially with attributions like “S knows what the magnitude of n is.”  
As we’ve seen above, numerical magnitude tends to be the paradigm 
example of AMR, and it is widely accepted that (at least) the vast majority of 
numerical magnitude representation is accomplished internally via a neural 
analogue. This neural analogue is often referred to as a “mental number line,” as 
numerical magnitude is represented topographically, left-to-right, much as it is on a 
physical number line (Göbel 2006; Harvey et al. 2013). The specifics of this have 
been the subject of debate 80 . However, the standard view is that numerical 
magnitude representation is not represented by discrete unit (neuron) activation, 
but by an activation distribution. 81 Consider the following account of how, after 
processing, numerical magnitude is finally represented: 
 
In the final stage, input is received from the summation code module and 
the summed activity 82  is projected onto a topographically organized 
“number line.” In other words, the summed activity is mapped onto a 
selective numerical magnitude unit that only responds to a selective range of 
values, but not if the value is larger or smaller. For example, the summed 
activity of seven objects is projected onto a unit, which prefers the numerical 
magnitude 7. However, this unit will also respond to the numerical 
magnitude 6 and 8, although to a lesser degree. Therefore, each projected 
numerical magnitude creates a bell-curved Gaussian activity distribution 
where the peak activation is centered on the preferred numerical magnitude. 
(Ansari and Vogel 2013, 394) 
 
In short, numerical magnitude representation is analogue. The magnitude of any 
given number is represented by a Gaussian distribution. Before discussing the 
implications of this type of representation, I first want to highlight the empirical 
evidence for the claim that numerical magnitude is represented via a continuous 
neural analogue. This comes both from the behavioural evidence that numerical 
magnitude representation follows Weber’s law, which suggests the representation 
is analogue, and neuroimaging evidence that also suggests that it is analogue.83 
																																																								
79 I must note again that much of the evidence cited in the literature on numerical magnitude comes 
from neurophysiological studies on monkeys. As with the “two visual systems” hypothesis in chapter 
two (§3), due to the horrifying ethical implications I want to minimize the role this research plays in my 
account. 
80 The key disagreement here is between whether representation is logarithmic (Dehaene & Changeux 
1993) or linear (Gallistel & Gelman 2000). For a general overview of this distinction see Ansari and 
Vogel (2013).  
81 Note that a rival account has been advanced by Zorzi et al. (2011). 
82 “Summation code module” and “summed activity” refer to the processing stage prior to final 
magnitude representation, which I discuss more shortly. 




Beginning with the findings of the seminal 1967 study by Moyer and 
Landauer, it has consistently been observed that the time required to judge which 
of two numbers is larger in magnitude is (roughly) inversely proportional to their 
ratio. That is, numerical magnitude representation follows Weber’s law. This result 
has been confirmed in the results of a multitude of subsequent studies (Parkman 
1971; Buckley & Gillman 1974; Banks et al. 1976; Gibbon 1977; Dehaene & 
Akhavein 1995). Put one way, “the most consistently observed effect in numerical 
cognition research is that the difficulty of numerical discrimination depends on the 
ratio difference between two values” (Prather 2014, 601). As discussed above, this 
strongly suggests that numerical magnitude representation is analogue.  
Beyond this, evidence from neuroimaging studies also supports the claim 
that the representation of numerical magnitude is analogue. Before discussing this, 
however, I first want to note that neurological study of numerical representation is 
complicated both by the fact that (i) numerical magnitude might be represented via 
multiple external formats (ex. “2” vs. “two” vs. two vs. * *) (Ansari 2007; for a meta-
analysis see Sokolowski 2017a) and (ii) multiple regions of the brain contribute to 
the processing of numerical magnitude (for a meta-analysis see Sokolowski et al. 
2017b). This results in a complex picture of numerical magnitude representation at 
the neural level, the details of which are still the subject of present research and 
debate (Sokolowski et al. 2017a/b). Rather than delving into the details of these 
complications, I’ll instead opt to simply highlight the fact that when a neuroimaging 
study observes an apparent analogue representation for a numerical magnitude, 
this does not necessarily mean that all numerical magnitude is represented in this 
way, or even that that specific magnitude is not also represented another way in 
the brain concurrently. Again, as first discussed in chapter two, it is important to 
keep in mind that the same information is often represented internally multiple 
times, in multiple ways.84 With this in mind, we might approach the evidence from 
neuroimaging studies that numerical magnitude representation often is analogue.  
Perhaps the most obvious neuroimaging evidence for analogue numerical 
magnitude representation is the observation that activation increases monotonically 
as the magnitude of a set of objects in a visual field increases. That is, “the more 
items present of a given non-symbolic stimuli, the higher the neurofunctional 
activation within the posterior parietal lobe” (Ansari & Vogel 2013, 395). For 
example, a study by Satens et al. (2010) presented participants with visual arrays 
that contained between one and five dots and used fMRI to measure 
corresponding activation. They found “a positive correlation between the strength 
of the BOLD85 response and number of target locations” (ibid, 82). As activation 
increases with magnitude, this of course is indicative of an analogue representation, 
with activation levels in this level of the brain serving as a neural analogue for 
magnitude. Similar results have been observed in other neuroimaging studies 
(Roggeman et al. 2010; Roggeman et al. 2011; Park et al. 2016). This particular 
activation pattern is often cited as evidence for “summation coding,” an 
intermediary stage of magnitude processing on which the magnitude of a 
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collection of items is simply summed before being mapped onto the mental 
number line (Ansari & Vogel 2013, 395; Sokolowski 2017b, 390).  
There is also neuroimaging evidence for final analogue representation of 
magnitude on the mental number line, which at the neural level is often referred to 
as “place coding” (Ansari & Vogel 2013; Sokolowski 2017b, 390). An early 
neuroimaging study to confirm this was conducted by Piazza et al. (2004). 
Researchers used fMRI to observe neural activation when participants viewed visual 
arrays containing either 16 or 32 dots, finding that: 
 
Although noisier than behavioral curves, the brain activation responses to 
habituation numerosities 16 and 32 showed the characteristic features of 
Weber’s law. The curves had an increasing width on a linear number scale, 
became identical in width when plotted on a log scale and could be 
expressed as a simple Gaussian function. (ibid, 550-1) 
 
In short, these representations displayed all the hallmarks of being analogue, even 
at the neural level. Similar conclusions have been reported by a number of 
subsequent studies (Piazza et al. 2007; Jacob and Nieder 2009; Eger et al. 2009; 
Harvey et al. 2013). 
As discussed in §4.1 with respect to AMR generally, if numerical magnitude 
representation is analogue, then it will be noisy. Thus, because of the behavioural 
and neuroimaging evidence I’ve just overviewed, it is widely accepted that 
“representation of numerical magnitude is analogue and, therefore, inherently 
noisy and approximate” (Ansari & Vogel 2013, 397). This is the case both for the 
significant empirical (Gallistel & Gelman 2000; Piazza 2010; Prather 2014; Nieder 
2016) and the much smaller philosophical (Beck 2015; Égré 2017) discussion86 of 
numerical magnitude representation. As with visuomotor noise, it is worth noting 
that noise in the representation of numerical magnitude does not necessarily 
undermine the success of the behavior it guides. For example, useful especially for 
magnitude discrimination tasks, “this system yields a noisy representation of 
approximate number that captures the inter-relations between different 
numerosities” (Feigenson et al. 2004, 309). Just as the slight misrepresentation of 
an object’s location does not hinder our ability to successfully grasp that object, the 
slight misrepresentation of two magnitudes does not hinder our ability to judge 
which magnitude is larger. 
Now I would like to begin the turn from empirical findings to the 
epistemological problem posed by these findings, the core of which should now 
sound familiar: Analogue representations of numerical magnitude are inaccurate in 
the sense that numerical magnitude is systematically misrepresented. For AMR of 
numerical magnitude, there are three distinct sources of systemic 
misrepresentation, which I discuss in turn: (i) bias, (ii) noise, (iii) and approximation. 
While the first two of these will of course be familiar from previous discussions, the 
third is unique to AMR. Accordingly, I will afford it the most attention. 
As I’ll use the term here, analogue representations of numerical magnitude 
are “biased” in the sense that magnitude of certain numbers are be consistently 
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misrepresented relative to other magnitudes. For example, if one’s internal 
representation of the magnitude of 5 happens to be consistently closer to the 
magnitude of 9 than it is to 1, this sort of systematic overrepresentation of the 
relative numerical magnitude of 5 is a bias in the representation of the magnitude 
of 5. While the observed patterns of relative representation of numerical 
magnitudes tend to be complex87, and it is not universally agreed upon how these 
representations are biased 88 , the prevailing logarithmic account maintains “a 
relative overrepresentation of small numbers compared to larger numbers” (Ansari 
& Vogel 2013, 394). Additionally, an especially robust effect is the systematic 
misrepresentation of the midpoint of two numbers (Göbel et al. 2006; Longo & 
Lourenco 2007; Loftus et al. 2008; Mohr 2010). Although not the most important 
contribution to inaccuracy I’ll discuss, it is at least worth noting apparent bias in the 
analogue representation of numerical magnitude. 
Next, there’s noise. To the extent that numerical magnitude is represented 
via neural analogue, those representations will be noisy. The argument from this 
point unfolds similarly to that from motor action, the first step of which is to argue 
that this noise can be understood not only as indeterminacy but also inaccuracy. 
That is, the noise in our representation of numerical magnitude means that we 
systematically misrepresent numerical magnitude. Or, as put by Égré in one of the 
few philosophical papers to directly address the matter (emphasis mine): 
 
An example of analog measurement is given by the approximate number 
system, by which we estimate numerosities. A key feature of this system is 
that cardinalities are represented with some probabilistic error, meaning 
that the same number of objects will be represented as more or less 
than it is. (2017, 3838) 
 
What Égré is referring to here is trial-to-trial variability in the represented 
magnitude of a set number of objects. That is, for certain trials magnitude will be 
overrepresented, and for other trials it will be underrepresented. We might 
compare this trail-to-trial variability to that we might observe for motor action. Just 
as our reaching and grasping movements are variable as the result of noise in our 
representations of relevant spatial properties, our judgements about the 
magnitudes of numbers vary as the result of noise in our representation of 
numerical magnitude. 89  This is best illustrated in the trial-to-trail variability of 
responses in number line tasks. Pioneered by Siegler & Opfer (2003), it is now 
widely accepted practice that we can observe subjects’ representations of 
numerical magnitude by having them indicate those magnitudes on number lines 
(e.g. Siegler & Booth 2004; Opfer & DeVries 2007; Geary et al. 2008; Berteletti et 
al. 2010).90 It is well documented that responses on these tasks are variable (for 
																																																								
87 For example, a series of studies by Landy et al. (2013; 2017) documented a complex pattern of 
relative misrepresentation involving large numbers, including discontinuities and, most notably, two 
distinct populations of participants.   
88 See Gallistel and Gelman (2000) for the alternate, “linear” account, and Karolis et al. (2011) for 
evidence for bias corresponding with that account.  
89 We might even note that variability in motor action also displays a Gaussian distribution (Bock & 
Daunicht 1987). 




studies that highlight this, see Cohen & Blanc-Goldhammer 2011; Kim and Opfer 
2017; Peeters et al. 2017), which suggests trial-to-trail variability in the 
representation of magnitude. In short, as Égré put it, numerical magnitude “will be 
represented as more or less than it is” (2017, 3838). This variability derives from the 
noisy nature of individual neural activation. Per Nieder: 
 
The read-outs for single trials of neuronal responses are noisy, and smooth 
and unequivocal tuning functions only emerge after the discharges of a cell 
to many identical trial repetitions have been averaged, or after the tuning 
functions of many equally tuned single cells have been pooled. (2016, 371) 
 
It is uncontroversial that the activity of individual neurons is noisy (see Faisal et al. 
2008).  
Finally, there is approximation. While it is widely accepted that analogue 
representations of numerical magnitude are approximate, it is a matter of debate 
what exactly this means (see Beck 2015, §3.2). Here I will not try to address this 
matter generally, but only highlight one specific point of the approximate 
representation of numerical magnitude: The neural analogue for numerical 
magnitude represents multiple magnitudes simultaneously. That is, we might say 
that the same number of objects will be represented as more and less than it is. As 
Nieder continues from above (emphasis mine): 
 
The brain, however, needs to decipher a presented number within a single 
trial. To cope with noisy discharge patterns, it must take the activity of a 
population of other tuned neurons into account. The important information 
in a population code is thus the relative, rather than the absolute, amounts 
of activity in different neurons. Just like a democratic election involves many 
voters, the coding of a particular number may involve many neurons, and 
the signal of each number neuron represents an independent vote for a 
specific number. (2016, 371) 
 
What Nieder is illustrating here is that since the representational content of 
individual neurons is simply whatever fact about the world they’re tuned to (see 
deCharmes and Zador 2000), whenever a neuron tuned to number n discharges, 
that is taken to represent the magnitude of n. However, crucially, the AMR content 
that guides behaviour involving n will not only be comprised of neurons whose 
activation represents n, but also neurons whose activation represents magnitudes 
greater than n and less than n. Thus, while this content represents the magnitude of 
“n” as n, it also represents it as more than and less than n. In this manner we can 
understand the fundamental misrepresentation inherent in the analogue 
representations of numerical magnitude. This content “approximates” the 
magnitude of n by representing it as n, but also to a lesser extent n+1, n-1, and so 
forth. Therefore, as this content always misrepresents the magnitude of n as being 
both greater than and less than n, beliefs that have content determined by these 
analogue representations will be false. 
Before continuing, I want to briefly address two potential worries: (1) Why 
don’t we just say that the behaviour-guiding content is determined only by neurons 




don’t represent specific magnitudes, only activation distributions do? The answer to 
(1) is simply that, as discussed at length above, doing so leaves us unable to 
explain behavioural observations like Weber’s law. Based on our behaviour, it is 
clear that the AMR content that guides magnitude comparison tasks, etc., includes 
the entire set of active neurons on the neural number line, not just the one that is 
most active. The answer to (2) is that taking this stand would be to reject the notion 
of neural representation entirely. While the exact nature of neural representation is 
not widely agreed upon, it widely accepted that individual neurons do have their 
own representational content (for a review see Vilarroya 2017).  
In the end, due to the biased, noisy, and approximate nature of neural 
analogue for numerical magnitude, we can understand that these representations 
are inherently inaccurate. Of course, the fact that analogue representations of 
numerical magnitude are inaccurate provides a case for factivoid knowledge only if 
our beliefs contain AMR content. At first glance, beliefs involving vague predicates 
(e.g. “tall” or “approximately 100”) seem like a promising avenue, as this is within 
philosophical precedent. For example, Gemel & Quinon maintain that analogue 
representations of numerical magnitude provide “the correct semantics for exact 
natural numbers, especially when used as vague quantifiers” (2015, 91). However, 
vague predicates turn out to be a bit of a dead end, as it’s not obvious that AMR in 
these cases actually misrepresents vague predicates. It’s not clear, for example, 
that when we misrepresent S’s height this means that we also misrepresent that S is 
tall. This I think is a complex and interesting question, as I indicate in §5. However, 
for the purposes of this specific argument, the better option is to look for beliefs 
with more obviously misrepresentative content. In order to do this, I want to start 
from the behavioural level, focusing on the behaviour that is guided by analogue 
representations of numerical magnitude. After identifying this behaviour, we might 
ask what beliefs we attribute on the basis of this behaviour, whether these beliefs 
are false, and whether these beliefs are known. 
As already discussed above, because they follow Weber’s law, it is widely 
accepted that numerical magnitude discrimination tasks utilize analogue 
representations. Moreover, there is compelling evidence suggesting that both 
symbolic and non-symbolic arithmetic tasks are also supported by analogue 
representations. Neuroimaging suggests that the neural substrates of AMR are 
shared by those of arithmetic (see Knops & Willmes 2014) and, behavioural 
observation from developmental psychology indicates that development of 
numerical AMR correlates with acuity in arithmetical tasks (Halberda et al. 
2008/2012; Piazza et al. 2010; Lyons & Beilock 2011). In short, we can safely 
assume that our behaviour in both numerical discrimination and arithmetical tasks 
are guided by analogue representations of numerical magnitude. 
Rather than focusing on the beliefs we might attribute on the basis of these 
behaviours, I want to skip directly to associated knowledge attributions. The reason 
for this is that language is limited in its ability to describe these beliefs, and it’s 
easier to get to them if we start with knowledge attributions and work backwards. 
Under standard, everyday conditions in which S displays a reliable ability to make 
numerical judgements guided by AMRs, it is ordinary practice to attribute to S 
knowledge of the magnitudes involved. For example, if S judges that n is less than 




magnitude of n is, or (iii) S knows that the magnitude of n is “n.” However, a 
complication arises for these knowledge attributions when we consider that our 
representations of numerical magnitudes are inaccurate. This means that “n,” S’s 
analogue representation of the magnitude of n, slightly misrepresents the 
magnitude of n. Taking the definite description “the magnitude of n” to refer to 
the actual magnitude of n, and ““n”” to refer to S’s internal representation of the 
magnitude of n, this means that S’s belief that the magnitude of n is “n” is false. 
Again, this is because S does not possess a perfectly accurate representation of the 
magnitude of n. This means that on a factive account of knowledge, S cannot know 
what the magnitudes of numbers are.91  
It is my contention that, even when we note that our representations of 
numerical magnitude are biased, noisy, and approximate, we still judge that we can 
have knowledge of numerical magnitudes. After all, these representations still meet 
the output requirements for the cognitive process that produces them. As 
mentioned above, these representations still retain the interrelations of the 
magnitudes they represent, and are sufficiently accurate to guide reliable 
judgements (at least for relatively small numbers92). Here we have another case in 
which it is only through empirical research that we might even realize that these 
representations are systematically misrepresentative. Taking this all into account, I 
don’t think the experimental evidence presented here changes our intuitive 
judgements that we have plenty of knowledge about the magnitudes of numbers. 
However, again I recognize that this judgement might not be entirely universal, in 
which case we might again appeal to the ever-growing skeptical problem 
associated with the factivity of knowledge. From previous chapters and §2, we 
might note that retaining factivity means conceding that we don’t ordinarily know 
where objects are in our visual field, how large those objects are, how they are 
orientated. Now, we can see this also means conceding that we don’t know what 
the magnitudes of numbers are. Accordingly, assuming we wish to avoid the 
skeptical conclusion, we must adopt a factivoid theory of knowledge, as discussed 
in the previous chapter. 
In this subsection, I’ve detailed evidence for the analogue representation of 
numerical magnitude, the properties of these representations, and the 
epistemological implications of these properties. Crucially, we observed that these 
representations are biased, noisy, and approximate, all features that contribute to 
systematic misrepresentation of numerical magnitude. However, we might also 
observe there are knowledge attributions associated with the behaviour guided by 
this content. Ordinarily, we want to say that S knows what the magnitudes of 
numbers are. This means that in order to preserve this attributive practice and 
avoid a skeptical result for knowledge of numerical magnitude, we need to adopt a 




91 I should note here that, as discussed above, there is also evidence for a second cognitive system 
used to represent magnitudes 1-4. Thus, we must restrict the domain of this conclusion to magnitudes 
greater than 4. 
92 Our representation of the magnitudes of large numbers (>100,000) might be inaccurate enough 






4.3 Temporal Magnitude 
 
I want to finish my discussion of AMR by saying a bit on the representation of 
temporal magnitude. Rather that discussing it with same depth I did with numerical 
magnitude, here I only want to highlight two empirical points: (1) Representations 
of temporal magnitude appear to largely share the same mechanisms as 
representations of numerical magnitude, and (2) the representations are not 
perfectly accurate. On this basis, we might argue along the familiar lines that much 
of our knowledge involving temporal magnitudes can only be accommodated by a 
factivoid account of knowledge. 
In a widely cited 2003 paper, Walsh proposes that “time, space and quantity 
are part of a generalized magnitude system” (483). He writes: 
 
It is the purpose of this paper to bring together, as A Theory Of Magnitude 
(ATOM), disparate literatures on time, space and number, and to show 
similarities between these three domains that are indicative of common 
processing mechanisms, rooted in our need for information about the spatial 
and temporal structure of the external world. (ibid, 483) 
 
Here I will specifically focus on the unifying framework for numerical and temporal 
magnitude representation. While Walsh also based his proposal on both 
neuropsychological and neurophysiological evidence, neuroimaging is most 
relevant for linking time and number. Walsh cites multiple studies that indicate 
common neural substrates for the processing of numbers and time (Chochon et al. 
1999; Dehaene et al. 1999; Rao et al. 2001; Piazza et al. 2002). While the extent to 
which these neural correlates overlap is still not agreed upon, it is recognized that 
there is at least some shared cognitive resources between numerical and temporal 
magnitude processing (Bueti & Walsh 2009; Skagerlund et al. 2016). 
Beyond this, there is also a wide body of evidence that suggest that 
temporal magnitude is represented spatially in general (see Leone et al. 2018, §1), 
as well as specifically in a “mental time line” (Bonato et al. 2012; Di Bono et al. 
2012; Marin et al. 2016). This of course we might compare with “mental number 
line” discussed in §4.2. Finally, there is a good deal of behavioural evidence 
demonstrating “interference” between representations of temporal and numerical 
magnitude, on which the processing of one impacts or “interferes” with the 
processing of the other. One representative study by Xuan et al. found that “stimuli 
with larger magnitudes in these nontemporal dimensions were judged to be 
temporally longer” (2007, 1). This means, for example, one might judge the 
duration of a presentation of a stimulus of 10 dots to be longer than that of a 
stimulus of 5 dots, presented for an equal duration. Similar results have been 
reported by a number of subsequent studies (Oliveri et al. 2008; Vicario et al. 2008; 
Chang et al. 2011; Hayashi et al. 2013). All this suggests that temporal magnitude 
is represented very similarly to numerical magnitude. 
In addition to the general suspicion we might have regarding the accuracy 




neurocognitive mechanisms with the biased, noisy, and approximate, 
representation of numerical magnitude—we might also note there is also more 
direct evidence that these representations are inaccurate. Most significantly, these 
representations are biased in a very specific way: 
 
The relative inaccuracy of temporal judgements in the visual modality 
appears not simply to comprise greater variance about an accurate mean; 
rather, a consistent bias has been observed, often expressed as “sounds 
seem longer than lights”. (Resta et al. 2016, 101) 
 
Here Resta et al. are referring specifically to findings of Wearden et al., who 
observed not only that, as we would expect from noisy representations, 
judgements about temporal magnitude were randomly variable, but also that 
“representations ran faster for auditory than for visual stimuli” (1998, 97). That is, 
participants consistently judged the same temporal magnitudes to be greater if it 
was indicated by an auditory stimulus than if it was indicated by a visual stimulus. 
This sort of bias in the representation of temporal magnitude was well established 
by the time of the Wearden et al. paper (Goldstone et al. 1959a/b; Behar & Bevan 
1961; for a review see Goldstone & Lhamon 1972). In short, we might safely 
conclude that our representations of temporal magnitude are not perfectly 
accurate. 
As evidence for the inaccuracy of these representations come from 
behavioural studies involving direct judgements of the duration of time, we might 
also conclude that these inaccurate representations are what guide our judgements 
about temporal magnitude. From here, we might make the same sort of argument 
against factivity I made in more detail with respect to the inaccurate 
representations of numerical magnitude. This time, we might note that on the basis 
of judgements about durations of time, we might attribution beliefs to S about how 
long that duration was. If S’s beliefs are sufficiently accurate, successfully guiding 
behaviour and so forth, we might also judge that these beliefs are known: S knows 
how long that event lasted, etc. However, we can only preserve these knowledge-
attributing practices under a factivoid account of knowledge. Again we find another 




5. Future Generalization 
 
The instances of knowledge this project has focused on have all been what we 
might call “low-level,” in that they involve belief content that is to a significant 
extent inaccessible. This inaccessibility is reflected in the natural language 
sentences we use in the attempt to describe this knowledge. S knows that the 
object is there; S knows the size of object O; S knows what the magnitude of 
number n is, etc. S cannot access much of the mental content that constitutes this 
knowledge, and therefore we must attribute that knowledge to her in this vague 
sort of way. Accordingly, we can imagine that the philosopher with a bit of 




knowledge, write off the category of “low-level” knowledge entirely. They might 
argue that the skeptical conclusion in this case is quite acceptable, as “low-level” 
knowledge is largely incommunicable from person to person, and therefore not 
what we normally think of when we first take inventory of our ordinary knowledge.  
For the purposes of this project, I have simply assumed that any even 
moderately skeptical result should be avoided. Accordingly, if one is willing to 
accept that we ordinarily don’t have knowledge of the spatial properties of objects 
in our visual field, numerical magnitude, etc., this is sufficient to block the argument 
I’ve presented in favour of factivoid knowledge. However, here I want to at least 
briefly consider how we might go about generalizing my argument further, so that 
it also includes “high-level” knowledge, which involves more accessible content. 
This means addressing questions like:  
 
(1) If S doesn’t know where the cup is, does S know that the cup is on the 
table? 
 
(2) If S doesn’t know the magnitude of 2, does S know that 2+2=4? 
 
To be clear, I don’t have a good answer for these types of question, and here I 
won’t attempt to provide one. However, here I at least want to point out that 
questions like (1) are a bit misleading, as our representations of the qualitative 
spatial relations of objects are distinct from the quantitative representation of their 
location (see Laeng et al. 2003). That is, the content of our belief that object X is in 
qualitative spatial relation R with object Y is not computed by “taking the 
quantitative representation and making it coarser” (Laeng 2014, 41). Thus, to 
determine whether there is any misrepresentation in the content of these beliefs, 
we more or less need to start from scratch. We might contrast this with (2). As 
discussed in the previous section, arithmetic is guided by analogue representations 
of magnitude. Ultimately, in either case, this is a matter for future research, and in 
this way we might understand that the full extent to which this project generalized 













In this project, I have argued against the factivity of knowledge and developed the 
non-factive analysis of knowledge, largely on the basis of empirical findings. Taking 
a step back from this endeavour, I think the most important lesson to take away 
here is not anything specifically to do with the factivity of knowledge. Rather, I think 
the most important contribution of this project is its demonstration of the profound 
role empirical findings can play in the analysis of knowledge. Without research into 
planning noise (and “Two Visual Systems,” and foveal bias, and AMR, etc.) there 
simply is no argument against factivity, and therefore no reason for the factivoid 
analysis of knowledge. Moreover, if we hold a few key epistemological assumptions 
fixed, we might note that whether knowledge is factive reduces to an empirical 
question. Of course, the fact that it no longer seems like knowledge is factive is 
itself a very significant finding. But as I have argued here, this might be easily 
accommodated by standard epistemology. However, the fact we reach this 
conclusion on largely empirical grounds highlights just how valuable this research 
can be, even for the most fundamental, seemingly a priori programmes of 
epistemology. What also strikes me is that all this research was conducted entirely 
independently of epistemological concerns, and I hesitate to imagine the impact 
cognitive-neuroscientific methods deployed in the service of epistemology. In the 
end, the future looks especially bright for the continued and increasing use of 
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